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Nonaligned Movement Resolution on Gulf Crisis

LD0510101790 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0416 GMT 5 Oct 90

["Pool" item]

[Text] New York, October 4 (TANJUG)—The ministerial meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement ended in New York this evening after adopting a resolution on the Gulf crisis.

The ministers applauded the proposal of Yugoslav Foreign Minister Budmir Loncar, who chaired the meeting, that the conference adopt a resolution condemning Iraq and appealing to this country to withdraw its troops and enable the legitimate regime to return to Kuwait, and calling for political action to avoid further bloodshed.

Amid the applause, Palestinian Minister Faruq Qaddumi vehemently intervened negating the legality of the acclamation. Qaddumi strongly demanded that Iraq not be condemned "while troops which support the Zionist regime in the Middle East are in the Gulf."

The chairman politely but firmly silenced Qaddumi, but similar remarks followed from Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca and the Yemeni and Iraqi representatives.

In this resolution, which remains as a document of the meeting and the movement, the non-aligned foreign ministers underscore the inacceptability of the Iraqi aggression on Kuwait, proclaim the annexation null and void, and demand an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from the territory of Kuwait, the return of the legal Kuwaiti Government, and the release of all foreign citizens who are held in Iraq or Kuwait against their will, as it is also stated in the United Nations Security Council resolutions.

The document also expresses deep concern over the fate of the occupied Kuwaiti people and demands that Iraq permit the International Red Cross and United Nations secretary-general representatives to help the imperilled population in the occupied territories.

The ministers are seriously concerned over a possible escalation of the conflict which might lead to an armed intervention. In that sense, they authorize Yugoslavia, as chairman of the movement, to launch an action for finding a political solution. The chairman of the movement is also authorized to convey to the Iraqi leaders the movement's stands and to offer its services towards resolving the problem as recommended by Security Council Resolutions 660, 662 and 664.

Bucharest International Trade Fair Opens 13 Oct

AU1310151290 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1042 GMT 13 Oct 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 13/10/1990—Starting today, 13 October the 16th Bucharest International Fair (TIB) opens its gates to visitors. This important international economic and trade event hosted by Romania's capital takes advantage of the democratization of Romania's socio-political life and its opening to a free-market economy. A proof to that are the 500 manufacturing and exporting companies exhibiting their products in no less than 33 pavilions representing as many countries: Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Chile, the Republic of Korea, Cuba, Egypt, France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Libya, Norway, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, U.S.A., USSR, Yugoslavia and Romania. Noteworthy is the Republic of Korea's first participation with an official pavilion. This country has remarkably engaged itself in cooperation programmes for the Romanian market, a fact duly appreciated by the Romanian partners. Apart from those above, about one more hundred companies from 19 countries are being represented by individual stands. Many of them have been longstanding partners of Romanian manufacturing and export companies.

As for Romania, it is, like at the previous editions, the main exhibitor, around 80 foreign trade companies and manufacturers covering most of the branches of the national economy tender their products. A novelty at the TIB will be the over 100 private companies (travel agents, manufacturing and trading companies, small manufacturers, import-export companies etc.) that are here to contact either Romanian or foreign partners, to negotiate with them import-export trade agreements, in short, to do business.

The fair opened in the presence of Prime Minister Petre Roman, other Romanian officials, heads of diplomatic missions accredited to Bucharest, managers and representatives of foreign and local exhibitors. For nine days, TIB '90 will offer numerous experts and business people opportunities to extend and study in detail their economic relations with the Romanian market, to seek new contacts with Romanian partners, and make deals.

The organizers, the fairs and exhibitions enterprise, a subsidiary of the Romanian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, have created propitious conditions for the purpose: pavilions and outdoor exhibition facilities (totalling circa 100,000 sqm), negotiation rooms, conference and demonstration halls, film and slide projection rooms, stands for promotional activities. Many exhibitors as well as specialists and businessmen attracted to Bucharest by this economic and trade competition expect much better results from the present edition than from the previous ones now that the whole socio-political and economic life of Romania goes through an all-encompassing and deep-going democratization, restructuring and modernization process, apt to build a market economy.

Beron Hints at New 1991 Parliamentary Elections

AU1510192990 Sofia BTA in English 1903 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Sofia, 15 Oct (BTA)—The Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) [SDS] does not want to enter a program government with the Socialists. The UDF, however, would accept ministers of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) in a cabinet formed by it, the leader of the opposition, Dr Petur Beron, told journalists today. He hinted that after the elections for local administration, which would probably be held at the beginning of next year, there might be new parliamentary elections. "Many things can happen after the elections for local authorities," Dr. Beron said and underlined that the most prospect-holding strata of the population young people and intellectuals, were supporters of the opposition.

The opposition is satisfied that in the latest public opinion poll the UDF is far ahead the BSP. It considers this fact to be perfectly normal and not surprising at all. "People have realized that the Socialists lied to them," Dr. Beron pointed out.

The UDF has not decided yet whether to support the program of the one-party socialist government Premier Andrey Lukanov submitted to the Bulgarian parliament on October 10, 1990.

The opposition considers it to be an insidious and embarrassing fact that the program is very close to the views the UDF stated this spring and finds the program even more rigorous because of the worsening situation in Bulgaria, Dr. Beron said. "Have the Socialists realized only now that this is the way or they knew it all the time, but deliberately kept it a secret and went on destroying the Bulgarian economy to win the election?" Dr. Petur Beron asked. He said that both variants were equally embarrassing.

According to the leader of the opposition the three-hundred-day moratorium on mass political drives proposed by Mr. Lukanov is unrealistic. "Even if it is approved by parliament, the people won't accept it," he said. In his opinion it would be wiser to propose holding peaceful and quiet rallies.

Commenting on the conflict in DEMOKRATSIYA, the paper of the UDF (last week four journalists were sacked), Mr. Beron underlined that the differences there were of organizational and personal character, they were not of political nature.

BSP Elections Held for New Municipal Leadership

AU1510203490 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 14 Oct 90 p 2

[Report by Georgi Dimitrov, Galina Antonova, and Radka Petrova: "Bulgarian Socialist Party Municipal Conferences Held"]

[Excerpts] Veliko Turnovo, 13 Oct—The Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] Municipal Conference in Veliko Turnovo, although with a reduced number of staff attending, proceeded normally and reflected the local party members' striving for a change, for transforming the BSP into a modern, left-wing party based on democratic socialism. [passage omitted]

Milen Chakurov was elected chairman of the BSP Municipal Council in Veliko Turnovo.

Ruse, 13 October: The second session of the Municipal BSP Committee in Ruse proceeded in a spirit of self-criticism and profound analysis of the current processes in our country. [passage omitted]

Svetoslav Michev, former secretary was elected chairman of the Municipal BSP Committee. No chairman of the Municipal Control Committee was elected, as a result of the missing quorum.

Kurdzhali, 13 October: [passage omitted] The BSP Municipal Conference in Kurdzhali adopted a report on the future tasks of the municipal party organization and an accountability report of the financial-auditing commission. The structures and staff of the BSP Municipal Committee were determined. An appeal to Kurdzhali citizens was also read at the session. Stefan Stefanov was elected chairman of the Kurdzhali BSP Municipal Committee.

Zhelev Vows To Support Government's Program

AU1510203790 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 13 Oct 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Dr. Zhelev Meets Journalists"]

[Text] At last night's meeting with journalists, Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev, our country's president, declared his intention to support the government program which might be attacked by various parliamentary groups at the Grand National Assembly. He pointed out that the public must realize the necessity of making sacrifices in this difficult period for our country, and expressed confidence that the political forces and the mass media will not try to further escalate the already high level of social tension.

This was Dr. Zhelev's second informal meeting with leaders of the major dailies in the Red Salon of the Sofia "Bulgaria" Restaurant which was attended by our colleagues from BTA and the Bulgarian Radio. The meeting was hosted by the OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK editor in chief, Lyuben Genov.

National Interests Group Stresses Ethnic Issues

AU1510203290 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 14 Oct 90 p 2

[Khaskovo correspondent Vanyo Stoilov report: "Dimitur Arnaudov Promises Interpellation to the Prime Minister"]

[Text] Khaskovo, 13 Oct—Dimitur Arnaudov, chairman of the All-National Committee for the Defense of

National Interests, spoke at today's opening of a nationwide conference of the committee in Khaskovo today, which is expected to last two days. He stated the following: Our most important and still unfulfilled task is to convince the leaders of the political forces in Bulgaria that a political consensus on the nationality issue is required.

The delegates enthusiastically applauded his remark that every democracy is strictly national in the first place, before being anything else. They expressed their doubts that the country's leaders realize this fact.

As deputy to the Grand National Assembly, Dimitur Arnaudov promised that he will address a formal question to the prime minister, asking him why the government program devotes only one sentence to the nationality issue. Naturally, along with the ethnic problems, other aspects of the nationality issue should not be neglected, and the ethnic conflict should be resolved only in the broad context of the comprehensive economic and social policy.

The conference is expected to resolve several problems, some of which are rather difficult, such as the question of why numerous people in our country have a negative approach to the All-National Committee, to what extent it is politically isolated, and what policy it should adopt under the conditions of the country's current realities.

The opening of the conference was attended by representatives of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, the "Bulgaria" Association, the Bulgarian Socialist Party, and the "Rakovski" Bulgarian Officers League. Representatives of the Union of Democratic Forces did not appear at the opening, although they were mentioned in the preliminary program.

Foreign Minister Views Effects of Depolitization

AU1510152390 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 12 Oct 90 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Foreign Affairs Minister Lyuben Gotsev by Valeri Vasev, in Sofia; date not given: "De-Partyization Must Not Have Negative Effect"; first paragraph is NARODNA ARMIYA introduction]

[Text] The draft law on amendments and addenda to the Law on Political Parties has been adopted at first reading. There hardly is a member of the military who is not interested in the practical implementation of the law and its direct influence over the Bulgarian officers corps. During one of the recesses of the Grand National Assembly sessions, I succeeded in interviewing Lyuben Gotsev, chairman of the Committee on National Security.

[Vasev] Mr. Gotsev, what in your opinion, are the consequences of adopting the draft law on depoliticization of the Army, the Militia, the security organs, the courts and Chief Prosecutor's Office, and the ministry headed by you?

[Gotsev] The issue of "de-partyization," not depoliticization, has several dimensions: political, moral, psychological, and purely human. The people who have been affiliated with a certain party will probably find it very difficult to accept the decision of the Grand National Assembly. For some of them this is an issue of personal conviction, party-mindedness [partiynost], and traditions. There are some who have devoted their life to the cause of their party, have participated in the antifascist struggle, and have struggled for the party ideas. One should not assume that absolutely all of them will leave their party with pleasure.

[Vasev] At the Wednesday session [10 October] during the debate, one noticed a rather sharp change in the attitude of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] toward the draft law. What caused this change?

[Gotsev] It only seems so at first glance. It was a long and complex process. During the last two months this process underwent an internal development and all members of the BSP parliamentary group reacted to the issue of de-partyization in different ways. Even now there are people who are not convinced of the efficiency of the draft law, and this was reflected in the voting. Despite this hesitation, and having in mind the truth about the protection of the nationwide interests, the BSP parliamentary group adopted the decision that was required by the present development of the democratic process.

[Vasev] Is this a temporary decision?

[Gotsev] Undoubtedly, the law's term of validity will be limited, however, nobody could say how long it will be. This is a question that belongs to the future. In my opinion, the law will be valid until the adoption of the new constitution, where such things will be regulated. Perhaps the issue could be resolved even earlier, in a general law on the civil servants.

[Vasev] As chairman of the Commission on National Security, could you tell us whether the de-partyization will affect the country's security?

[Gotsev] It appears that according to the rules of the Grand National Assembly, the ministers cannot head or be even members of the permanent commissions, because they are in fact subordinated to the relevant Grand National Assembly commission. Subsequently I shall soon resign from the post of chairman of the Commission on National Security. I cannot answer your question precisely. The de-partyization will certainly affect certain departments. Let us hope that it will not be a long-lasting and negative effect; we must not allow this.

[Vasev] Nevertheless, if the depoliticization does not eliminate the personal political views of the people, why does the law have such a declarative character?

[Gotsev] I can only express my personal opinion on this matter—this is necessary at the present stage of the political reality. It will calm the public opinion and the members of the opposition and will reassure them that the employees of certain departments will not protect the interests of a single party. In addition, some people think that this will eliminate the BSP's leading role.

[Vasev] As a senior diplomat and now, leader of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, do you know how this issue stands in other countries?

[Gotsev] We conducted special research and I can tell you that there is an incredible variety of different cases. In some countries, such as Italy, the issue does not exist at all—it is your problem whether you are a member of a certain party. In other countries the membership of certain civil servants in political parties is firmly prohibited by the law. In yet other countries, as long as you are at work, you do not have the right to belong to any political party, however, after work you are free. The practice in the former socialist countries also varies. Some of them now adopt laws similar to ours. Thus, it is impossible to speak about world traditions in anything related to the depoliticization issue.

Large Economic Corporations Expected To Close

AU1510174290 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 12 Oct 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Bulgarplod, Vinprom, Bulgartabak, and Bulgarsko Pivo Expected To Disappear"]

[Text] A proposal on closing down the four economic trusts—Bulgarplod, Vinprom, Bulgartabak, and Bulgarsko Pivo—was prepared and submitted by the leadership of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry. This was announced by Lyubomir Draganov, deputy minister of agriculture and food industry, at a new conference with journalists specializing in agricultural subjects.

As far as the other economic trusts, such as "Fodder Grain," "Rodopa," and "Milk Industry," are concerned, the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry is planning to use the same measure at a later date. The ministry links their reorganization with the establishment of mechanisms likely to replace their present functions as balancing factors in dealing with foodstuffs.

Deputy Minister Draganov stated as follows: "Foreign companies are currently manifesting great interest in our food industry sector. Representatives of such companies have arrived for negotiations with ready-made projects. Foreign participation is not only likely to bring capital investments, but to stimulate competition."

The deputy minister further submitted some ideas on de-monopolization which is an absolutely necessary prerequisite for privatization in our major economic branches. The speaker also devoted attention to price liberalization without which the local monopolism could not be abolished. He advocates a flexible system of granting subsidies in agriculture aimed at further encouraging the producers' sense of responsibility.

Agriculture Minister Notes Delay in Fall Sowing

AU1210112990 Sofia VECHERNI NOVINI in Bulgarian 10 Oct 90 p 1

[Interview with Agriculture Minister Todor Pandov by Simeon Danevski; place and date not given: "Uncultivated Land Would Be a Disaster"; first two paragraphs are VECHERNI NOVINI introduction]

[Excerpts] Todor Pandov, minister of agriculture and food industry is confident that the autumn sowing will be completed within the schedules determined by agrometereological conditions. However, certain problems remain. We were alerted by a conversation overheard in the lobbies of the Grand National Assembly. Certain difficulties connected with the autumn sowing, especially in northern Bulgaria, but also in the Pleven and Veliko Turnovo areas, were mentioned in this connection. It was pointed out that numerous problems are seriously obstructing the work of the depleted ranks of cooperative farmers who are still courageously standing up, like lonely guards, against the vicissitudes of this crazy, unbearable, but interesting year 1990, which is already nearing its end.

The minister of agriculture and food industry somewhat calmed our worries. Nevertheless, his statement did not sound optimistic enough to let us drop the question altogether.

[Danevski] Do you have any misgivings related to this season's autumn sowing, such as being afraid that the land may remain uncropped?

[Pandov] No, this would be too farfetched. Numerous problems exist, of course, especially related to the supply of pesticides, but I am confident that they will be delivered as soon as possible. As usual, the crucial problem is the lack of hard currency, but we must provide for it. The sowing should take place within schedule, namely by 25 October 1990 at the latest. The shortage of fuel for the machine tools is also a problem.

[Danevski] We have been alerted about the farmers' unwillingness to cultivate the land as long as the new law is still delayed at the Grand National Assembly. Could you explain this argument?

[Pandov] It cannot be true. As a matter of fact, the preparation of an acceptable law on the land is still delayed for certain reasons. However, should this mean that the land must remain uncropped? If we should let this happen, it would be disastrous for all of us. The land

will be cultivated by its former owners—the members of labor cooperative agricultural farms. They must sow it, fertilize it, and take care of everything. If the law should be ready in the meantime and if it should be decided to restore the land to its former owners instead of to those who are cultivating it, as some political forces demand, then it can be restored and cultivated. Nevertheless, this is not likely to happen before spring 1990.

[Danveski] How is the autumn sowing campaign proceeding?

[Pandov] There is a certain delay, but it could be overcome. Approximately 15 million decares of land should be sown with autumn crops, such as wheat, barley, and rye. [passage omitted]

[Danevski] Could you describe some other important tasks awaiting your ministry?

[Pandov] They are closely linked with the harvest. There are still some vegetables and fruit which have not been collected, and the same applies to some autumn crops, such as corn, which remained in the fields. Work should be speeded up, considering that the autumn seems to be rapidly approaching. [passage omitted]

There is even more: We have been alerted that certain collective farms and private farmers are withholding their products in order to sell them at the most profitable time possible. They just try to prevent their goods from reaching the domestic market. Such actions may be justified to a certain extent, but there is also a moral aspect to the question. Taking into consideration the desolate state of our market, the shortage of numerous foodstuffs and goods in the stores, such actions are really unpardonable. The Council of Ministers has adopted a decision to ban the export of nearly all agricultural products, especially of those in short supply on the market.

Interior Minister Reports on Black Market Fight

AU1510210990 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 14 Oct 90 p 1

[Plamen Enchev report: "Minister Penev's News Conference"]

[Text] Yesterday you could hardly find a black marketeer or illegal tradesman at the "Moskva" Park Hotel. Pencho Penev, minister of internal affairs, held a news conference in one of the hotel lobbies, which was televised live on Bulgarian Television. Representatives of the People's Militia Directorate, the customs authorities, and the Ministry of Trade and Public Services also participated in the news conference.

Minister Pencho Penev dealt with the role of the recently adopted Law on Combating Black Market and Illegal Trade. After explaining the reasons for the law he declared that it is an unusual but necessary measure, and that the public should be involved in the struggle against illegal trade.

A system of incentives for employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs who have distinguished themselves in the struggle against crime and against illegal trade, in particular, is to be submitted within the next month or month and a half. This measure, along with the skills of the people working in the law and order organs, should represent a guarantee against possible corruption, Minister Penev pointed out in answering journalists' questions.

Dimitur Vangelov, chief of the "Economic Militia" Department, declared that his department is pursuing its work on the channels of illegal trade. He expressed the wish that the law might soon become unnecessary under the future conditions of a market economy.

Todor Tsvetkov, deputy chief of the Chief Customs Administration with the Ministry of Finance, stated that the journalists' assistance is required in the efforts to reach the so-called mafia bosses. At the initiative of the SOFIYSKI VESTNIK, an initiative of "Journalists Against Illegal Trade" has already been established and is supported by numerous mass media.

The three ministries—namely the Minstry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Trade and Public Services—are resolved to pursue their coordinated efforts in combating illegal trade. Organized groups of Polish citizens and Bulgarian gypsies, operating on our country's territory, have already been unmasked.

Legal Expert Analyzes Rising Crime Rate

AU1210110990 Sofia MLADEZH in Bulgarian 10 Oct 90 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Dimitur Kyumyurdzhiev, expert from the Criminological Research Council under the Chief Prosecutor's Office, by Marin Todorov; place and date not given: "We Have Reached the Brink of the Abyss"]

[Excerpts] [Todorov] Crime has acquired dangerous proportions in our country. This is clear from the people's increasing concern and from the numerous materials on the subject published in the media. Under the conditions of the current economic, political, and moral crisis, unsuspected passions and vices that go beyond the norms of a democratic civic society have emerged and are expanding. Which dogmas and cliches should be renounced in examining such an important phenomenon as crime?

[Kyumyurdzhiev] Such analyses have always pursued a single goal, namely of keeping crime under control and mitigating its harmful consequences. Over many years criminology in our country was subject to Marxist-Leninist methodology. It involved categorical conclusions, such as the argument that the application of dialectical-materialistic methods is a sine qua non for the development of criminology and that crime cannot be

analyzed without such methods. [passage omitted] Naturally, such theories never produced any practical results.

[Todorov] Are the specialists capable of indicating the reasons and conditions for the deteriorating crime situation in our country?

[Kyumyurdzhiev] Yes. Over many years we invented reasons and arguments for the existence of crime in our country by attributing it to various stages of development in "socialist society." Instead of renouncing such "ideological tricks" (as the German criminologist Kayser quite appropriately defined them) and instead of focusing our attention upon real problems such as migration, alienation, disintegration of family life, and the growth of the population—namely, social disorientation, generally speaking—we described imaginary reasons, such as primary and secondary causes, internal causes, organizational conditions, and so forth. If you open the textbooks of the past, you will read that crime as a real social phenomenon in social life is attributed to ..."hostile political, economic (!), and ideological activities of the imperialist states, to overt and secret hostile acts of the overthrown classes, and to the surviving individualist, capitalist consciousness, bourgeois social habits and traditions..."

Would it not be better to examine the real factors that motivate the crimes of young people in our country today—such as their alienation from society, or the lack of legal means for satisfying their demands under the current "economy of shortages?" Last but not least, we should stop trying to struggle to eliminate crime completely. Special statistical data unequivocally show that we lost this struggle long ago. Let us try to restrict crime to a normal, tolerable limit, something which the authorities in all civilized countries are somewhat more successfully trying to do.

It is not necessary to be a specialist in order to establish the connection between the country's instability and the increase of several forms of crime resulting from the transition to a market economy. It is high time to sound the alarm, because we have reached the brink of the abyss and the results are unpredictable.

[Todorov] You do not mention anything about economic crimes. Is there any reason for optimism in this respect?

[Kyumyurdzhiev] This question is more complicated. At a first glance the available data could mislead us, considering that the number of crimes in 1990 was less than that in the same period in 1989. However, this is only the first impression. It is so because the totalitarian economy of 1989 differes essentially, or at least significantly, from the transition to a market economy, which characterizes 1990. This is also reflected in economic crime; a restructuring of economic crime can be established. [passage omitted]

At the same time, in examining the statistics, we should not forget that in the process of the transition to a market economy, the privatization of real property, and the development of shareholder forms of ownership, some kind of new "non-traditional" forms of crime are expected to develop in our country, which are unknown to our public, but whose implications are significant. I am talking about crimes that are typical of a market economy such as tax evasion, forged bankruptcy, monopolistic price setting, various forms of abusing the confidence of the executive councils, and many other such offenses which are not provided for in our Penal Code because of the legislators' passive attitude. The "social price" that our public will have to pay as a result of crime depends, above all, on our capacity to examine these phenomena unhindered by ideolgical prejudice.

Bank Head Suspected of Stealing Foreign Currency

AU1610093790 Sofia BTA in English 0847 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] Sofia, 16 Oct (BTA)—Dollars, Deutsche marks, Austrian shillings—foreign currency amounting to about 100,000 dollars' worth has been stolen from the branch of the Bulgarian National Bank in the town of Trun near the country's western border.

The main suspect is Georgi Krumov, director of the branch, who on Saturday morning [13 October] left for Yugoslavia.

The theft was discovered yesterday. According to the director of the regional police department, the bank was robbed on the night of Friday to Saturday, most probably on Friday. The alarm system was intact, no doors or windows were broken. The latchkeys, with which the cash boxes were opened, were found in the locks. It has not been established yet whether they were forged, it is more likely that the original ones were used. There are fingerprints on which dactyloscopy experts are working.

Only the director of the bank and the booking-clerk knew the code by which the armored door could be opened. On Friday the director let the bank clerks go at about 16:00 hrs. and was alone in the bank. The alarm system was switched on at about 17:30 hrs., the watchman came, too. A little later Krumov left the building.

People close to Krumov, who has recently divorced, say that he has a girl-friend in Italy and that he was going to visit her.

It is also known he has tried to cross the western border on Friday night, but for reasons which are not known for the time being, he was not allowed to do it at the Strezimirovtsi checkpoint.

POGLED Interviews Zhivkov's Defense Lawyer

AU1510130790 Sofia BTA in English 1000 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Sofia, 15 Oct (BTA)—The Todor Zhivkov case records consist of 106 files and getting familiar with the evidentiary material is an uphill task, says Ms. Reni Tsanova, the ousted dictator's defense lawyer, in an interview for the "POGLED" weekly. Further investigative proceedings are under way now in connection with the objections of the defense, and Ms. Tsanova believes that any tendentious delay of the case is out of the question. "No one has prevented me from doing my duties, all my technical and professional requests have been complied with, and I haven't noticed any bias in the conduct of the investigation, either," Zhivkov's defense lawyer says.

The preliminary investigation against Todor Zhivkov was initiated in January 1990. He was charged with incitement of ethnic hostility and hatred, with gross misappropriation of public property and with gross malfeasance. Later on, the Prosecutor General's Office added to the charge sheet design and construction of projects and settlements, conclusion of economic agreements with other states, reorganizations in the country's economic system which inflicted serious damage on the state and the economy. In July the investigative material was made entirely available to the accused and his defense.

"Our general objection is that none of the charges against Zhivkov has been proved. We advance circumstances on the strength of which the case can be dismissed and no committal proceedings can be filed for," Ms. Reni Tsanova observes.

The lawyer tells that at times Zhivkov is inclined to recall episodes from the history of the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] and the country but he has no sense of guilt because the decisions have been taken collectively.

At present, Zhivkov is under house arrest. He lives together with his granddaughter's family because he has no home of his own.

Zhelev Congragulates Gorbachev on Nobel Prize

AU1510190690 Sofia BTA in English 1839 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Sofia, 15 Oct (BTA)—The president of Bulgaria, Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev, has sent a cable to Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev, president of the USSR, congratulating him on having being awarded the 1990 Nobel Peace Prize.

It is a well-deserved reward for your extraordinary contribution to the dismantling of the totalitarian system and the assertion of the democratic process in the Soviet Union and East European countries, for the creation of a new political climate in Europe and the world in which peace and cooperation among all peoples are the most cherished values, it is said in the cable.

Receives USSR Envoy Sharapov

AU1510152790 Sofia BTA in English 1514 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Sofia, 15 Oct (BTA)—The president of Bulgaria, Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev, received Mr. Viktor Sharapov, ambassador extraordinary and envoy plenipotentiary of the USSR, at request of the latter. They discussed some problems related to the condition and the development of Bulgaro-Soviet relations at the new stage the two countries are entering upon on their road to democracy. The two sides shared the opinion that all positive things in the two countries' relations should be preserved and advanced further on the basis of mutual interest and complete respect for their national sovereignty. The conviction was expressed that the future summit level meetings will affirm the new-in-principle character of Bulgaro-Soviet relations.

Bulgarian Democratic Party To Be Formed in Serbia

AU1510201890 Sofia BTA in English 1911 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Belgrade, 15 Oct (BTA correspondent)—By the end of October a constituent meeting of the Democratic Party of the Bulgarians in Serbia will be held in Nis. The initiative for setting up the party was launched by representatives of the Bulgarian minority in Serbia—intellectuals mainly, the BRATSTVO (Fraternity) weekly, which is published in Bulgarian in Nis, has announced.

There are several tens of thousands of Bulgarians in Serbia. They live mainly in the south Moravian area and their status has been recognized to be that of a minority, while, if one is to believe to the census taken in the last decades, there are no Bulgarians in the other Yugoslav republics, Macedonia included.

Prof. Prokopi Popov, one of the members of the initiative committee, gives more details about the new party in the NIN weekly which is published in Belgrade. "The Democratic Party of the Bulgarians in Yugoslavia will act at a level of municipalities, in those municipalities which are populated by large masses of Bulgarians—Dimitrovgrad, Bosilegrad, Surdulica and Babusnica. It will fight for the defeat and the elimination of the bureaucratic forces which have hindered the economic progress of the municipalities," Prof. Popov states. He expresses satisfaction with the situation of the Bulgarian minority in Serbia, supports all measures taken by Serbia in Kosovo and sides with the Serbians in Croatia.

"As a great number of Bulgarians live in Macedonia, we will fight for our compatriots there being granted the same rights the Bulgarian minority in Serbia has, Prof. Popov states.

Communist Party Argues Over Property Estimates

AU1510150790 Prague CTK in English 1757 GMT 11 Oct 90

[Text] Prague Oct 11 (CTK)—More than 15,000 new members have joined the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia since last November 17, more than the average of the last ten years, a representative of the party told journalists here today.

Chairman of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia Jiri Machalik estimated the number of communists at 500,000 in the Czech Republic and at 180,000-200,000 in the smaller Slovak Republic.

The party had some 1.7 million members before last November 17.

He announced the stand of the party's Executive Committee on what he described as a "situation which arose by an intentional use of quotes taken out of context from a speech of First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Vasil Mohorita" last weekend. Mohorita was quoted in the press as saying that the blueprint for economic reform in Czechoslovakia meant "an end to national understanding and the beginning of a tough and uncompromising struggle." Machalik said that the party has not been the first to say that the period of national understanding has ended. He remarked that such words as "tough and uncompromising struggle" should not belong to the vocabulary of political parties and movements and political and constitutional representatives.

Machalik also commented on moves to approve legislation on taking away property from the Communist Party. A draft law on the expropriation of Communist Property gained before last May was discussed by the government today. A government spokesman said that this intention was meeting public demands that all political parties have the same chances for their activities.

Machalik argued against an assessment by control bodies that the party's property exceeded 5,000 million korunas. He said that on 31 August the party had a property of 2,260 million and that it has since continued turning over property to the state. He also presented the party's idea of a minimum required for its activity cars, offices, equipment and other property worth some 1 million korunas in each district (over 120 in Czechoslovakia) and 50 million for the Central Committee.

Law Pending on Communist Property Expropriation

AU1510150890 Prague CTK in English 1256 GMT 11 Oct 90

[Text] Prague Oct 11 (CTK)—The property of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia will be expropriated without compensation after the respective constitutional bill, to be quickly presented by the Czechoslovak Government to the federal parliament, is passed, the government decided today, according to information obtained by CTK from the government Presidium's office.

The party will thus be deprived of the property it gained unjustly and which gives it advantages over the other political parties and movements which is at variance with democratic principles.

According to Czech Minister of State Control Bohumil Tichy, the total of party's movable and immovable assets was worth 7,512 million korunas as of 30 April 1990. According to party sources, the property was worth 2,055 million korunas.

Minister Tichy said that over the past 20 years (1969-1989), the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia received from the state subsidies worth 5,200 million korunas. Moreover, the party and some functionaries received additional subsidies and enjoyed various financial and taxation reliefs.

After an extensive campaign waged by the Czech and Slovak public and initiated by the Civic Forum in the Prague CKD Polovodice (semi-conductors) engineering works in Prague, the Presidium of the Federal Assembly decided last May to ban this and other parties and organizations active under the communist regime (toppled in November 1989) from transferring their movable and immovable assets.

Though such transfers could be carried out only under permission by the Czech Ministry of Finance, the Czech Ministry of State Control found that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia manipulated with its property in contravention of the legal measure of the parliament's Presidium.

The campaign around the party's property resurged after the broadly criticized statement by Party First Secretary Vasil Mohorita of October 5 that the period of national understanding is over and a period of hard and uncompromising struggle starts. Even some Communist Party officials have dissociated themselves from the statement.

Korinkova on Expropriation of Communist Property

LD1510192990 Prague CTK in English 1440 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Prague Oct 15 (CTK) - Kvetoslava Korinkova, the Czechoslovak minister of control, told journalists here today that the only just way how to tackle the issue of the property of the Communist Party is to dispossess it through a constitutional law.

According to Federal Government spokesman Zbynek Fiala a constitutional law on the expropriation of the Communist Party property, has been drafted already and is going to be submitted to the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly (parliament) immediately.

Korinkova added that Czechoslovakia proceeds in a different way than other East European countries, where the property of political parties, movements and civic associations is not particularly controlled. She said that similar steps are likely to be considered there, too. Of 12,300 million crowns which were at the party's disposal by December 31, 1989, it has 2,600 million at present. The expropriated property will be used by central bodies of the federation and by the republic governments. As it was gained above all from the federal budget it will be returned to Czechoslovakia's people, i.e. it will be granted to the health service, education system and culture. It will be also used for rehabilitations and financial damages to the persons unjustly persecuted by the former communist regime.

Federal Government Holds Meeting in Prague

LD1110222190 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1730 GMT 11 Oct 90

[Text] The Federal Government held a regular meeting in Prague today. Here is a report on the results of the session by Barbara Tacheci and Oldrich Sestak:

[Tacheci] The Federal Government today approved the conclusions reached by the Financial Council at its meeting on Monday in Bratislava. We have already been informed of the details, so let me just report very concisely what Minister [of Finance] Vaclav Klaus had to say at the news conference. In view of the unfavorable development of the Czechoslovak economy this year and the intention to maintain a surplus state budget, the Financial Council decided to abolish state subsidies for individual and cooperative housing construction. All three ministers of finance also agreed on the basic features of budgetary management for next year, and on the division of powers between the federation and the republics in finance and currency policy. Agreement was also reached on the organization of the central banking system.

Federal Minister [of the economy] Vladimir Dlouhy reported at the news conference on another document approved by the Federal Government today: a draft concept for state structural policy. Minister Dlouhy described it as a key document which redefines the role of the Federal Ministry of the Economy following the abolition of the system of central planning. The government strategy in its structural policy will be a path of clear priorities. In practice this means that in the period to come the government will support only promising and essential spheres and projects, such as the construction of oil pipelines, the motorway network, and the communications system, while the so-called contraction programs will be exposed to the effect of the market, which will itself decide on their future. Thus, for example, from next year subsidies to the Niklove Hute [nickel metallurgy] and Kovohute [metal metallurgy] Krompachy enterprises and a series of other inefficient plants will be abolished.

[Sestak] Minister Vladimir Dlouhy then reported on specific details of economic reform in the agriculture and food complex. Property rights with respect to land are to be reviewed, and the bill is currently being finalized. A market regulation fund is to be set up, with the aim of providing for state intervention in agriculture. Prices will be guaranteed in four product ranges, and 7.7 billion korunas will be allocated from the state budget for this purpose next year. Further, in its proceedings the government rejected a proposal to reduce the taxes on agricultural enterprises from 50 to 25 percent.

The news conference also dealt, of course, with today's government-sponsored bill on expropriation of the property of the Communist Party without compensation—property which is obtained unjustly and which gave it an advantage over other political parties and movements. On this subject, press spokesman Zbynek Fiala said that up to the end of last year, the Czechoslovak Communist Party [CPCZ] had property worth more than 12 billion korunas, which was gradually reduced to 5.5 billion korunas, but this, of course, refers to quantifiable property, because otherwise it is much greater. In addition, a number of discrepancies were found with respect to its transfers, with not entirely above-board transactions taking place, and so forth. Thus, this is an absolutely essential step. The bill on the CPCZ's property is to be worked out by Minister [without Portfolio] Kvetoslava Korinkova, and we should know the details at the beginning of next week.

Also on the list of questions and answers was the oil situation, and from Minister Vladimir Dlouhy's response I have selected the comment that a specific proposal for further steps, which is being discussed by the crisis team, is to be presented by tomorrow afternoon. The Federal Government itself did not have this problem on its agenda today. However, I would like to draw attention to two of the items which it did discuss. It approved a bill on inventions, industrial designs and innovations, and a bill amending the Federal Government regulation on the obligatory deposit [povinna ulozka] when beginning building projects during the current year. This obligation is abolished with respect to environmental investment programs.

Report on 1 Oct Proceedings in Parliament

AU1110123790 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 2 Oct 90 pp 1, 2

[Alena Slezakova report: "Deputies' Interpellations; Law on Restitution on the Agenda of Today's Joint Meeting of Federal Assembly Chambers"]

[Text] The sixth joint meeting of the Federal Assembly's People's Chamber and Chamber of Nations, which was adjourned on 20 September, continued yesterday with deputies' interpellations, suggestions, and comments. In the morning and during the lunch break, intensive talks were conducted in the Federal Assembly Presidium, in

some Federal Assembly committees, among representatives of clubs of deputies, and within the clubs themselves about the two other items on the agenda: The bill on mitigating the consequences of some property wrongs (restitution law) and the bill on state awards.

These intensive discussions on the two drafts were prompted by the fact that a number of objections of principle and proposals for substantial changes were raised in the parliamentary committees. The possibility was even considered of once again adjourning the joint meeting. Finally, the decision was made to continue the joint meeting today with the resitution law as the first item on the agenda.

After the meeting opened, Premier Marian Calfa was the first to take the floor to reply to an interpellation from Deputy Dana Nemcova (Civic Forum) concerning small cross-border contacts with Poland. He explained in great detail the circumstances that have led to the present situation and drew attention to the existing disproportion in the number of border crossings. The quotas agreed upon this July put Poles at a significant advantage. Polish citizens were allotted a quota of 1,400,000 border crossings for the purpose of working in Czechoslovakia, 62,000 crossings for commercial purposes, and 31,900 crossings for family reasons. The respective quotas for Czechoslovak citizens are much lower—under 160,000, just over 22,000, and under 3,200. The CSFR Government is prepared to lift restrictions on small cross-border contacts as of 1 November. Ministry of Finance and bank representatives are now in Poland to conduct talks on the tourist exchange rate and the mechanism of its adjustments. The Polish side proposes that wide-ranging talks be held on 10 and 11 October on the restoration of small-border contacts and the lifting of restrictions on tourism. The premier also announced that the government wants, as soon as possible, to abolish the administrative measure under which Polish citizens [wanting to visit Czechoslovakia] require an invitation from the CSFR. He noted, however, that economic and technical conditions for this have not yet been created.

Following a debate, deputies to the People's Chamber, unlike those in the Chamber of Nations, refused to acknowledge Marian Calfa's reply.

Deputy Jiri Kovac (Civic Forum) interpellated the minister of defense. He cast doubt on the results of competence checks [atestace] in the Army, asked why members of the military counterintelligence have not been dismissed, and why the salaries of career soldiers have been raised. In his reply Minister Vacek said that he decided on competence testing because he had not been told how to cleanse the Army of unwanted people. The military counterintelligence is now subordinated directly to the minister of defense. The Czechoslovak Army has 800 military counterintelligence members at present; this number should be reduced by 40 to 50 percent. Not only the salaries of career soldiers have been raised but also the pay received by conscripts.

Several interpellations concerned the problem of Romanies. Klara Samkova (Civic Forum), for example, proposed the formation of a parliamentary commission to permanently monitor instances of racism and the human rights of individuals and groups. She said that the wave of racism has surpassed a tolerable limit and communicated the massive concern of the Romany population over developments in Slovakia. Thousands of Romanies are leaving for Bohemia and Moravia; 30,000 of them have recently migrated to Ostrava alone. Petr Miller, federal minister of labor and social affairs stated that the Romany issue is a social problem and that his ministry is dealing with it intensively. In the afternoon some deputies raised factual objections to the statement of Deputy Samkova.

Marian Calfa provided a reply of principle to an interpellation of Deputy Pavol Kanis (Communist Party of Czechoslovakia), who defended the right of trade unions to call a political strike and asked the premier and Minister Miller whether they really intend to question this right. Marian Calfa expressed his conviction that after the elections to representative bodies, the passing of legislation on the political mechanism, etc., one can hardly accept the idea of a political trade union strike. Trade unions represent their members vis-a-vis their employers and ties of employment between trade union members and the political spectrum do not exist. A strike in the trade union sense, therefore, cannot be used to assert political rights. His reply was supplemented by Deputy Jan Sokol (Civic Forum), who said that the trade unions' objections to the legal measure expanding the range of offices to be filled by appointment have been accepted to a degree allowed by law.

As for the other interpellations (government members will respond to most of them in writing within the deadline set by the law), let us mention at least the following:

Deputy Miroslav Richter (Civic Forum) asked whether the Ministry of Foreign Affairs coordinates the sending of our experts to high-risk regions throughout the world. According to information available to him, Technoexport was sending Czechoslovak citizens to Iraq as late as the beginning of September. Deputy Peter Kulan (Public Against Violence movement) asked the federal minister of interior to have diplomatic passports in the possession of ex-diplomats and prominent figures of the former regime withdrawn immediately. Deputy Jindrich Konecny (Civic Forum) demanded the recognition of the so-called third (anticommunist) resistance, with all the rights enjoyed by members of the first and second resistance. Deputy Erich Kriz (Civic Forum) spoke about the need to expeditiously open additional border crossing points to the FRG. Deputy Miroslav Jansta (Communist Party of Czechoslovakia) raised the issue of the necessity of settling the claims of Czechoslovak citizens persecuted under the Nazi occupation.

An interpellation of Deputy Stanislav Devaty (Civic Forum) was answered by Minister of Defense M. Vacek.

He said that since 1967 a total of 3,166 foreign students have been trained at Czechoslovak military schools—208 from Iraq and 1,252 from Libya. Commenting generally on the problem of foreign students at military schools, the minister added that in many cases these are economically profitable deals, carried out in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

In another interpellation Deputy Devaty called upon the government to assume a stand on the statement by the Civic Forum Coordinating Center in Zlin, which protests against the endeavor of the South Moravian Regional National Committee to speed up the introduction of the land setup. As this issue falls within the jurisdiction of the Czech National Council and the Czech Republic Government, M. Calfa promised that he will ask Czech National Council Chairwoman Buresova and Czech Republic Premier Pithart to reply to Deputy Devaty in writing.

Following the deputies' interpellations, the deputies elected three additional members of the parliamentary commission for the investigation of the events of 17 November 1989. These three members were not present at the last session [of parliament on 20 September which set up the commission], which is why they could not sign the affidavit that they had never collaborated with the State Security Corps [required for membership in the commission]. In the afternoon the commission held its first meeting and unanimously elected Deputy Jiri Ruml (Civic Forum) as its chairman.

Havel Spokesman Views Civic Forum Election

LD1510203390 Prague CTK in English 1430 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Prague Oct 15 (CTK)—Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel's press secretary Michael Zantovsky today characterized the election of Vaclav Klaus chairman of the Civic Forum as a "step in a good direction."

Czechoslovak Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus was elected to this post at a national congress of the Civic Forum on October 13. In some of his recent speeches President Havel stressed that it is necessary for the Civic Forum to have a clearer structure and to show a clear profile. "We hope that the election of Mr Klaus [as] chairman of the Civic Forum is exactly the step in this direction", Zantovsky said. He rejected the opinion of today's LIDOVE NOVINY (the Czechoslovak independent daily) that the "election of Vaclav Klaus is a failure of the castle's idea of the Civic Forum".

He positively evaluated the Interparliamentary Club of the democratic right wing established last week by more than 60 Federal Assembly (Federal parliament) and Czech National Council (Czech parliament) deputies. This was initiated by the Civic Forum deputies. The club supports extensive privatisation, preservation of the Czechoslovak Federation and development of contacts between Czechoslovakia and NATO. "We see the creation of the Interparliamentary Club of the democratic right wing as part of a natural process of differentiation of the Civic Forum. Also in this respect we consider it a step in the right direction", Zantovsky said, adding that it is advantageous for the society.

Speaking about the popularity of President Vaclav Havel, the press secretary said that according to international experiences presidents were least popular in the middle of their tenure. "In our country this is linked with our specific situation, with problems we settle just now as well as with the fact that the decline is, of course, relative. The decline is from a certain degree of popularity which is very exceptional for presidents. So, we do not speak about unpopularity, we speak about the decline of popularity", Zantovsky pointed out.

He paid much attention to frequent demands of the Czechoslovak public to punish those who contributed to the collapse of the Czechoslovak state during the 40-year rule of the Communist Party. "Mr president stressed several times that we are against the principle of collective guilt, that any condemnations must apply to individual persons and concrete acts. It has been apparent recently that it is very difficult to gather legal evidence which could help punish some people. According to Czechoslovak law, many criminal offences became statute-barred, others were amnestied. But the public calls for a certain form of condemnation. Therefore, such a condemnation might have a form of a moral but not a legal act", Mr Zantovsky said.

Speaking of the work of the presidential commission to inquire into the activities of the Czechoslovak Army in November 1989, Zantovsky said it consists of members of the Defence and Security Committees of both houses of the Czechoslovak parliament, of the President's Office, the Defence Ministry Inspection and the military Revival (Obroda) association (of soldiers persecuted under communist rule for political reasons). The commission, set up on September 18, is to verify the truthfulness of information under which the Czechoslovak Army was to be used in November 1989 against the people who showed discontent with the communist regime. The commission will end its work this week. According to today's statement of the commission, the materials given it by Free Legion (association of officers regarding the present democratization in the army as fictitious) representatives, supposed to contain concrete proofs of the army activities last November, provided no new or unknown facts.

Asked whether the President's Office would react to an article in the SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, according to which Czechoslovak spies continued working in Britain independently of the new Czechoslovak Government and their information was likely to be passed to Moscow, Zantovsky said the Presidential Office cannot react as it is not the institution that deals with sending agents to any territory or their withdrawal. "If the Foreign Ministry receives an official request by the British government, an official response would follow", he said.

Referring to Czechoslakia's attitude to the Middle East situation, Zantovsky said "we agree with the U.N. Security Council resolution expressing concern about the action by Israeli police against Palestinians. It condemns violence and we join the condemnation of every violence. This, however, changes nothing on our position on the occupation of Kuwait, on the Persian Gulf crisis".

Former State Security Agents To Run in Elections

AU1510183090 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 11 Oct 90 p 2

["(MLY)"-signed report: "Will We Elect State Security Agents?"]

[Text] Prague—Yesterday we asked Frantisek Starek, deputy director of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Democracy and head of its press department, how the office views the issue of publishing lists of former State Security collaborators. Mr. Starek replied as follows:

"Publishing the names of former State Security collaborators is not within the office's authority. The office does not want further scandals. The situation surrounding the local elections is another matter. The office has certain information on citizens who were State Security collaborators and who are now campaigning in the elections. For example, we know about a former agent (the word former, however, is not absolutely precise because he is still probably cooperating with his controlling organ) who has been working against Charter 77 since 1984. For example, he "informed" on Vaclav Benda, Jan Carnogursky, and Jiri Dienstbier; he received more than 70,000 korunas from the State Security for this. Despite this, he is campaigning and we cannot prevent him from doing so because we have received no request from the government or the election commission to compare the list of candidates with the network of former State Security agents. We would be glad if this could be dealt with somehow. The current situation is alarming."

General Vacek Prepared To Resign If Necessary

AU0910100790 Bratislava SMENA in Slovak 29 Sep 90 p 1

[Interview with Army General Miroslav Vacek, CSFR minister of national defense, by Juraj Gressner, in Kromeriz on 27 September: "Always Prepared (Even to Resign)"; first paragraph is SMENA introduction]

[Text] The joint meeting of our three governments at Kromeriz Castle on Thursday [27 September] was held behind closed doors. As a result, journalists were passing their time away by chatting in the adjoining rooms of the conference hall and in the corridors of the historical building. At noon sharp, I noticed the minister of national defense on the staircase and, without hesitating, asked him a question:

[Gressner] A report has recently appeared in the mass media according to which the students who were protagonists of the 17 November events demand that the state organs be cleansed of the people who do not posses moral and professional qualities. They are asking for your head....

[Vacek] I have never made a secret of the fact that I was a member of the Communist Party. I spoke about it already in our parliament where I said, among other things, that at my age I do not have to take credit for the November revolution in order to save my present position. I do not need it, believe me!

[Gressner] May I ask you an inconvenient question?

[Vacek] Few people ask me convenient questions today.

[Gressner] Well, when the former representatives of the totalitarian power began to speak about restructuring our society, they called for new thinking. Do you—until recently a member of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia—think in a new way, and no longer as a Communist?

[Vacek] This is a complex process which does not concern just me, but a number of colleagues in our ministerial department. I believe that people would have to think that we are not normal if we radically changed our thinking over six or seven months. I know many high-ranking officers, former members of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, who sincerely want to help carry out changes in our society. Why do many people think that this is not true?

[Gressner] What is your specific attitude toward student demands which ask that your resign from the position as minister of national defense?

[Vacek] I feel quite calm. If I have to resign, I will! I must add, however, that pressures demanding my resignation are being coordinated by someone; they have appeared at the time when the prestige of our Army is declining and when all sorts of people criticize us—soldiers derisively calling us the dregs of society. Many critics even remind us that since the battle on the White Mountain in 1620, we have not fired a single shot....

[Gressner] No country can do without an army.

[Vacek] If the Army and its command do not identify with the views of the leadership of the state, then it is possible to talk about a putsch. Is someone interested in a rift between the Army and the government? Does someone want soldiers to do whatever they like? Does it bother someone that there is a consensus and understanding today?

[Gressner] Army General Miroslav Vacek spoke with deliberation, calmly, and openly. His eyes met the eyes of the interviewer. Because of that we believed he is prepared—either to continue performing his responsible function honestly, or to resign from it. Would it, however, be useful for all of us at this very time?

Mohorita Explains Statements on National Consensus

AU1210141890 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 9 Oct 90 pp 1, 4

["(zr)"-signed report: "Somewhat Taken Out of Context"]

[Text] Prague— The statements made by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Central Committee first secretary at a session of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia Central Committee have aroused great attention. His statements that national consensus has ended and that a bitter and uncompromising struggle has begun is the most frequently quoted. V. Mohorita provided our editorial staff with the following statement on this subject:

"This has been somewhat taken out of context. In my statement I wanted to say that, in view of the adopted economic reform, our party can no longer continue to accept the government's policy with such understanding as we did when the government came into office. Our views simply diverge to such a degree that our party cannot support the method of implementing the scenario of economic reform. I want to emphasize that it is not the fault of the Communist Party that national consensus has disappeared; in fact it practically disappeared after elections when legal measures against communists were passed and now purges are also being directed toward those who believed that even in such a situation they had the freedom to democratically express their opinion, yet they cannot avoid criticism by some representatives of the ruling power.

"This does not mean, however, that the Communist Party is returning to the methods of the political struggles used in the first republic. First of all, times have completely changed. Also the shape of our party is different and if we are witnessing attempts to return this country to the conditions that prevailed in the first republic, then our party —as far as its methods of work or its reconstruction and principles that is stands for are concerned—does not intend to return to this period. Yet it has the right—and this is also the principal condition for its existence—to enter the political arena and to defend the interests of the people who have voted for it, that is, the interests of those whom it wants to serve. If I am talking about a bitter and uncompromising struggle, then I am doing so mainly because it is our political rival who has been the first to chose such an attitude.

"This attitude puts at risk not only the rights and social guarantees of our members and of our many voters, but also the very existence of democracy and democratic development in our country."

Regarding what has been published about V. Mohorita's words concerning the activity of party organizations in factories and the activation of Communists in the Trade Unions, the statement reads:

"Above all, I have not said "in" factories, but "at" factories. Twenty percent of our organizations operate at work places. This is in full conformity with the valid law on political parties.

"We are very interested in cooperation with the Trade Unions. In recent days the Czech and Slovak Confederation of Trade Unions has approached individual clubs of deputies with a request to assert their standpoints in legislative bodies. A favorable response by the Club of Communist Deputies in the Federal Assembly was delivered to the Confederation, that is, to its president, Mr. Kovac, on Tuesday [2 October] last week. Our objective is not to usurp power in the Trade Unions. We want to work and have influence wherever the Trade Unions are active—and we are interested in mutual cooperation when asserting the interests of our members and voters—that is, above all, where people work.

"How much easier the situation would be if the leadership of the Confederation of Trade Unions exploited the offer of joint discussions made by the Club of Communist Deputies in the CSFR Federal Assembly. We could better explain our standpoints to one another, without disinformation or opinions taken out of context."

Havel's Stand Seen as Boost To Slovak Separatists

AU1110130390 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 9 Oct 90 p 1

[Peter Holka commentary: "Marriage of Convenience!"]

[Text] The marriage between Czechs and Slovaks, concluded out of convenience in 1918, is once again heading towards the divorce court. In the meadows, groves, and towns of the historic Czech lands, in the mass media and over glasses of beer, one vehemently storms about the stupid Slovaks, infatuated by the hyphen. One shakes one's head in disbelief over Slovak Premier Meciar's policy and calls it bizarre. One cannot comprehend the agreements of Trencianske Teplice [where the Federal and republican governments agreed on the transfer of powers].... The Slovaks have gone completely mad because they demand that the Slovak language be recognized as an official language in their country. This is unheard of! They destroyed the republic once before, so let us be vigilant. The Slovaks are nationalists, chauvinists, separatists...and, who knows, perhaps even communists.

If all this was being said only over a glass of beer, we would be able to dismiss it; however, when one hears similar reactions in the Federal Assembly, one wonders, willy nilly. [Federal Assembly deputies for the Civic Forum] Messrs. Jicinsky, Zeman, and company are miserably disguised leading representatives of the Slovak National Party [SNS]. After practically each of their speeches in parliament, the SNS wins another five percent of potential voters demanding separation. Even the [seat of the president at Prague] Castle has become intensively involved in the [SNS's] election campaign.

Its first humanist or playwright has further entangled an already complicated plot. He vehemently defends and understands the rights of the Lithuanians—and other nations which are not sovereign—to sovereignty, but cannot see as far as Slovakia is concerned. It must be the fault of the river Morava [separating the Czech lands from Slovakia] and the notorious fog above it. The Castle pages keep harping on the same tune, they only have the wrong score, and, moreover, are either tired or simply irreplaceable [allusion to presidential spokesman Zantovsky, who once explained some controversial statements with his fatigue and whose offer to resign President Havel did not accept on account of his being irreplaceable].

The Hungarian card is also comical and theatrical, with the help of which Prague manifests its support for the rights of minorities. At the same time, however, it forgets that the same rights should be enjoyed by the majority, especially if it is a sovereign and state-forming majority and not the branch of one—the Czech—nation as Father Masaryk used to claim.

In a divorce case, it is always the other side that is guilty, is it not? Did the Czechs and Slovaks conclude their marriage out of convenience or out of passion? Passions usually evaporate quickly, common sense should outlast them.

Havel Comments on Declining Popularity

LD1410225290

[Editorial Report] Prague Domestic Service in Czech at 1315 GMT on 14 October, in its "Conversation at Lany" program, carries a 26-minute interview with Federal President Vaclav Havel by Jiri Vejvoda. Havel begins by thanking everyone for their birthday greetings to him over the last two weeks. On the future of Lucerne Theater in Prague, Havel says he is a writer, not a businessman, and he has no interest in, nor intention of, being connected with that theater. He thinks it should be made into a joint-stock company or something similar.

Asked about his declining popularity, Havel explains that this is natural because by an accident of history, the public came to see him as the personification of the revolution, its ideals and values. Furthermore, when things do not happen quickly enough, and more crises appear, he is seen as the main person responsible. In addition, there is the polarization of political life, which is part of society's crystallization. Havel knew he alone could never entirely fulfill the public's aspirations and that his popularity would inevitably decline. He did not become a dissident or president to court popularity, and he is fulfilling his duties as best he can.

On public attitudes toward state power, as reflected in a statement of support published by LIDOVE NOVINY last week, Havel read the statement and it pleased him. The public wanted free elections and it got them; it is from those elections that parliament, the government, and the president emerged, so no one can believe that those in power are self-appointed. Some people still live by the stereotypes of the old totalitarian system when society was divided into "us," the people, and "them," the oppressors; furthermore, when things are not going well, they automatically blame "them." We all share a degree of the responsibility, so it is illogical and unfair for people who did not complain under decades of totalitarianism to suddenly turn on the new leaders for being too slow in dealing with their inheritance. Perhaps it is also partly due to a sense of bad conscience that they, themselves, did not speak out in the past as they should have done.

In connection with the Czechoslovak Communist Party chief's statement that national understanding has ended and it is time for a hard and uncompromising struggle, Havel said he had followed the affair, and it had the probably- unwanted result that it "helped unite the people to some degree and rouse them out of the apathy that was threatening."

On the progress of rehabilitation, Havel notes public discontent that they are not proceeding fast enough—that the nomenklatura fat cats still have their big pensions and nice houses, while the widows of those who suffered for many years in prison survive on a meager pension. Havel is to meet the justice minister next week to check on the progress of rehabilitations. People feel the appropriate consequences have not been applied in the rehabilitation cases. The symbolic act of legal condemnation of the past 40 years is not enough. Furthermore, much greater progress must be made with the rehabilitations and material compensation, though no amount of money can compensate for lives lost or destroyed for many years. Havel also shares the public's frustration at the slow progress in the enquiry into the 17 November events. Work is proceeding intensively, but the public cannot yet see the results.

On progress in drawing up the constitution documents, Havel notes the importance of having a constitution document finalized as soon as possible to set out people's constitutional rights, duties, and freedoms, as is the case in other countries. Here, of course, the two republics will have their own modifications, but the basic constitution must be a unified one, adopted by the Federal Assembly. We are rebuilding the whole legal system, so we must start from scratch, specifying the relationship between the citizen and the state. This is the basis of the whole legal system. It must embody the spirit and concept of this state, and it is from this that the legal system, devolution of powers, and so forth must spring.

Asked if continual arguments over power sharing would have a bad effect on the economy, Havel says power sharing issues should be sorted out as quickly as possible; if they continue to argue about the matter indefinitely they might reach a point where the powers are divided up perfectly, but the economy is in a state of collapse. Havel thinks power-sharing issues ought to be resolved

by the end of this year, because when price liberalization begins on 1 January next year, that is when the going will really get tough.

Invited to review his meetings with foreign VIP's this week, Havel notes the meetings with Luxembourg Foreign Minister Poos and IMF chief Michel Camdessus, recapping in general terms what they discussed. Havel's team is trying to minimize ceremonial meetings to allow time for his other presidential duties. He hopes to visit Plzen and Hradec Kralove before next month's communal elections, and he will be visiting Slovakia "much more often."

Premier Calfa on Soviet Oil, Mohorita Remark

LD1210211290 Prague Television Service in Czech 1850 GMT 12 Oct 90

["Ten Minutes With the Premier" program: interview with Premier Marian Calfa, by unidentified interviewer; place and date not given—live or recorded; Calfa in Slovak, interviewer in Czech]

[Text] [Interviewer] Mr. Premier, last Friday we began our interview with the visit you were expecting to make to Moscow. A week has passed and you have not been to Moscow. What is the actual situation now?

[Calfa] I said that we had proposed to the Soviet leadership that we meet as soon as possible, and we even suggested that weekend. The response is that our proposal is being studied in the Soviet Union. However, I must say that since that time there has been a significant improvement in discipline as far as deliveries of oil from the Soviet Union to Czechoslovakia are concerned. A quantity is being delivered which is above the technological limit, the technological minimum we need, so I think that our call contained a certain risk which has had a positive outcome in respect of that situation.

[Interviewer] On the gasoline consumption measures, the government has been criticized for its administrative approach, so to speak; the regulation measures have been criticized, and the public has more or less called for such matters to be resolved consistently in future in an economic way. Do you think, Mr. Premier, that not only with gasoline but with other similar problems, too, the government will have the courage to tackle things in a truly economic way?

[Calfa] Well, I must say that these measures were worked out by a whole team of experts, and the regulation of sales was formulated above all by officials in charge of these matters in the republics. We approved the manner they proposed to deal with this matter. In our view this reaction is interesting because when we raised the price of gasoline in July, for example, we came in for a lot of criticism for dealing with it only by the price method and not by some rationing method. This time we have chosen the rationing method, and now we are being criticized for not doing it solely by the economic method. Calculations are being made, but the likelihood is that from 1 November we will actually reach the conclusion that the sale of these oil-based products in Czechoslovakia will really be based solely on price.

[Interviewer] Now I would like to come to yesterday's government meeting; it had a very full program, but I would say that the greatest welcome, so to speak, was given to the news about the expropriation of Communist Party property. Would you like to say anything further about this?

[Calfa] Well, we had at our disposal a document submitted at the government session by Minister Korinkova, the federal minister of Control. This document summarized the work of the ministry of control and of the republican ministries of control; this work took about four months, it contained complete details of the property both of the Communist Party and other political parties as well as voluntary public organizations, of which there is an enormous number in Czechoslovakia, so it took a little time to get a true picture of the extent of the property, its value, its location, and what it comprises. I must say that there were shortcomings in record-keeping, there was also a degree of movement with the property, and we had to deal with all that. We had decided a week earlier that we would include this item, so it is not in any way a spur-of-the-moment matter. In a nutshell, it is the result of a government intention which the government put in hand, in fact, after it was given this task by the Federal Assembly, which also played a very intensive part in the matter.

Anyway, as far as the Communist Party is concerned—because that is the party with the largest amount of such property—Mrs. Korinkova, the minister, proposed several options for resolving the matter. One of these options was to give up the property by agreement, in other words a sort of agreement between the state and the Communist Party; one option was to give up this property on the basis of a state law. There are no grounds for anything other than having it expropriated, and therefore the government decided in favor of a single and emphatic solution to clear this item from the agenda once and for all so as to resolve this matter. I do not deny that certain statements by Vasil Mohorita at the session of the Communist Party Central Committee made the government's decision somewhat easier to make.

[Interviewer] When talking about this, a large number of people expressed their opinions recently as to the outbursts by Mr. Mohorita. What is your view on this, Mr. Premier?

[Calfa] I must say one thing: If the first secretary of the Communist Party, Federal Assembly deputy, and, in fact, a member of he leadership of the Federal Assembly, in a situation when in fact we are all appealing for some kind of understanding, a certain balance, a certain tolerance, a certain search for a consensus in all the spheres, whether economic, political, social and so on—if an official of this rank says the opposite of what we are striving for, if he speaks about some kind of dissonance,

some kind of confrontation—in other words, if this sort of attitude of confrontation is adopted, then it is understandable that a politician of such a rank must bear the consequences of what he had said. Personally, I think that it is crushing the effort of the government and the other organs to achieve a peaceful development in Czechoslovakia, it is ruining what we are all striving for and I must say that I condemn this resolutely.

[Interviewer] Mr. Premier, several times we have encountered a lasting criticism of the work of the government, parliament, supreme organs, various views of who should resign, who should be recalled. I should like to say that we should not forget one thing which was published in LIDOVE NOVINY last week and which is of the opposite tone. LIDOVE NOVINY publishes a short text with several signatures. Despite all criticism and despite all that we do not like about the work of the government and its organs, it expresses support in the president, the parliament, and the government. Mr. Rudolf Zeman told me yesterday that this text has already been signed by over 2,000 people and that citizens come to their office to sign it. How did you receive this report?

[Calfa] Well, the report which expresses support in the government, the president, and the parliament is a positive one. The big question is—well, we have organized free elections, the parliament was born out of these elections, the president was elected during these elections because the parliament elected him, these elections gave rise out the Federal Government, and in the long run, to all the republican organs, because the parliament approved their program statement and thus expressed trust to these organs, in other words, I consider this set of organs a set which was born in a democratic way. If we hear voices of the kind you talked about I consider them undemocratic. I think therefore that the appeal published in LIDOVE NOVINY—as far as I know, it is being signed by more people—in fact expresses understanding of this problem, it is a certain expression of support to the democratic process and the democratic institutions. People feel it very strongly, I must say. Very many nice letters have been delivered recently to the government, the individual members of the government, to me, which express a certain support to the need not to allow ourselves to be misled from the path that we have embarked upon, because we are pushing before us the entire economic reform, the entire decision-making process on the part of the individual institutes. And I think that all these voices are in a way aimed at misleading us from this path of ours.

Well, I would like to thank you for the support expressed in us and to promise that we shall proceed in such a way so as not to disappoint what the people express by their support.

Calfa Interviewed on Government, Attacks

AU1510192190 Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech 9 Oct 90 pp 1, 4

[First installment of an interview with Premier Marian Calfa by Martin Denemark; place not given, on 5 October: "Punishment for the November Events?"; first paragraph is SVOBODNE SLOVO introduction]

[Text] On Friday 5 October Marian Calfa, CSFR premier, granted a long interview to SVOBODNE SLOVO. Today we publish the first part which is devoted to the results of the work carried out by the government so far and to public reaction to them. Tomorrow we will publish the second part dealing with economic reform.

[Denemark] The government is a target of considerable—and very often unjustified—criticism, the source and causes of which can often be easily identified. Recently, however, you personally have been the target of the attacks. I do not have in my mind the gutter press—which wants to assert itself before the public by slandering people—but I have in mind, for example, those few students who called for your resignation. What is your opinion of such actions?

[Calfa] Students actively seek contacts with me. They asked Mr. Baksaj, leader of the Public Against Violence movement group in the Federal Assembly, to set up a meeting. I welcomed this. I am positive that we will make our standpoints clear.

The supreme manifestation of the political will of people in a democratic society is free elections. The recognition of the election results is inseparable from the elections, however. The elections have shown that the greatest political force in Bohemia is Civic Forum, and the Public Against Violence movement in Slovakia. In our federative state we must form the central organs on the basis of a certain parity between Czechs and Slovaks. All this was taken into consideration when the Public Against Violence movement, Civic Forum, and also the president himself nominated me for the position of premier—as a Public Against Violence movement member who achieved good results in Slovakia during the elections, that is, the highest number of preferential votes. If I form the government democratically, then I may only change it democratically. I am in the position of premier because I was appointed to this position by the president and because parliament approved the program of the Government. The premier can be recalled in the same manner, that is, he can be recalled by the president after a vote of no confidence in parliament. Every citizen can pass his judgment about the work of the government, yet constitutional consequences may only be drawn by the Federal Assembly and the president.

[Denemark] Where do you see the source of attacks against your person?

[Calfa] I am not naive and I believe that this situation is coordinated. I can see a purpose behind it. Except for a

few people, the Federal Assembly expressed its confidence in the government. Only Slovak National Party representatives, both Liberal Democratic Party deputies, and individual deputies from other political parties and movements, for example the Christian Democratic Party, voted against or abstained from voting. It is possible that some attacks come from these circles. Yet, some evidence points to something totally different. It is possible that an action is under preparation, by which I am to be punished for my attitudes in November and December 1989.

[Denemark] Can you, from your point of view, tell us what the Government was successful in and what did not go the way you wanted it to? Let us begin with the first half-year....

[Calfa] In the first months the government was discovering what, in fact, it had inherited. It was not simple. The data available on Czechoslovakia was not truthful. At the same time, we were solving the very serious problem of how to present Czechoslovakia to the world. It involved a number of trips abroad and establishing contacts with European communities and many outstanding personalities in world politics, economics, and culture. Apart from this, we had to deal with various problems brought by everyday life. We were also preparing economic reform. There were various diverging opinions on the reform in the government and they were gradually refined. During the first six months, changes were implemented in the political system—legislation on political parties and elections. The members of the government engaged themselves in the elections with exceptional intensity. Almost all key personalities of the movement were members of the government. Gradually, we have, in fact, liquidated the iron curtain on the borders.

[Denemark] Does this mean that you were satisfied?

[Calfa] I think that the government did a lot in the first six months. How many people from Czechoslovakia have taken their vacation in the Alps or Italy for the first time ever? Reportedly, some 1,000 buses have left for Venice on the weekends. Also privatization, that is, a change in ownership relations—which is an absolute requirement for the reform—was under preparation then. Gradually, we have found that it would be impossible to adopt identical privatization rules applicable to a tobacco shop and a coke plant as well. We had to discontinue the work and to start working on a step-by-step variant.

[Denemark] The second half-year was even more busy for you than the first one....

[Calfa] Members of the government, who had been in their positions since December, needed a rest. They were completely exhausted. The government left on vacation and voices calling for a speedy solution to the competence issue between the republics and the federation were heard in Slovakia in the summer. Upon our return from vacation we found a lot of work waiting for us—the individual stages of privatization, competence, resuming the work of the Federal Assembly after the vacation, and preparing the local elections. The third quarter was characterized by cutbacks in crude oil deliveries and the destabilization of the national economy connected with these cutbacks. Then came the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the quick reunification of Germany, which had significant impacts on our economy—yet it is difficult to say whether these impacts were only negative ones.

[Denemark] Sometimes, the public has an impression of inertia. Do you have a similar feeling?

[Calfa] From the examples that I have given I can state that I do not have this impression. Yet, we still have problems, of course. The state apparatus felt that the discussion on personnel issues was a threat to its existence—some officials became more concerned about themselves than about working on the tasks that had been given to them by their superiors. Because of this, the government was in a difficult situation. Yet we managed to take the first step because we made a decision on the course of privatization. Now we can deal with other problems. We have declared what the economic conditions will be next year, we are preparing measures against illegal money changers, and we are working on the internal convertibility of koruna. To put it differently, I do not quite understand the allegations that things are not moving. I think that they are moving, despite all those accumulated problems.

[Denemark] Public opinion is, to a certain degree, shaped by journalists. We have freedom of the press, yet it is one-sided, somehow. It allows the scum of the journalistic profession to establish a communication channel full of mud, in which any lie can be heard. On the other hand, journalists who want to establish serious papers face great difficulties when they want to change the papers of the former organizations of the National Front into genuinely independent papers. Fortunately, your government is not going to dictate to journalists what they should write and how they should write it. However, the government will certainly deal with the freedom of the press....

[Calfa] The state of the mass media is a reflection of the general situation—prevailing in November 1990—and will certainly change. Democracy is a firm order and not the chaos in thinking and behavior, which still prevails in our country and will prevail for some time. It is necessary to pass laws on the press and other communications media soon. All democratic countries have them. We must distinguish what is objective and what is subjective reporting, what is an effort to help and what is an attempt to attack, what is unscrupulous, what is a criminal act, violation of ethics, or an insult. All this must be defined in a modern manner. A democratic institution in this sphere is the law on the press, the opportunities which it gives to journalists, and also the sanctions by which it protects citizens. I am not sure whether it will come into force as of 1 January because

parliament designated 25 November as the last deadline for presenting draft laws which are to come into force as of next year. We still consider the legislation on economic reform to have priority and this is why the work on the law on the press was postponed.

It seems to me that the communications media is a little ahead of ordinary people. Journalists have a huge quantity of information available to them, they know how to extrapolate, and they can see "round the corner"—they are a somewhat exceptional breed. However, they have to respect readers, their interests, taste, and knowledge. I would serve no good if journalists get ahead of the public and the public can not understand them.

Discusses Economic Reform

AU1610100390 Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech 10 Oct 90 pp 1, 4

[Second installment of an interview with Premier Marian Calfah by Martin Denemark; place and date not given: "Steps Toward the Reform"; first paragraph is SVOBODNE SLOVO introduction]

[Text] **Yesterday, we carried in SVOBODNE SLOVO the first part of an interview with Marian Calfa, premier of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. In the second part, the premier contemplates some aspects of the economic reform.**

[Denemark] Foreign trade is a key area in the Czechoslovak economy. One hears a lot about the oil supplies and about the relations with the Soviet Union. We have, however, difficulties also with the enterprises in the former GDR. Will the unification of Germany really hurt us?

[Calfa] It is difficult to unequivocally ascertain whether or not the present situation in the united Germany damages the CSFR. The movement which began there is probably modern and has great prospects. If it harms us, then we are not in the same promising stream. The matter is, however, obviously much more complex. The problem arose from the deviation in the GDR's conduct from that agreed upon, particularly as regards the ratio of the mark to the ruble. We spoke about it with GDR representatives several times and understand their reasons. In the rapid developments, they themselves did not have a realistic opportunity to act any other way, and therefore they expressed a wish to deal with the problem in a tripartite meeting with the FRG also present. Since September we are unremittingly dealing with representatives of the FRG Economics Ministry.

[Denemark] What is the outcome?

[Calfa] Our partners decided that connections to the relations with the CSFR and Czechoslovak organizations with which the GDR enterprises cooperated will be considered when investing capital in projects on the territory of the former GDR. Concrete agreements are foreseen for this year, and still next year the FRG is willing to operate with definite numbers which are not very advantageous for the FRG. Apparently, we cannot hope for anything more. Therefore, we are analyzing our mutual relations in great detail. The problem is that in some areas, like in combine harvesters, we were greatly or almost 100 percent dependent on supplies from the GDR. We work at several levels. I would like to meet with Mr. Kohl so we could clear up the issue. I proposed a meeting in the first half of November to deal with this year's situation and to get some ideas about next year. I would not speak about damages as yet. Who knows whether that which is annoying on a short-term basis, does not actually help us in the long run by forcing us to restructure and to apply modern methods in the economy.

[Denemark] One frequently refers to the interest of foreign capital in Czechoslovakia. Sometimes we hear that it is marginal, and then again concerns are expressed that it is so great that foreigners will buy out Czechoslovakia. What do you think?

[Calfa] Earnest people are beginning to come to Czechoslovakia now. They are the genuinely interested investors from renowned companies with sizable capital, tradition, world marketing networks, etc. They are, however, quite careful. The political development in the CSFR during the first half of 1990 seemed stable enough but politicking began after the elections. The political scene is fragmented, even Civic Forum itself is not an entirely compact entity. It is already a topic of public discussions that Civic Forum should be politically defined. There are questions regarding the relationship of our peoples and various uncertainties. He who wants to invest seeks security. All those attacks on the political forces, the fact that different bodies and forces have different priorities, all that evokes uncertainty. The uncertainty gets not only to the foreign investors but to our citizens as well. People, particularly the intelligentsia, began to leave the country. Only a well-functioning economy can give security to the people. That is why in the government priority scale the economic reform has the first spot.

[Denemark] How do you assess the willingness of the people to go through with the reform?

[Calfa] The reform simply must be implemented. To continue with the present developments would mean that the whole thing comes crushing down on our heads. Whatever will happen, the government has only one goal—to implement the reform. We must really closely watch the development in the economy after 1 January. We must not allow inflation to set in. We are ready to take vigorous actions so that the situation does not slip out of our hands. The people on the one hand act quite naturally, I would say, economically; on the other hand, we would after all need a little more of their trust.

[Denemark] Do you think that the government has the trust in this respect?

[Calfa] Of course trust can only come when people actually see that what we do works and that it brings

results. We promised free elections—they took place. We promised free travel abroad—the borders were opened. It is obvious to me, however, that people consider all that was achieved to be a matter of course. It really is a matter of course in the world but it was not in the CSFR. People have a very short memory. Therefore, we cannot depend on it. Even if there are some protests, we must manage to continue in the right direction. And I think that we are going in the right direction even under pressure. We are facing great uncertainties, and people do not like them. People prefer even bad certainties. The uncertainties will gradually disappear as we adopt individual reform steps and new ones will appear in their stead. Certainly, for instance the price of fuel and power will increase but, on the other hand, wages will grow. We do not expect people's thanks for removing certain difficulties, we expect an atmosphere of anxiety. I have to admit that I understand them.

[Denemark] The governments met in Kromeriz for the first time to shield the small privatization process by their joint authority. Do you expect such a cooperation with the Prague Castle also in the future?

[Calfa] We did not understand Kromeriz [meeting] as the small privatization [discussion]. Kromeriz—it was the beginning of the reform. It was the first 100-percent reform document clearly signalling the end of the period of searching and contemplating, and the beginning of the period of action. At the same time, it was the start of destroying the structures. By transferring small business to private hands, we cut off everything above it, and that includes the connections behind the scenes. Kromeriz—it was a signal that we are serious in the economy and that the process of the state restructuring commences. That is why the president was present. The second step is not the first one, therefore, we do not expect the direct presence of the Castle in the subsequent steps. It was, however, necessary when setting off.

Commission on 1989 Unrest Begins Work

LD1510224390 Prague CTK in English 1918 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Prague Oct 15 (CTK)—The Czechoslovak parliamentary commission which is to inquire into events that led to the brutal suppression of a student demonstration in Prague last November 17 held its first working session today.

The commission has been set up by the Federal Assembly (parliament) elected last June after a commission formed by the previous parliament failed to provide an answer as to who was really responsible for the attack of police troops on the students last November. The attack was followed by nation-wide demonstrations that eventually toppled the communist regime in Czechoslovakia.

Three high officers of the secret police were taken into custody on the basis of the investigations but have since been released for lack of evidence.

Former Communist Party Chief in Prague Miroslav Stepan, who was investigated in connection with the police action, did not rule out that the attack was to be the start of a coup.

Unlike the previous commission which only supervised investigations by public and military prosecutors, the new commission is authorized to conduct is own investigations and hear witnesses.

The sessions of the commission will take place behind closed doors. They will be recorded by television and these records will be held by the Federal Assembly until it permits their release for the public. The media will be informed by a spokesman.

The spokesman, Petr Toman, said today that the commission will study at first the investigation records which have 18,700 pages. It plans to work in four groups each of which will focus on some aspects of the developments.

Dienstbier Honors Jan Masaryk's Life, Works

LD1510224290 Prague CTK in English 1927 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Prague Oct 15 (CTK)—The death of Jan Masaryk in 1948 became a symbol of the interruption of democratic developments in Czechoslovakia for the next 40 years, Czechoslovak Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier said here today inaugurating an exhibition on his life and work.

Jan Masaryk (1886-1948), son of the founder of the independent Czechoslovak state in 1918 Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, was a great democrat, diplomat, politician and statesman. In the years 1919-1922 he was Czechoslovak ambassador to the United States, in 1925-1938 to Britain. In the years 1940-1945 he was Czechoslovak foreign minister of the government in exile in London. In February 1948, after the communist regime came to power, he became foreign minister, but died later in the year, probably by suicide. The exhibition is installed in his former service flat in the Cernin Palace, the seat of the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry.

"Jan Masaryk dreamed that a democratic chain of free nations encircling the whole world will be forged," Jiri Dienstbier said and added that he would certainly be happy that it is now possible to return to this idea.

Army Spokesman Objects to 'Tendentious' Campaign

LD1610042490 Prague Domestic Service in Slovak 1600 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Colonel Petr Tax, press attache at the office of the minister of defense, gave CTK a statement in which the headquarters of the Czechoslovak Army objects to allegations by the headquarters of Free Legions that have been publicized during the last few days in the press, on the radio, and on television. Any incitement of the general public or attempt to discredit the Army with

unobjective and misleading information is seen by the headquarters of the Army as tendentious, and as an effort to influence the commission appointed by the president of the Republic.

Defense Minister Criticized for His Collaborators

AU1110115790 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 6 Oct 90 p 3

[Igor Cibula commentary: "A Sober View Is Desired"]

[Text] The public is very impatiently awaiting the final report of the special commission established at the Office of the President, to investigate the allegations about the participation of the Army in the 17 November events—Above all, the orders to use special military units against students and demonstrators. The Army command has denied their existence, yet some political circles do not doubt that the present Minister of Defense and the then chief of the General Staff, Miroslav Vacek, prevented such a situation.

Repeated attempts to cast doubt upon General Vacek's trustworthiness in his post as minister of defense have appeared lately; these attempts point to the fact that former Communist Party of Czechoslovakia members remain in their posts in the corp of Commanders of the Army, despite the activity of the so-called screening commissions in the Army. Many young Army officers have left the Army mainly for this reason. Opinions can be heard that old structures in the staff of officers are unable to cope with democratic changes that have taken place in our society.

Despite these undeniable facts, it is desirable to retain a sober view on the situation in the Army. If the screening of the cadres in the Armed Forces degenerated into an unscrupulous ideological purge, then we could say goodbye to all our generals. I would recommend to all the radically thinking people to look at the composition of the Bundeswehr in the 1950's and to compare it to Hitler's Wermacht. Or, let them find out how many officers in the Spanish Army were awarded their distinctions during the civil war while on Franco's side against the legitimate republican forces. The professionalism of the officers is expensive not only because of their professional education and military training, but also because of their experience as commanders. In this context, it would be better to talk about the ways of establishing an institutionalized system which would allow civilians to keep the Army under the control of a democratic state.

Criticism targeted against General Vacek may be provoked by his inconsistency toward the people around him, where, for example, he allows that Vit Suchy—who is well known to journalists and also to the public from the Brezhnev-Husak normalization period—to remain in his position as Ministry of Defense press attache. Many can remember when as a reporter from Hanoi or Brussels, he told us spooky tales about the aggressive NATO alliance. Some people have an unpleasant feeling when they recall his activity in the CTK Prague center and, even more, in his position as deputy chief of a section of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Central Committee. For this reason, it would be useful if the minister looked at the people around him, that is, where his opponents look for the pretexts for the attacks against him personally.

Miller, Calfa Comment on Trade Union Talks

LD1110090890

[Editorial Report] Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak at 1730 GMT on 10 October carries a five-minute report on talks held in Prague between the government and the Confederation of Trade Union Associations.

An announcer opens the report by stating that "representatives of the Confederation of Trade Union Associations, headed by their new president, Roman Kovac, held talks in Prague today with Premier Marian Calfa, Petr Miller, federal minister of labor and social affairs, and other members of the government." He adds that demands of the chemical workers trade union were among topics discussed at the meeting, and "thus we asked Minister Miller for his views. Miller says that he recently attended a Federal Assembly session with Minister Dloughy. "Minister Dloughy was questioned there for a very long time about the measures concerning gasoline supplies, etc. I would like to stress quite responsibly that the Federal Government has nothing to do with this and is not responsible. When decisions were being made on how the situation should be resolved, I remember that twice we sent Minister Dloughy to make a telephone call, to intervene, to call Minister Vrba in the Czech Government, to say that the method which the Czech Government proposes—and the Slovak Government too, for that matter—is unacceptable, that it is nonsense which will only cause chaos and a bad atmosphere. Twice Minister Dlouhy came back saying that Minister Vrba did not agree and that the Czech Government holds its ground, and the Slovak Government, too. Thus the Federal Government, if it has no say, no power, in these issues, cannot be blamed and cannot be held responsible," Minister Miller said.

The announcer goes on to note that at the end of the session, correspondent Dittrich asked Premier Calfa about the results of the talks with the trade unionists.

Premier Calfa says, "It was the first meeting between representatives of the new trade unions and representatives of the government. I personally think that it was very useful. They briefed us on their vision concerning the start of the economic reform, and above all the certain level of social certainties. They asked the government to try to define its own vision of the developments next year and the year after. They put forward a proposal for concluding a certain agreement between trade unions and the government which would bridge uncertainties for the year 1991, as we will not have at our disposal any definite legislation, etc. We agreed with this, and work

has started. Sometime toward the end of October we should meet to discuss the contents and sign it in the proper way."

The correspondent notes that trade unionists came to the meeting with a statement on the gasoline problem which was somewhat critical. "What was the reaction of the Federal Government?" he asks Calfa.

Calfa replies that the government "noted that the problem does exist, and we have agreed that Minister Dlouhy, who is a kind of a coordinator in the government, and who is responsible for this whole sphere, would—most probably after tomorrow's government session—meet trade union representatives. He does not know about this yet as he is not in Prague at present, but as soon as he returns he will be given this task and the matter should be clarified. I think, however, that it is necessary to understand that there are matters for the executive power and matters for the trade unions. I personally believe that in the course of the future talks in this sphere it would not be a bad thing for a representative of this union to be present. I think that many things would be clarified for them and about the actual situation in this sphere throughout the state. For the future, the administrative form of regulations is possibly not the best thing, and possibly this will be one of the first spheres where we will regulate the situation by the market mechanisms: that is, by price, supply, and demand," Calfa concludes.

Indexation of Pensions Planned for 1991

AU1510205890

[Editorial Report] Prague PRACE in Czech on 11 October on pages 1 and 3 carries a 500-word interview with Igor Tomes, deputy federal minister of labor and social affairs, by Jitka Skaloudova entitled "Indexation Is Knocking at the Door." The interview, the date and place of which are not given, deals with the proposal of the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs to introduce a system for the indexation of pensions. According to Tomes, both his ministry and the Council of Economic and Social Accord propose that the lowest pensions be adjusted according to the development of the cost of living (so that these pensions retain their real value) while the other pensions should be indexed to the growth in average wages (so that pensions cannot grow faster than income from gainful employment). Tomes says that indexation should first be applied on 1 November 1991 and, thereafter, on 1 November of every subsequent year. The proposal foresees that the pensions can also be adjusted on 1 May, if the annual increase in average wages exceeds 10 percent. In this case pensioners would receive 50 percent of the expected annual increase. No indexation will take place if the increase in average wages falls short of three percent. The percentage of the increase in pensions is to be announced by the government at least three months before it is due. Asked about the cost of indexation, Tomes says that each percentage of increase in pensions in the first year of indexation will cost 650 million korunas. The greater relative increase of the lowest pensions will cost 1.3 billion korunas.

Republican, Federal Banking Jurisdictions Delimited

AU1510094990 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 10 Oct 90 p 1

[Milada Doleckova article: "Financial Council in Unison"]

[Text] Monday's [8 October] Bratislava session of the Financial Council—the brains trust of our currency politics—was deciding on the key moments in the progress of the economic transformation and on the further economic coexistence of the Czechoslovak federation. Because of the Slovak-Czech exchange of verbal fire at a rather high level and the fundamental differences of opinion among the Financial Council members, the session was awaited not only with tension but also—or even above all—with quite strong anxiety. Eventually, the late Monday evening session demonstrated that sometimes the reverse of the saying "one hour in the morning is worth two in the evening" is true. We still managed to report the Financial Council consensus regarding this year's adjustments to the state budget and the outline of the budget policy for next year in the evening edition. The afternoon, however, brought the three finance ministers and the chairman of the Czechoslovak State Bank some hot moments—literally (as illustrated by the frequent ventilation of the room) as well as figuratively (as illustrated by the extension of the discussion into the late evening hours).

Eventually, the Financial Council decided that the system of direct taxes imposed on the population, enterprises, and corporations, as well as the system of indirect taxes, will be administered by a single federal law. Supplementary taxes like, for instance, road tolls, gift taxes, or inheritance taxes will be administered on the level of the individual republics.

The council clarified the confusion regarding the division of revenues from small privatization so that the receipts from the sale of privatized enterprises belonging to communities will go to the communities. The revenues from the privatization of purely state enterprises will be divided so that 70 percent will go to the state and the remainder to the communities. In order to prevent these amounts from creating overly high demand, the entire sum obtained from small privatization will be frozen for a period of two years, which, according to my opinion, is too short a period for such an amount of money (it is estimated at over 100 billion korunas). From circles close to the State Bank, however, I heard that employing this sum is considered to cover the credits of selected enterprises, the debts of which surpassed any realistic hope of being repaid from their own resources.

Creation of financial markets in connection with the introduction of the internal convertibility of the koruna was the next item on the agenda. The Financial Council again followed a rational principle and decided that the legislative foundation of the financial market should be formed on a federal basis. Of course, this does not mean that physically the financial exchange could only be in Prague—on the contrary, one can already now surmise that the exchange offices will appear in several locations of the federation.

The last item to be probed was an issue which apparently caused the greatest controversies among the council members: banking. The point of departure for the council was the logical premise that if the CSFR wants to be a single state, it must have a single currency and therefore a single currency system. The details of this currency system will be specified in a single Federal Assembly law. I consider this approach to be the alpha and omega of the entire problem, the key point at which any subsequent discussion on the concrete terms of the banking system will begin. The outline of the system is clear: There will be one center or directorate on the federal level and two centers on the level of the republics. The latter will participate in the formation of currency policies by full votes in the directorate. The arrangement of the central banking institution in Germany served as a model scheme, and not only because of its proved effectiveness, but also because that institution might become the nucleus of the future European bank.

I have gotten the impression that all participants in the council, be it from the federal level or from the individual republics, demonstrated identical efforts to find solutions that would preserve the federal character of the state. And because of these endeavors the solutions were found—the jurisdictions of the federation and of the republics in the areas of currency and budget were delimited. One can only hope that their borders will not be violated in the upcoming discussions and that nobody in the council will yield to external emotional or demagogic pressures.

State Bank Paper on Impact of Privatization Cited

AU1210135990 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 11 Oct 90 pp 1, 8

["jop, CTK"-signed report: "Federal Assembly Committees Discuss Small Privatization"]

[Excerpts] At their meeting yesterday afternoon, the Planning and Budget Committees of the Federal Assembly discussed the so-called small privatization. [passage omitted]

The Czechoslovak State Bank made available to the deputies its "Standpoint on the Financing of Small Privatization and its Monetary Consequences." This paper states, among other things, that small privatization will be accompanied by a formidable movement of capital, of which the population's own savings will represent the crucial source. The reduction in citizens' savings will reduce the inflation gap [inflacni mezera], which is a positive thing. The possibility of paying for the privatized property in installments amounts to an interest-free loan from the state. Staged repayment of these loans could endanger the repayment of money owed by the businesses that are to be auctioned off. The profits [of these businesses] could turn out to be lower than the loans that have to be repaid. The terms of these loans must not be made easier because this would maximize claims [for loans] and lower the [anti- inflationary] effect of the reduction in savings. As for the possibility of foreign capital buying up the privatized businesses with the help of "straw men," the bank states that this possibility cannot be completely eliminated. The funds obtained from the privatization must be frozen for at least two years, until consumer demand is sufficiently covered by the growth in supply. The Czechoslovak State Bank's standpoint came in handy because the aggregate purchase cost of the property to be auctioned off within the framework of small privatization is estimated at 200 billion korunas. Some 100,000 businesses will be offered for sale.

Finance Minister Comments on Budget Difficulties

LD1110232990 Prague CTK in English 2033 GMT 11 Oct 90

[Text] Prague, 11 Oct (CTK)—Czechoslovak Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus said today that it will be difficult to achieve the intentions approved by the parliament for the federal budget.

"The situation in the federal budget has been worsening since July," the minister told a press conference after a regular session of the cabinet today.

The minister did not rule out that despite the planned surplus of 5,400 million crowns the 1990 budget might end in the red. "If for instance oil would have to be imported at different prices and for different currencies (than intended)...we might easliy turn the budget from a surplus to a deficit. We are taking various measures to prevent this from happening," Klaus said and mentioned the suspension of grants for private housing construction announced on Monday [8 October].

He also reported on solutions reached in the disucssions on the division of powers between the federal and national governments in the financial and banking spheres. There will be a single legislation for the whole of Czechoslovakia on the system of taxes and on the financial market. Also the principle of a single monetary system and a single currency was adopted. Klaus compared the structure to that of the Federal Republic of Germany.

On the other hand, insurance legislation will be approved by each of Czechoslvoakia's two constituent republics.

Economics Minister Vladimir Dlouhy announced that government plans include a phasing out of coal-burning power plants, the construction of new oil pipelines, extension of transport networks and a decision on the construction of nuclear power plants.

Restructuring in ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy is aimed at phasing out nonprofit and material-intensive productions. State subsidies to some nonferrous metallurgy plants will end on January 1.

Dlouhy said that in agriculture, the ministries of the two republics will have the decisive say. State intervention is intended in agriculture but it is yet to be decided if this body of market regulation is to be one, on federal level, or two, i.e. one in the Czech and one in the Slovak Republic.

The cabinet approved at its session today draft trade agreements with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and with Albania which provide for mutual payments in hard currency and at world prices. A draft trade and payments agreement with Hungary, which was approved at the session, applies the same economic conditions.

Geological Study on Domestic Oil Reserves Cited

AU1210084090 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 8 Oct 90 p 8

["lr"-signed article: "How Much Crude Oil Do We Have?"]

[Excerpt] The total geological reserves of natural gas and crude oil in the CSFR are estimated at roughly 790 million tonnes. If we used as a point of departure the current consumption of crude oil in the national economy, we would arrive at the conclusion, using simple math, that these reserves should last decades. In this case, however, simple math is not applicable. According to the "General Project of Geological Research and Prospecting for Crude Oil and Natural Gas in the CSSR Up to the Year 2010" (this document is about one year old), from which we draw our data, the greater part of the geological (i.e. not necessarily recoverable) reserves is accounted for by natural gas. According to the well-known conversion table, 1,000 cubic meters of natural gas is equivalent to one tonne of crude oil. This "convertibility" is not always helpful, however, unless we could process natural gas directly into gasoline, for example.

The geological reserves in the Slovak Republic are estimated at 428 million tonnes of crude oil and natural gas. Almost 50 percent of these reserves are situated at a depth of more than 5,000 meters. Today's standard of technology and equipment, as well as the interpretation of the results of deep-hole drillings, do not, however, allow drill holes of the needed qualities in excess of 5,500 meters. It takes three to five years to drill such a hole and the prospecting itself, which consists of an exploratory, a preliminary, and a detailed [podrobna] stage, and the preparation of the deposit for extraction extend the preparatory period to 15 to 20 years. It costs billions and is not economical. Even the exploration of deposits up to a depth of 5,000 meters is not feasible without considerable subsidies. Resources allocated in the past never sufficed to finance the exploration of our crude oil and natural gas deposits. The originally projected expenditures on this research for the years 1990 to 1995 were 750 million korunas, which is very little.

There exist, however, far more efficient technologies in the world, especially in the United States, and it is to be hoped that one day we will come to an agreement with partners who are more advanced. [passage omitted]

Economics Minister: Gas Rationing To Stop 1 Nov

AU1110183290 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 10 Oct 90 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Federal Minister of Economy Vladimir Dlouhy, by Zdenek John and Jiri Leschtina in Prague on 9 October: "The Oil Puzzle Continues"; first paragraph is MLADA FRONTA DNES introduction]

[Excerpt] Yesterday's session of the crisis staff of the Federal Government, which considered, under the chairmanship of CSFR Minister of Economy Vladimir Dlouhy, our present oil puzzle from various angles, did not end before the late afternoon. Immediately after its conclusion, we asked Minister Dlouhy:

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] How did the crisis staff react to the public's criticism of the administrative approach to the regulation of fuel sales? In today's issue of our newspaper, for example, we report on the recommendation of the Federal Assembly's economic committees that the government abandon the rationing system.

[Dlouhy] All members of the crisis staff, which is comprised of representatives of the Federal Ministry of Finance, the Czech and Slovak Ministries of Industry and Strategic Planning, as well as representatives of the petrochemical industry, including the directors of the most important petrochemical enterprises, agreed that the rationing system should be waived. We will propose that the governments raise the price of gasoline to 16 korunas [for 91-octane gasoline] and 18 korunas [for 96-octane gasoline] per liter as of 1 November. We have also worked out a system for compensating disabled citizens [for the increased fuel cost]. The rationing system whereby car owners may purchase up to 25 liters of gasoline a month for a lower price should be abolished [as of 1 November]. As of 15 October, the allocation will be increased from 25 to 40 liters. We have worked out a detailed system for monitoring compliance with the administrative system of gasoline sales. I shall not, for understandable reasons, reveal the nature of these control measures. We do not consider them to be a panacea, however, because every rationing system gives speculators a chance. [passage omitted]

Pithart Criticizes Federal Legislators

AU1610100290 Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech 10 Oct 90 p 4

["From the Speech by Czech Premier Petr Pithart" at the fifth meeting of the Czech National Council; in Prague on 9 October: "Behind the Scenes of Privatization"]

[Text] I consider it my duty to inform you about an event which stirred up, and continues to stir up, our public's excitement—the meeting of the three governments at Kromeriz and, above all, what preceded it.

The Czech Republic Government understood very well the significance of the so-called small privatization. Yet it not only understood it but, as I want to prove to you, it also drew from this understanding the essential conclusions and acted quickly and energetically.

Petr Pithart went on to speak about the sequence in which the draft law was discussed.

I would like to inform you that, as in many other recent cases, the federal legislators did not respect the constitutional principles of the division of powers between the federation and the republics and submitted a draft which regulates issues, the regulation of which is not within the competence of the federation.

This was the first serious shortcoming of the proposals submitted by the federal legislators, one which it was impossible to eliminate at Kromeriz. But there were other shortcomings as well.

On the basis of the conclusions of an extraordinary session of the Czech Republic Government, which ended late at night, the Czech Republic legislators revised the draft. As I have already said, representatives of the secretariats of the Legislative Councils of the Federal and Slovak Governments as well as representatives of the republican ministries for privatization also participated in this revision. As you can see, we opted for a course of action that is absolutely without precedent, leaving aside any prestige considerations.

The draft of the law on small privatization prepared by the Czech Republic Government became the foundation for the talks at Kromeriz. All participants in the talks admitted that this draft is the only possible basis for further negotiations.

What were the bones of contention? I would like to introduce a bit more clarity into this issue, which is connected with the so-called preferment [of current employees of businesses that are to be privatized]. We did, of course, consider the interests of the current employees of businesses as well as the interests of those who would like to bid for them in auctions. Most of all, however, we considered the interests of 16 million consumers.

After the talks at Kromeriz, all these considerations were, in my opinion, presented in a rather confusing way—as a dispute between sentimental moralists on the one hand and modern, consistent, and practically-minded liberals, advocates of a market economy, and advocates of equality before the law—i.e. those who realize that dirty money needs to be laundered one day so that we may finally collect taxes from it—on the other. In other words, it was presented as a dispute between bashful left-wingers who let themselves be influenced in their decisions by the slogan "Shops should belong to those who sell in them" and who therefore want to give priority, cost what it may, even to those shop assistants who embitter our lives today by their notoriously disobliging attitude and between radical innovators who prefer new and dynamic entrepreneurs. I must say that never, at any stage of the negotiations, was there any doubt—neither on the Czech nor on the other two governments' part—that current employees should enjoy some form of preferment. The only pending issue was the extent of this preferment. Likewise, there never were any doubts about why current employees should be preferred. I believe that my colleague Mr. Meciar simplified the matter a bit when he started the news conference at Kromeriz with his vehement opening statement in which he spoke about the dirty money of butchers, greengrocers, and waiters and about dirty money being on both sides of would-be prospective owners.

This was not the point or, at least, the main consideration. The basic argument in favor of preferment was not so much the fear of dirty money—which, I am afraid, will get its way anyway—but the fear of too greedy money: The fear that the so-called small privatization, if carried out without any form of preferment, could literally take apart the structure of our retailing network at the expense of those 16 million consumers. Preferment is therefore a certain—and I stress this, only certain—guarantee of a stable retailing, service, and catering network, or at least a guarantee of its gradual, and not reckless, transformation. It also guarantees that this transformation will not be motivated only by the scramble for quick profit but also by respect for the customer.

The final proposal whereby current employees will be able to repay 50 percent of the purchase price in installments over a period of five years after the signing of the purchase contract is therefore a necessary compromise.

Civic Forum Attacks Against Meciar Criticized

AU1110114490 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 5 Oct 90 p 3

[Igor Cibula commentary: "An Ugly Example of the Alliance Between Civic Forum and the Public Against Violence Movement"]

[Text] Since the legendary meeting involving three governments in Trencianske Teplice, Premier Vladimir Meciar has, almost regularly, been the target of attacks led by journalists from Prague press. Even the Office of the President has begun contributing to this campaign through its press spokesman, Michael Zantovsky. Federalists burdened with Czechoslovakism cannot swallow

Meciar's consistency when he pushes for Slovak interests within the framework of the Czechoslovak federation. This is why they take every opportunity to compromise him in the eyes of the Czech public as an unfit partner for Prague political representatives.

The weekly FORUM, which is published by the Civic Forum Coordinating Center, is particularly outstanding in these efforts. Many readers of this periodical have gained the impression that its chief editor must have good contacts with the Regional Administration of the National Security Corps in Kosice, or, as the case may be, with the branch of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Democracy—from which FORUM draws information about the so-called Demikat affair—which is located there. The destiny of this former State Security member is a rewarding subject from the journalistic point of view and serves the purpose of casting doubts on the authority of the Slovak Republic premier.

The article in the latest issue of FORUM goes beyond the framework of journalistic criticism which the politicians in democratic conditions must be used to. These are not only blows below the belt, but are explicit lies which cast doubt upon the author's intent to present the authentic truth to his readers. For example, it would be sufficient if the author checked with the Faculty of Law at Comenius University in Bratislava about when the Slovak premier graduated in law, or when he was awarded the right to use the title JUDr. [LLD]

It is certainly possible to scrutinize the allegations regarding Premier Vladimir Meciar which appear in the above-mentioned article. It would also be useful to note what the circumstances were which provoked the aversion of the Kosice police top brass toward the former Slovak Republic interior minister. Some believe that its roots stem from the days when federal Interior Minister Richard Sacher appointed the Chief Commander of the National Security Corps Regional Administration in Kosice to his post; Meciar, at that time, objected that this had happened without his knowledge, despite the fact that he held the office of Slovak interior minister.

Political insults against Meciar in Civic Forum's paper are not a good example of the alliance between Civic Forum and the Public Against Violence movement. It could be understood as indirect evidence that the political line represented by the Slovak premier is accepted in Civic Forum's circles with clenched teeth. For this reason Prague Castle should also be more restrained when presenting its standpoints on how Slovak representatives accept participation in Czechoslovak state representation.

OF Deputies Found Internal Right-Wing 'Club'

AU1210134690 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 11 Oct 90 pp 1, 3

["ij"-signed report: "Questions for the Czech Government"]

[Excerpts] Prague—The plenary meeting of the Czech National Council continued yesterday with deputies' interpellations. [passage omitted]

Some Czech National Council and Federal Assembly deputies for the Civic Forum [OF] set up the Interparliamentary Club of the Democratic Right [Meziparlamentni klub demokraticke pravice]. During yesterday's meeting of the Czech National Council they familiarized other deputies with their aims. They intend to press for the coupon method of privatization, for a market exchange rate of the koruna, and for a firm stand against groups that would like to delay the economic reform. Their concept of the constitutional setup of the state is based on the premise that the powers of the republics ought to be derived from the powers of the federation. They see a guarantee of the state's security in the promotion of contacts with NATO member countries, which is conditional on the observance of all conventions on human rights and national minorities. "We want to put an end to political ambiguity," the Interparliamentary Club of the Democratic Right, which held its first meeting on 25 September, said in its statement. [passage omitted]

Right-Wing Group Formed Within Civic Form

AU1510152490 Prague CTK in English 0758 GMT 12 Oct 90

[Text] Prague Oct 12 (CTK)—Almost sixty deputies of the Federal Assembly and the Czech National Council today announced they were forming a right-wing group within the Civic Forum (OF), the movement which gained an overall majority in the federal and Czech parliaments in last June's elections.

OF, founded by leaders of the reform movement during the public demonstrations against the communist regime last November, has so far been reluctant to constitute itself as a political party and has said it would represent a wide spectrum of views. In the absence of any major right-wing political force in Czechoslovakia, and especially the Czech Republic, many commentators have noted OF's increasingly left-wing orientation.

"We want to put an end to political ambiguity," the deputies said in a statement which appeared in the independent daily LIDOVE NOVINY today.

They announced the formation of the interparliamentary group of democratic right wing associating deputies of liberal, conservative and similar streams within the OF.

In a statement of principles they described promotion of contacts with NATO states as the best way of ensuring the security of Czechoslovakia. They urged the government to take a resolute stand against groups attempting to delay economic reform and supported the coupon method of privatization in which state property would be handed out free to the population. They committed themselves to support for the federal order and regretted that disputes over the division of powers between the

federal authorities and those in the constituent republics hamper economic reform and the solution of social issues.

The statement was signed by 36 deputies of the Federal Assembly and 21 members of the Czech National Council out of 118 and 127 deputies in the Federal and the Czech Parliament respectively. The group is chaired by Daniel Kroupa, a member of the Civic Democratic Alliance, one of the minor political parties which ran in the elections on the OF list.

The OF is active in the Czech Republic, the larger of Czechoslovakia's two constituent parts, while in Slovakia the role of a civic movement has been played by the Public Against Violence (VPN) movement.

Civic Forum Urged To Become Political Party

AU1210173690

[Editorial Report] Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech on 11 October on page 3 carries a 600-word "appeal" by the "founding members of the Civic Forum [OF] group in the Hostivar Machine Tool Factory," entitled "Most Votes, the Greatest Responsibility."

The appeal criticizes the "present activity of the OF," saying that it "provides no guarantee that a way will be found out of the present crisis" in Czechoslovakia. It proposes the "transformation of the OF from a movement into a political party with a program of radical economic reforms, without any false and dangerous toying with the idea of some sort of a 'social market economy'." The appeal also proposes that, "in view of the absolute lack of concept of the Public Against Violence [VPN] movement," the OF's sister organization in Slovakia, the OF should spread its activity to Slovakia and become a federally operating political party.

The appeal stresses that the state, the government, and the public need a "well-functioning mechanism of political parties" and that it is "dangerous nonsense" to claim that a "broad-based movement" has advantages over a political party.

In concluding, the members of the Hostivar OF group describe the upcoming OF Assembly as "one of the last chances, if not the last chance" to reverse the recent negative developments. They warn that "should some leading OF representatives disagree with the formation of a political party, we shall not regard them as our representatives any longer."

Civic Forum States Support for Calfa, Vacek

LD1210213490 Prague CTK in English 1543 GMT 12 Oct 90

[Text] Prague Oct 12 (CTK)—The Civic Forum, the strongest political movement in the Czech Republic, continues supporting Czechoslovak Premier Marian Calfa and Defence Minister Miroslav Vacek in spite of some recent reports about them in the daily press, Civic Forum representatives told newsmen today.

Zdenek Jicinsky and Martin Palous reacted to student calls for the resignation of Calfa and Vacek, both former communists.

The Civic Forum will hold an assembly tomorrow and most likely elect a chairman of the movement, which led the last November revolutionary drive in Czechoslovakia. Martin Palous is the only candidate so far for the post.

Reacting to questions whether the time had not come to change the "velvet gloves for an iron fist," called for by tens of thousands of people in Prague's old town square Thursday, Palous said "we do not intend replacing one period of unlawfulness and injustice by another one. We are shaping a law-observing state and creating legal conditions for these changes."

Jicinsky stated that "we regarded it as a virtue that development following November (1989) was kept within a certain legal framework. We think it is a virtue of our development whilst being aware of all problems connected with it. We do not think we should change this line".

Civic Forum Members Discuss Upcoming Assembly

LD1310045490 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1730 GMT 12 Oct 90

[Report on the "regular news conference" of the Coordinating Center of the Civic Forum on 12 October in Prague]

[Text] Apart from Vladimir Zelezny, the press spokesman of the Civic Forum's Coordinating Center, Professor Zdenek Jicinsky and Martin Palous, members of Civic Forum's Collegium, also answered journalists' questions today.

Asked how he sees the state of affairs in the Civic Forum before tomorrow's assembly, Prof. Zdenek Jicinsky replied:

[Begin Jicinsky recording] I have formed an impression that the entire Czechoslovak society was in crisis and that it was very complicated and difficult to get out of this crisis. The entire political structure that exists here is only just being formed, and everything is at the very beginning. The Forum has given within its framework a scope to the activities of smaller political parties and it has understood itself to be a base for the formation of political pluralism in Czechoslovakia. In other words, I would not want to talk here about a crisis in the Civic Forum.

We have reached a certain development state with which we had to reckon, and in such a complicated and eventful period we are living through at present it can naturally never be predicted beforehand when certain

degrees of such development will appear. We, ourselves, however, believe that the Civic Forum continues to form the main base for the main political current which bears responsibility for what is happening in Czechoslovakia.

The Civic Forum assumed this responsibility by its victory in the elections, and this platform is, in my judgement, still the base for the activities of the Civic Forum, despite the existence of the Club of Democratic Right within the Civic Forum's framework in the Federal Assembly and the Czech National Council. [end recording]

Journalists were, furthermore, assured that the Civic Forum's Coordinating Center was cooperating with the other Civic Forum organizations in regions and districts and was informed about their activities.

It was confirmed once again that Martin Palous was the sole candidate proposed to the post of Civic Forum's chairman. Tomorrow's assembly ought to also discuss Ladislav Lis's proposal to disqualify candidates to local government bodies due to their possible cooperation with the former state security service.

At the close of the news conference, on the question of whether the time has not come to swap velvet gloves for an iron fist, as called for by demonstrators at the Old Town Square yesterday, Martin Palous said that they did not intend to replace one period of unlawfulness and wrong doings by another one.

Professor Zdenek Jicinsky added that the fact that the development after 17 November has been held successfully within a certain legal framework has been regarded as a virtue. We believe, he said, that this is a virtue of our development, despite the awareness of all problems linked with it. We do not believe that we ought to change this course. If this happend, it would not be a success but a failure of our democratic process, Prof. Zdenek Jicinsky said in concluding his view.

Civic Forum Congress on Political, Economic Line

LD1310210490 Prague CTK in English 1913 GMT 13 Oct 90

[Text] Prague, 13 Oct (CTK)—A Civic Forum congress of the Czech Republic is held in Prague today, dealing with the fundamental political line and questions connected with the economic reform.

Member of the Civic Forum Council Jan Stern spoke of the political line concept and stressed that the Civic Forum will apply the principle of state unity, while preserving the biggest autonomy possible for both republics. He spoke of such a division of powers which would accelerate—and not impede—the procedure of constitutional and economic reform. The Federal Government has submitted a blueprint for the reform which is in harmony with the election program of the Civic Forum, he said.

Member of the Civic Forum Coordinating Centre Board, Federal Deputy Premier Pavel Rychetsky, said that the communist totalitarian power has been removed only from the political centre of the state but the communist structures occupy today lower positions of state power and administration and even the economic management apparatus, posing the biggest obstacle for the realization of the Civic Forum intentions.

The continuation of the economic reform requires a much firmer political unity of the Civic Forum, Czechoslovak Economy Minister Vladimir Dlouhy told the Civic Forum congress here today.

In connection with the statement by communist chief Vasil Mohorita, he said that the question now arises if people who are today members of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia can maintain their functions if the party proclaims publicly that it does not support the blueprint for the economic reform.

Civic Forum representatives from Prague and Litomerice, North Bohemia, voiced objections to the policy of Czech Premier Petr Pithart.

Czechoslovak Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus said that Czechoslovakia is experiencing a dramatic period when the fate of everybody is at stake. The Civic Forum must play a dominating role. Therefore people who act in the name of the Civic Forum must be certain of having its real support. He said he himself does not have this certainty which is quite a paralyzing factor. One of the reasons may be that his opinion is dramatically different from the clearly prevailing opinion of the Civic Forum. The second reason may be that the current Civic Forum representatives insufficiently reflect the prevailing opinion of its supporters, Klaus said.

First deputy chairman of the Federal Assembly (parliament) stressed the Civic Forum responsibility for the political stability in the country. He spoke in this connection of demands for the resignation of some personalities which emerged from the Civic Forum and underlined that too quick changes in the leading functions might weaken the confidence of the public in the movement.

Czechoslovak Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus was elected at a Civic Forum congress here tonight chairman of the movement which won the June parliamentary elections in Czechoslovakia.

Vaclav Klaus was born on June 19, 1941. He graduated from the Prague School of Economics in 1963. In 1966 he studied in Italy and in 1969 in the USA. In 1963-1970 he worked in the Economic Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. After dismissal he was employed in the State Bank of Czechoslovakia and in 1988-1989 in the Prognostic Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences.

He became member of the Civic Forum Coordinating Centre in November 1989 and was appointed finance

minister in December. He is deputy to the House of the People of the Federal Assembly (parliament) for the Civic Forum. Vaclav Klaus is without party affiliation.

The other candidate for the function was Martin Palous.

Czech Parliament Debates, Passes Two Laws

AU1210111390 Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech 10 Oct 90 p 1

["vrz"-signed report: "Prague As a Single Community"]

[Excerpts] Prague— Only two laws—on the capital city of Prague and on district authorities—are on the agenda of the fifth meeting of the Czech National Council [CNR], which CNR Chairwoman Dagmar Buresova opened yesterday, in the presence of the Czech Republic Government.

Before the debate on the two laws started, Czech Premier Petr Pithart asked that he be allowed to inform the deputies about the Kromeriz meeting of the three governments and the negotiations which preceded it. [passage omitted]

The law on the capital has a long history. [passage omitted] The version which the CNR deputies approved yesterday is already the second one. Its basic philosophy is that Prague will be conceived as a single community. Only such a concept guarantees the preservation of all the essential functions of the city (environmental protection, transportation, energy supply, etc.) in the interest of its residents. At the same time the law significantly reinforces the powers the individual parts of the city. [passage omitted]

The second draft on the agenda of yesterday's CNR session was the bill on district authorities [zakon o okresnich uradech]. It is connected with the abolition of the existing system of national committees as a relic of centralized bureaucratic management. The new social mechanisms have made it necessary to separate local self-administration from state administration.

The powers of the present district national committees will, under this law, be transferred partly to the local representative bodies and partly to district authorities. For a transitional period (which must not extend beyond 31 December 1992), i.e. until communities become economically self-supporting, the district authorities will also fulfill some economic functions.

The strongest objection raised in the debate came from K. Prochazka (Movement for Self-Governing Democracy), who branded the law as anti-Moravian, setting the seal on the postwar discrimination of the Moravian-Silesian land, and called on the Moravian deputies to reject the law on district authorities. [passage omitted]

In their reaction to this statement, a number of deputies described the appeal of the Movement for Self-Governing Democracy as a destructive initiative. Czech Premier P. Pithart also spoke in this spirit.

In the evening the deputies approved the government draft of the CNR law on district authorities, the regulation of their powers, and some related measures in the wording of the joint report of the CNR committees.

Session Ends, New Body Set Up

AU1210134390 Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech 11 Oct 90 pp 1, 4

["vrz"-signed report: "Package of Interpellations; the Fifth Meeting of the Czech National Council Continued"]

[Excerpts] Prague— The second day of the Czech parliament's meeting was devoted exclusively to deputies' interpellations, questions, and comments. [passage omitted]

The interpellations concerned questions of employment policy, the unemployment of university and high school graduates, preferential court rehabilitations, the indemnification of political prisoners of the fifties, the Romany problem, care of disabled and elderly citizens, etc. [passage omitted]

In his closing address, Czech Republic Premier P. Pithart recommended to the Czech National Council Presidium the possibility of regular meetings between ministers and deputies to discuss partial and local problems. Czech National Council meetings could then provide greater scope for the solution of deputies' interpellations concerning serious problems. [passage omitted]

During the noon recess, the highest body for so-called collective bargaining in the Czech Republic was ceremonially constituted—the Council of Social Accord [Rada socialni dohody]. This tripartite body has 21 members (seven representatives of trade unions, seven government members, and seven representatives of private entrepreneurs). The council will formulate joint standpoints of the parties represented in it with the aim of forestalling critical social shocks accompanying the economic reform. This method has acquitted itself well elsewhere in the world.

The fifth meeting of the Czech National Council ended in the evening.

Protest Outside Bohemia, Moravia Party Congress

LD1310210590 Prague CTK in English 1955 GMT 13 Oct 90

[Text] Prague, 13 Oct (CTK)—Some 2,300 demonstrators assembled this morning in Olomouc, north Moravia, in front of the building where the first congress of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, attended by over 600 delegates, started.

The demonstration was convened by the Professional Union of Students, the Civic Forum and several political parties in Olomouc. Demonstrators chanted slogans

against the holding of the congress, against the Communist Party and its representatives.

Chairman of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia Jiri Machalik dealt in his almost 60-minute address with the current social situation in Czechoslovakia. The Communist Party is honestly striving to respect the national understanding policy which is being nevertheless replaced by a line of political and social retaliation, he said, adding that communists have been driven to a verge of society.

"The incorrect policy of the ruling parties in the former socialist countries is to blame for the current situation. We have also adopted the Soviet model and our party has become a state party and ruled out its political partners from a factual share in power," Machalik said, adding that in the future communists should act according to the principle that they are only one of equal parts of the left-wing political spectrum.

Dealing with the past of the Communist Party, Machalik said he cannot accept such an interpretation of the postwar development which describes the attempt at creating a socially just society as a diabolical conspiracy and its 40-year existence as an evil empire. "We do not deny co-responsibility for the mistakes of the past years but we do not think that they should become a one-sided argument, a would-be panacea for all current disorders."

He also spoke of the Communist Party relation to the trade unions and the economic reform. "In fact we are not against big privatization. We only warn against rash and irresponsible sale of joint riches. Privatization cannot be the aim but only a means of increasing the effectiveness of the national economy," Jiri Machalik said.

Organizers of the congress told CTK that they received an anonymous call that a bomb had been placed in the building where the congress is being held.

45-years-old film director Jiri Svoboda was elected today chairman of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia at the party congress in Olomouc, North Moravia.

Jiri Machalik, former chairman, gained the second highest number of votes.

Bohemian-Moravian Communist Party Congress Ends

LD1510034590 Prague CTK in English 1835 GMT 14 Oct 90

[Text] Prague Oct 14 (CTK)—The first congress of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia ended in Olomouc, north Moravia, today with a surprise—none of the two candidates for the chairman of the Council of the Federation of Communists of Czechoslovakia gained the necessary absolute majority of votes.

Vasil Mohorita, first secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, gained only 314 and Miroslav Grebenicek, historian from Masaryk University in Brno and deputy to the Federal Assembly (parliament), 322 votes. The congress was attended by 648 delegates.

The delegates agreed that it is not necessary to recall Vasil Mohorita from the Presidium of the Federal Assembly and Defence Minister Miroslav Vacek from his function.

New chairman of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia Jiri Svoboda told CTK that the ideas included in the program of the party and in its economic and social program, which the congress adopted, demonstrate a fundamental change in the attitude to political partners and the whole society. He voiced his belief that honest communists will strive for a change of the Communist Party into a modern left-wing party which will be recognized by the majority of society.

Communist Property Expropriation News Conference

LD1110201590 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1730 GMT 11 Oct 90

[Text] Communist Party property was discussed today not only at the Federal Government session, but also at a news conference of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia. Our editor Marie Fajsigova reports:

[Fajsigova] Jiri Machalik, the chairman of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia said that only the Federal Assembly will assess whether the proposal for expropriation of communist property is in agreement with the ideals of democratic society. He said at the same time that this very day, today—that is, the day of the government session—Communists proposed that they would give up all their property to the state. They only want to keep immovable assets which they acquired after 17 November, and also the necessary existential minimum.

At the request of journalists, Jiri Machalik defined this minimum by saying that, in every district, it should apply to property with the value of about 1 million korunas because district party committees need, among other things, computers, fax machines, duplicators, and cars. In addition, the Central Committee must have property worth 50 million korunas.

Let us now put aside financial affairs. In connection with the approaching Czech and Moravian congress, we have also learned at this news conference that the Communist Party has about 700,000 members in Czechoslovakia and that it acquired 15,000 new members after 17 November.

Journalists were, however, most interested in the words of Vasil Mohorita on Sunday [7 October] about the end of national understanding and the restoration of Czechoslovak Communist Party organizations in enterprises.

While we can read in RUDE PRAVO in the morning that the Communist deputy chairman of the Czech National Council, Michal Kraus, said that nothing is more important for our republic than national understanding, and that it would be silly for party organizations to make a comeback in enterprises. In the afternoon, Jiri Machalik claimed communists were not the first who said the period of national understanding is over. He did not make any comment on the formation of party organizations in enterprises.

When asked whether Vasil Mohorita harmed or benefited the party with his statement, Jiri Machelik honestly said: It is difficult to say.

Number of Czech Unemployed 'Almost Doubled'

AU1110184490 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 9 Oct 90 p 2

[Article by Renata Hrbkova, Czech Republic Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs press spokeswoman: "Half of the Unemployed Are Manual Workers"]

[Text] The number of newly registered unemployed in the Czech Republic has increased by 81 percent in comparison with the previous month. This figure has almost doubled. In August, 9,297 people applied for employment at district national committee employment departments and labor exchanges; in September, 16,836 people applied at the appropriate institutions. A total of 24,597 people were seeking employment in the Czech Republic at the end of September. Of the approximately five million citizens who are capable of working, 0.5 percent of them are unemployed.

Almost half the overall number of unemployed are manual workers. Among the remaining unemployed are 1,192 university graduates and 3,410 high school graduates. Since the end of August, their number has doubled. This is a consequence of the centralist method of planning the number of students and the necessary number of employees in certain sectors of the national economy. The newly established labor exchanges, which are now operating in the majority of districts in the Czech Republic, have instructions from the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs to devote increased attention to finding employment for these young people.

A fundamental problem affecting the labor force's free movement is a shortage of apartments and beds in dormitories. This is a particular problem for families with children. In all regions, including the border districts, job vacancies with the possibility of lodgings have, so to speak, disappeared.

Of the almost 25,000 people who are looking for work, only 11,544 of them are materially provided for, that is, they are receiving support while they are unemployed. They are the people who have been unsuccessful in joining the labor force within 15 days of their registration. In comparison with last month, the number of citizens who are not interested in work and who intentionally refuse to cooperate with staff in unemployment services has fallen.

The overall number of job vacancies has rapidly decreased, although their number remains very much in excess of the number seeking employment. Since August the number of vacancies has fallen by 10,000. However, it is often the case that enterprises advertise vacancies which do not correspond to reality. Their number changes from day to day for a number of reasons, the most serious of which is the organization's uncertain future prospects.

Chancellery of President To Open in Bratislava

AU1610100590

[Editorial Report] Bratislava SMENA in Slovak on 12 October on page 1, under the headline "Bratislava Is Not a Maneuver," publishes a 500-word interview with Karel Schwarzenberg, Chancellery of the President director, by Tibor Bucha, SMENA correspondent. The place and date of the interview are not given. Bucha refers to Prince Schwarzenberg's visit to Bratislava as a proof of the imminence of the opening of the Chancellery of the President in that city and he asks whether this is "a matter of trust, necessity, or a tactical maneuver." Schwarzenberg explains that the opening of a branch office is a necessity for "several federal offices as well as some ministries are to move to Bratislava," and, in order to emphasize the position of "Bratislava as the second seat of the president, the Chancellery is to be located in the present Slovak National Council building."

Asked whether the Bratislava location was chosen because of the proximity of the prince's family in Vienna, Schwarzenberg laughs and says that although he will help at the beginning, the Bratislava office will be staffed by Slovaks.

Federal Official Rejects Slovak Ideas

AU1110131990

[Editorial Report] Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech on 10 October on page 2 carries a 700-word statement by Josef Kreuter, deputy federal minister for strategic planning, entitled "The Interests of the Entire Economy." The statement is published in response to a statement by Slovak Government Commissioner Engineer Lubomir Dolgos concerning disagreements between the Federal and Slovak Governments over the division of powers in the area of demonopolization policy.

Kreuter contests Dolgos' statement that the commission of experts set up to deal with this issue agreed that the enactment of antimonopoly policy would be within the jurisdiction of the republics. He says that representatives of the Federal Government represented in the commission did not agree to this as "this solution is inconsistent with the principle of establishing homogeneous market conditions on the territory of the entire federation and

would palpably upset the prerequisites for the implementation of the scenario of the economic reform." Kreuter asserts that a uniform antimonopoly policy is essential and that only a federal body availing itself of the necessary powers can guarantee such a policy. In his view, the federal body should be able to "oversee the decisions of the republican antimonopoly bodies and correct their decisions if necessary." He also argues that even within the framework of the EC, the policy on economic competition and monopolies is coordinated at the level of the community and that only a federal body can be an "acceptable partner for transnational organizations such as GATT, OECD, and the EC."

He concludes his statement by saying: "Mr. Dolgos will have to decide what kind of an economy he is aiming for—a Slovak economy as part of a single CSFR economy and, potentially, after some time, of a single EC economy, or a separate, single economy of Slovakia. Each of these alternatives has, of course, completely different logical premises and different consequences."

Slovak Body Rejects Federal Government Paper

AU1510204590

[Editorial Report] Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak on 12 October on page 3 carries a 650-word Peter Vojtech report on the 11 October Bratislava session of the Slovak Government Council for Economic Management. The report is published under the headline "The Federal Authorities' Inadequate Approach." One of the items on the agenda of the session was the "draft of state structural policy," a paper prepared by the Federal Government. According to Rudolf Filkus, Slovak minister for economic strategy, the "negative aspects of this paper significantly outweigh the positive aspects. The paper contains conclusions which the republican governments were not consulted on. These conclusions are not balanced and give a one-sided preference to the structural needs of the Czech Republic. Only about one-sixth of the projected volume of foreign loans and assistance is to be allocated to Slovakia. Minister Rudolf Filkus therefore recommended that the draft be discussed only as information and that the proposed resolutions not be approved." According to the VEREJNOST report, the council finally proposed a "substantial revision of the material."

Slovak Political Party Assembly Elects Leaders

AU1210161690 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 11 Oct 90 p 1

[Martin Krno report: "Assembly of Political Parties, Movements, and Associations: Aspiration To Be a Platform for the Presentation of Alternative Solutions"]

[Excerpts] Bratislava—"The Assembly is a democratic platform for the interaction of civic associations, political parties, and movements. It seeks the civic public's informal participation in solving problems of general interest. It applies the principles of voluntarism, equality, independence, openness, collective membership, and democratic consensus and observes the principles of mutual tolerance and respect. It stands up against racial intolerance, fascism, war propaganda, tyranny, social deprivation, and totalitarianism," states the preamble of the "Statutes of the Assembly of Political Parties, Movements, and Associations in the Slovak Republic."

This document was approved at yesterday's meeting of the Assembly's Central Committee. [passage omitted]

Anton Tazky, the Assembly's chairman, said on this occasion that the Assembly is not a "painted over" National Front, whose activity in Slovakia terminated on 21 March of this year. The coordination between various organizations is also essential to safeguard the gains of the November revolution. More and more often we encounter instances of violation of democratic principles by the governing movements and parties, as well as attacks on personalities who did not compromise themselves in the last 20 years. Opposition groups do not have sufficient access to state-run mass media and the chance to put across their views and stands on proposed and approved laws. The discussion confirmed that the Assembly should be neither a pro-government nor an opposition force but a platform for the presentation of alternative solutions to serious social problems.

A total of 58 special interest organizations and 16 political parties have joined the Assembly so far, only one of which—the Communist Party of Slovakia—is represented in parliament. (The Green Party asked to be granted observer status). In a secret ballot, Anton Tazky (Slovak Union of Anti-Fascist Fighters) was elected chairman of the Assembly by a great majority of votes. Jan Sekaj (Party of Democratic Socialists) and Miroslav Janek (Liberal Democratic Party) were elected deputy chairmen.

Slovak Commentary Reacts to Czech Criticism

AU1210090090 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 9 Oct 90

[Igor Cibula commentary: "A Reaction of Passive Czechism"]

[Text] Sunday's [7 October] television address by [Slovak] Premier Vladimir Meciar, which was devoted to some of the practices of Prague Castle—or rather, of its officials—regarding Slovak state representation, has not received anything like the publicity the Czech press gave to the critical statement made by Michael Zantovsky, the president's press secretary, which was targeted upon the most senior Slovak representatives in connection with the Brazilian president's visit to Czechoslovakia. Just a few Prague newspapers considered it worthwhile to familiarize their readers with the Slovak premier's abovementioned television address.

This coincides with the malicious practices adopted by Czech journalists who, since the "hyphen war," have still

not managed to come to terms with the "Czech petty bourgeois" superiority complex. How the Prague daily HOSPODARSKE NOVINY—which is close to the Federal Government—referred to the nationwide Matica Slovenska [Slovak Heritage Foundation] assembly in support of the legalization of the Slovak language and the amount of space it devoted to Meciar's television "denial" is perhaps typical of their understanding of the situation in Slovakia. While the premier was merely allocated one column on the back page, HOSPODARSKE NOVINY placed the Matica's cultural event on the first page under the headline "Tedious Massage of Nationalism."

The information contained beneath this headline is not incorrect, but it conceals the other side of the coin from the uninformed Czech reader—conditions in southern Slovakia. It avoids the core of the problem, that is, the unwillingness of some members of the Hungarian ethnic minority to use Slovak in official—or rather, public—contacts. Nor does it mention the instances of discrimination against Slovaks living in ethnically mixed districts in southern Slovakia.

By coincidence, the above mentioned issue of HOSPODARSKE NOVINY carries an interview with Jaroslav Sabata, a Czech Government minister, in which he recalls the phenomenon of "passive Czechism which lives with the feeling that the state is falling apart and which becomes aggressively anti-Slovak." The Chartist dissident Sabata has hit the nail on the head; it is just a pity that we do not find many like him and Czech Premier Petr Pithart among Czech politicians. Perhaps, in this case, we would also find more Prague journalists who, as far as Czech-Slovak relations are concerned, would be able to see further than the optical equipment installed at Prague Castle allows them to.

Deputy Premier Carnogursky on Slovak Independence

AU1310164390 Bratislava SMENA in Slovak 11 Oct 90 pp 1,3

[Interview with Jan Carnogursky, Slovak first deputy premier and chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement, by Karol Jezik and Lubo Lazovy; place and date not given: "The Gyroscopic Principle"]

[Excerpts] [Jezik] In April and May it seemed that the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] would come out on top in the elections. However, your movement received considerably fewer votes than you obviously envisaged. Why?

[Carnogursky] If the KDH was expected to receive more votes, then perhaps it was also mechanically assumed that the situation was the same as in 1946. Public opinion polls in April and May had suggested a larger number of votes. Perhaps we also received fewer votes because we did not know how to present our program to the public in a sufficiently interesting manner. It is possible that the intellectual atmosphere in this country has not changed as much as we thought. Political changes, as well as changes in higher political ranks at various levels of society, took place following the revolution. What I mean by the unchanged intellectual atmosphere is that there is still a rather reserved attitude toward Christianity in the mass media. There were also some other circumstances which had an effect.

[Jezik] We agree that the intellectual atmosphere has still not markedly changed. The people and parties which are not striving for intellectual creativity, but which are exploiting the emotional and instinctive atmosphere have sufficient fertile ground for their activities.

[Carnogursky] You are probably correct; this is one tier of the republic's spiritual climate. Democracy has freed the way for these forces. But another tier of the republic's spiritual climate—the one I have in mind—is still rooted in 1968 in illusions about "democratic socialism" and in the idealized points of view expressed by communists from the 1950's.

[Jezik] Even among KDH supporters the opinion prevails that you made grave errors during the preelection campaign. Your ideas about Czech-Slovak relations and your attitude toward Hungarians in southern Slovakia, however, were considered at that time by undecided voters and by non-KDH voters to be modern and politically and altruistically acceptable. What did the arguments mean to you? A paradox? Temporary disharmony? Satisfaction?

[Carnogursky] In politics it is rather important—not only in politics, but particularly in politics—to be faithful to a specific line. That is, it is important to draw up a specific political line in advance and to adhere to it even in situations when it is unpopular. Moreover, in politics it is necessary to be aware of long-term goals and not just short-term ones. On the other hand, immediate and popular solutions do not even have to be constructive. It is necessary to regard a firm political line for this or that long-term goal to be correct and not just a preferred course of action.

[Jezik] So, you base your political program on lasting values?

[Carnogursky] Yes.

[Jezik] Your outright opponents may also base their policy on lasting values, others may change them. Which would you appreciate more?

[Carnogursky] Those who have lasting values, of course. However, this is a suggestive type of question. I will return to the main issue. For example, when I express my views on Hungarian-Slovak relations, fundamental emphasis is laid on mutual tolerance and, preferably, on some contemplation—at least for a little while—of the views held by the other person before making an immediate reply. Another thing: To a certain extent, my statements were incorrectly understood or were even badly interpreted on purpose. For example, my remark

about Komarno in connection with the Slovak language. I was later asked if I consider Komarno to be Slovak and part of Slovakia or not. Of course, I consider it to be part of Slovakia; in my replies at that time I merely reflected the fact that many people in Komarno speak Hungarian. [passage omitted]

[Jezik] How would you evaluate cooperation to date in Vladimir Meciar's coalition government?

[Carnogursky] There are certain ideological differences, which are obvious to everyone, between the KDH and the Public Against Violence movement; however, they are not apparent when matter of fact solutions are being sought in the government. They remain just ideological differences.

[Jezik] Is this an agreement based on reason?

[Carnogursky] Yes, it could be called that or respect for the will of the voters. A matter of fact solution, moreover, in the majority of cases, involves an economic or technical solution, although this may be ideologically motivated.

[Jezik] What is your attitude toward the Slovak National Party?

[Carnogursky] The Slovak National Party appeared like a pike on the Slovak political scene, especially during the preelection period....

[Jezik] Would it not be better to use the concept "pike in the Slovak political fishpond?"

[Carnogursky] Good, like a pike in the Slovak political fishpond. The fact that it has formulated several extreme demands makes it easier to find a golden path through the middle. I remember the Federal Assembly in Prague when the first decision was being made about changing the country's name and, then, when the second decision was being made following a demonstration organized by the Slovak National Party. There was a huge difference in the atmosphere. I give credit to the Slovak National Party for approaching certain Slovak demands and for formulating certain Slovak points of view without getting a complex about it. The risk for—and the disadvantage of—the Slovak National Party is that the party somehow does not know how to estimate or respect the limit beyond which its radical stances become risky or even counterproductive. This means that the one-sided assertion of Slovak demands, which could be at variance with international agreements or the political line practiced in international relations, could lead Slovakia into isolation, complicate Slovakia's position, and make it difficult for us to achieve our aims. Formulating a too radical political line narrows down the political base. The Slovak National Party is aware of this, although it recorded a steep rise in its membership before the elections....

[Jezik] ...also thanks to your voters....

[Carnogursky] ...yes, also thanks to our voters; however, the number of votes it won will not be enough for it to achieve its aims. Its chairman has announced that one of its aims is the declaration of an independent Slovak Republic. It will not even be capable of achieving this with a larger number of votes. This is for other reasons. If they were to seek a strong coalition partner—that already sounds better, but as you know a coalition is always a compromise—they would have to cut out these most radical demands from their program. In my opinion, the Christian Democratic Movement has formulated in an optimum manner the very aims the Slovak National Party is advocating. We insisted that the Federal Government assert in its program that it wants to lead our nations into Europe in such a way that they enter it as independent and equal entities. What more can it want to achieve? We are also entering into Europe; we have been accepted into the European Democratic Union. Simply, we have already achieved political results which specify Slovak demands as much as possible and which, at the same time, offer ways and means for achieving them. There is no certainty that we will achieve them, but the probability is perhaps greater that we will.

[Jezik] What is your opinion of the demands for an independent Slovak Republic? To what extent do you support them?

[Carnogursky] An independent Slovak Republic is unrealistic at the moment for the following reasons: First, there are not enough Slovaks to carry this demand through. Look at the public opinion polls and the distribution of political forces. Second, no one abroad would support or maintain an independent Slovak Republic. No one. Third, it is not certain whether an independent Slovak Republic would be capable—in a medium-range forecast—of guaranteeing the integrity of Slovak territory and of ensuring a functioning economy. Economic crises, which would hit the population hard, could focus even further on the social base demanding an independent Slovak Republic.

However, on the other hand, every nation has the right to self- determination and has the right to independence. Slovaks also have this right. I do not derive this right from the existence of the Slovak state in 1939-45, but am deriving it from international law and from our existence as an independent nation. I see this right being fulfilled in such a way that Slovakia will be included among the other European nations on an equal basis and by a method currently recognized and accepted in Europe and in the world. If we want to achieve this we have to act like a serious partner, we must not allow ourselves to be carried away by passions, we must observe human rights, and we must adhere to international treaties; however, we must also firmly, clearly, and resolutely set this aim for ourselves, and in order to achieve it, we must know how to establish a sufficiently strong base in Slovakia. Only an aim formulated in this way is capable of achieving the following: First, establishing a sufficiently strong base in Slovakia. Second, if not winning

international support, then, at least gaining international tolerance. Third, excluding all the risks of independence which I mentioned in the first part of my answer.

[Jezik] You mention international support. Would international guarantees not be enough?

[Carnogursky] No one will ever be willing to give them to us. Name one state which would be willing to provide them.

[Jezik] Will our greatest misfortune not be that we are not aware of ourselves as a nation?

[Carnogursky] I would not say that. For example, in Bohemia national consciousness is lower than in Slovakia. Awareness will never be perfect, there will always be something to improve. Slovakia can only achieve an equal status among European nations in harmony with its neighbors. We will be practically incapable of achieving this status if we are in conflict with our neighbors.

[Jezik] What is the main reason for the current disagreements between Czechs and Slovaks?

[Carnogursky] Mainly that they are two nations. Wherever two nations live in just one state, there is conflict. Let us take Yugoslavia, Canada, and—of course—the Soviet Union as examples. The fact is a nation lives better on its own and in its own state. As a rule, this is the case where it is possible. In many cases, this simple thing is impossible—for internal or external reasons. Apart from this, Czech culture is very close to Slovak culture, but, on the other hand, they are different. In the Western press, when they were attempting to characterize the differences between Czechs and Slovaks, I read that Czech culture is typically European, while Slovak culture is almost East European. Quite simply, there are different cultural accents in Bohemia and Slovakia.

[Jezik] Is this accurate?

[Carnogursky] It is not accurate. It is correct to the extent that there are various accents and that they are different.

[Jezik] However, a federation conceived in this way is not a unique organic or natural alliance....

[Carnogursky] We must realize that in 1918 neither the Slovaks nor the Czechs would have been released from their bondage. Coexistence was one way of getting out of it. On another occasion I formulated our point of view—the KDH's point of view—that in the future Europe we would like to have our own chair and our own star on the European flag. I think that such a stance would be even more acceptable! Premier Calfa and, according to him, foreign visitors—I do not doubt this—tell us that only one chair awaits us in Europe. If Slovakia would like to secure two chairs for the republic, this would not be less, it would be more! This would also be acceptable to the Czech Republic. So far, Europe is not willing to accept this. However, perhaps it would be willing to accept it if Slovakia were to proceed more wisely; therefore, I emphasize a wise course of action. I am opposed, for example, to the excesses of the Slovak National Party. I am also opposed to exacerbating too much our relations with Hungary and the Czech Republic. [passage omitted]

[Jezik] What are the feelings of someone in opposition who has a position?

[Carnogursky] I once came across a certain concept in an American article: the radar principle and the gyroscopic principle. A radar constantly spins round, while a gyroscope constantly maintains its orientation. I recognize the gyroscopic principle.

Slovak Premier on Language Law Issue

LD1510093990 Prague Television Service in Slovak 1855 GMT 14 Oct 90

[Weekly talk by Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar—live or recorded]

[Text] Good evening, esteemed fellow citizens.

Throughout this week everyone has been especially agitated and concerned by debates about the language law. This is undoubtedly a very important aspect in our political life which is of great significance because political forces, movements, opinions, and stances are polarizing because of it. It is of great significance also because it is to establish a certain project of coexistence in language between the Slovak nation and the Hungarian, Ukrainian Ruthenians and Polish minorities who live on the territory of the Slovak Republic.

Allow me to take a stand on these issues. In comparison with me you are at an advantage. You may not want to accept this stance and reject it, and if you do not like my talk you can switch off the television. Because of my position in political life and the chair I am occupying I cannot do so.

The adoption of this law is an enormously important matter because a possible conflict poses a threat of division, uncertainty, and instability in the country. It is an enormously important also because political parties and movements which are formulating their stance on these principles are going through a very important maturing stage of their decisionmaking and the maturity and ability to assume political responsibility. It is very simple to shout: We are masters here. I am personally convinced that if we use the term master [pan] as a way of describing a person's sex [the word "pan" can be used both as Mr. and master in Slovak] I have nothing against it. No politician and not a single representative has the right to feel himself master in the present times. He or she must be a humble servant. He must feel deeply about what pains and concerns you. He must have great concern about the future and seek ways not of ruling but of serving. This nation has already more than enough masters of various types, mostly bad ones, and it does not need new ones.

The language law has been prepared for debate in the Slovak National Council. The government discussed two officially presented stances and a third that was unofficial. You know that we have postponed for a week the debate on these documents, and according to the latest Slovak National Council's bill and the debate of it will be the sole affair of the deputies who will put forward the bill.

Allow me to say where I personally see the problem. There was a bill that envisaged considerably broad powers and rights to use languages of national minorities. All the three proposals had one thing in common: No one has any doubts that the Slovak language has to be the official language. But all three of them have a different view of powers and concept: How much right is a national minority to have to use its own language in official contacts and matters? This issue is resolved in various ways.

The first proposal did not specify the territory, or the method, or the way in which the language is used. Thus by the fact that the question of a national minority as such was not defined as a territorial question we could have a situation in which a citizen of Hungarian nationality when stopped by a policeman in Liptovsky Mikulas [a region not inhabited by the Hungarian minority] could say: I do not understand [in Hungarian] and the policeman would have to accept this statement because he cannot communicate with him. This, surely, is impossible. We have to be linked by our language and it has to make equal communication possible for all.

The second proposal submitted to us was at the other extreme. It envisaged that the languages of national minorities would not be used in official contacts at all. This is a very serious political mistake. If the contents of this bill in debates is turned primarily against the Hungarian minority, then I believe that this proposal ignores several facts. The first is that our Hungarian fellow-citizens are citizens of this republic. They live here, make use of their rights, and we have to ensure their life with us Slovaks in peace and in fruitful work. The second is that we guarantee the scope of human rights, as agreed upon by international conventions, for every single citizen of this country regardless his nationality. We cannot allow a situation in which the denial of language rights would lead to political unrest and confrontation. No one has a right to have his revenge upon the Hungarian minority for Magyarization. No one has a right to speak about discord between the Hungarian minority and the rest of the population only because we do not like some elements of political life in the Hungarian Republic. No one has a right to touch language teaching in schools. We cannot take only ourselves into account; we have to be aware of this too if we want to live in social peace. We have to take into account also international aspects, and we have to come to terms with them. Europe has to find us comprehensible and accessible.

The FRG ambassador during a conversation with me told me that foreign capital is easily frightened off. It goes only where it feels safe. Slovakia will not manage without help. No one will help Slovakia if it is divided and is engaged in nationalities arguments. We could be scoring a goal in one's own net!

I do not agree in the least with the third proposal which among other things suggests that Hungarian should be used as an officially recognized language in trade contacts. Esteemed authors of such a bill, do you expect that every enterprise in Slovakia will have a Hungarian interpreter who can translate invoices and orders, and that everyone who goes into the store will have to speak Hungarian and if he does not speak Hungarian he will not be understood? Are they expected to understand such extreme solutions as well? It is no accident that such proposals are initiated by the Coexistence Party, which is headed by poor (Duray). We must discuss these questions in a professional way with understanding. We must consider what brings people together or divides them both on the border and in minority groups.

I am struck by one thing: Catholics have one Christ, one faith, one doctrine. The sincerity of the faith means sincere compassion for others. But we are beginning to place the nationality issue even above the religious issue and are wishing to find division even here. There will be no office that will create some kind of collective rights for minorities. Europe has already been through this. Europe has already learned from it. There will be guaranteed rights for the citizen.

Today and tomorrow the government of the Slovak Republic is selecting experts who will work on comments on the draft bill, who will work on it in such a way as to ensure that this bill is first in keeping with European norms of government in the sphere of language culture. We are not the only ones with this problem. We cannot be so wrapped up in ourselves that we become blind to the wider context. We cannot become a source of political ridicule because of incorrect formulations which the international public will force us to change at the cost of great losses. This bill must accord with the constitution of the republic which we are formulating today and with existing laws and rights.

If I appeal to all of you in considering this question, emotion plays no part in making a decision about it. We can indulge in a rush of emotion in the first (?instant) but we cannot make decisions in politics in acccordance with a rush of feeling, emotions, and doubts although they may sometimes be justified. Everyone must be constitutional in this area today. We are faced with many unpleasant things not just within the republic. We want to organize our relations with the federation. We want to organize our relations with a collective of states with which Slovakia wishes to be in close cooperation and partnership. Let us not destroy more by our impatience and pseudo-revolutionarism than is truly (?necessary). National awareness will not be strengthened because of a law, and it must be a law that will regulate rights and will not suppres rights. Thank you.

Slovaks, Hungarians Polled on Linguistic Ability

AU1510193690 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 12 Oct 90 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Monolingual or Bilingual?"]

[Text] Bratislava—On 20-26 September 1990, the Institute for Public Opinion Research at the Slovak Statistical Office in Bratislava attempted to determine the level of knowledge of both languages—Slovak and Hungarian—in the ethnically mixed regions of southern Slovakia. A total of 751 respondents in 11 districts were polled; the sample contained an almost equal number of Slovaks and Hungarians. Thirty-eight percent of the Slovak respondents speak Hungarian equally as well as Slovak, 25 percent speak both languages, but with problems, and 37 percent only speak Slovak. Almost 79 percent of Hungarian respondents speak both languages equally well, 18 percent speak both languages, but with problems, and three percent only speak Hungarian. As far as the bilingual designation of towns, villages, streets, shops, and public facilities is concerned, 26 percent of Slovaks are in favor of this, 63 percent are in favor of Slovak names, 10 percent are indifferent, and 1 percent replied "I do not know." As far as Hungarian respondents are concerned, 74 percent are in favor of bilingual names, 1 percent is in favor of Hungarian names, 13 percent are in favor of Slovak names, 10 percent are indifferent, and 2 percent of Hungarians are undecided.

Hungarian Attitude Toward Slovak Language Criticized

AU1610124990 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 11 Oct 90 p 3

[Igor Cibula commentary: "It Is Impossible To Fight on All Fronts"]

[Text] An impartial observer of the situation in southern Slovakia would certainly disagree with the view that the problem surrounding the legalization of Slovak as the republic's official language evolved as a consequence of the Matica Slovenska's [Slovak Heritage Foundation] eccentric patriotism or of the Slovak National Party's utilitarian need to expand its base of potential voters. The demands to legally institutionalize the status of the Slovak language in social communication are merely the logical outcome of a situation associated with the unwillingness of some members of the Hungarian ethnic minority to use the Slovak language in official—or rather public—contacts, and the discrimination against Slovaks living in ethnically mixed districts of the aforementioned region. If these indisputable facts are not taken into consideration in the dispute about the optimum version of the language law, there will be no end to the passions and confrontations.

It is equally harmful to consider focusing the argument on just the aforementioned circumstances, for even the legal regulation of the use of the Slovak language cannot guarantee a conflict-free relationship between Slovaks and Hungarians in southern Slovakia. Hungarian citizens living in this region are its original settlers. It is impossible to deport them just because their forefathers settled here before Slovaks and because many of them have still not acquired a positive attitude toward the language of the state-forming nation. During the First Republic, Hungarians lived among us with the knowledge that the situation was temporary and, thus, they felt no need to adopt Slovak as their second national language. During the Communist regime, this historical attitude against the Slovak language was accentuated by the knowledge that this was the language of a totalitarian state where there was relatively less freedom than in Kadar's Hungary.

During our very short period of renewed democracy, radicals would like to force the issue and solve the problem overnight, a problem which is rooted in the antagonisms caused by 1,000 years of Hungarian domination over all the nations in the former pre-1918 Hungary. Models for coexistence among ethnic minorities in European states larger than the Slovak Republic are no good to them; with their version of solving the problem they have declared their resolve to place one-tenth of the republic's citizens—those with another native language—into the actual opposition of a dissatisfied minority. It is as if they ignored the fact that such a course of action would only breathe life into the irridentists roused by certain voices coming from our neighbors.

If politicians at so-called public meetings for democracy cannot understand that a revolution is taking place on the squares and cannot manage to approve laws there, then it is necessary to remind them that by their behavior they are weakening Slovakia's position in the current process of Czech-Slovak settlement. If they have decided to fight on all fronts, they should not drag the whole nation into their hazardous strategy. History provides us with well- known examples of leaders who led their countries to capitulation with their good intentions for the welfare of their common people.

Slovak Premier Accused of Not Observing Protocol

AU1210091090 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 9 Oct 90 pp 1, 3

[Statement issued by Karel Schwarzenberg, director of the Office of the President: "The Rules of Protocol"]

[Text] As director of the Office of the President, I consider it necessary to explain the following facts to the public in connection with the speech delivered by Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar on Slovak Television on 7 October 1990:

1. In Bratislava's Hotel Forum on 14 September at 1700, Dr. Vondra, director of the foreign policy section in the Office of the President, informed Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar—in the president's presence—that the visit of Brazilian President Fernando Collor would last

for one day, that a visit to Slovakia would be impossible for technical reasons, and that Mr. Meciar—just like the Czech premier—would be invited to Prague Castle. The premier accepted this information without any objections.

2. On 1 October 1990 the premier, at variance with the facts, told the Slovak National Council and viewers of "Czechoslovak Television Journal" the following: "Originally we were informed that the Brazilian president would come for one day. In fact, he will come for two days. I do not know why, but he will not visit Slovakia."

3. President Collor arrived at Ruzyne Airport at 1830 on 1 October; he departed on 2 October at 1630. He spent 22 hours in Czechoslovakia.

4. The information which Mr. Zantovsky issued to journalists on Tuesday [2 October] morning corresponded to his knowledge of the facts. The director of the secretariat, the director of the foreign policy section, and I only found out about Mr. Meciar's nonparticipation in the contentious dinner from television a few minutes before it was due to begin. Then, on Tuesday afternoon it was ascertained that on Monday afternoon Mr. Meciar's secretary called the staff at the Office of the President and informed them that the Slovak premier was not coming because he did not have time. Mr. Meciar's absence was not explained in a manner corresponding to the rules of protocol.

5. During official meetings with journalists, the president's press spokesman expresses points of view which apply to his position. He does not express his own opinion. This was the case on this occasion.

6. In order to avoid similar misunderstandings, suspicions, and unjust accusations in the future, an expert commission at the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs—following a suggestion made by the president—is drafting precise rules of protocol which will be submitted to representatives of the republics and the federation within 10 days at the latest.

Anti-Chemical Unit Commander Views Gulf Tasks

LD1210224290 Prague CTK in English 1718 GMT 12 Oct 90

[Text] Prague Oct 12 (CTK)—The Czechoslovak anti-chemical unit of 183 men, to be sent to Saudi Arabia, is not a combat but a humanitarian one, designed "just" to help people, not to participate in combat operations, the unit's commander Colonel Jan Valo said today.

He told a news conference at Slany near here where the unit is concentrated until Saudi Arabian representatives ask for help that each of the 183 men can quit the unit until it leaves for the Gulf. Asked about financial aspects, he said that they will be part of a bilateral agreement.

The unit is capable of giving first aid after the use of chemical weapons, of detecting chemical substances and decontaminating hit areas.

Asked whether the deployment of the unit in the Persian Gulf will not jeopardize the position of Czechoslovak citizens in Iraq, Mr Valo said that the unit "is not going to fight against Iraq but to help people. The relatives of the Red Cross members who work there might be thus exposed to danger as well."

As regards technical equipment, T-815 trucks, water treatment equipment, chemical laboratories, mobile ambulances, etc. will be used. The weight of the cargo totals 660 tonnes and should be carried by C5 galaxy planes from the Ruzyne airport in Prague. The freight also includes videos, TV sets, various games, as well as 500 condoms, to be used to cover gun barrels to prevent sand from penetrating them.

32 Citizens Not Allowed To Leave Iraq

AU1110114990 Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech 9 Oct 90 pp 1,4

["(zny)"-signed report: "Czechoslovak Hostages"]

[Text] Prague—A total of 32 Czechoslovak citizens working in Iraq on the Daura construction site—designated by the intermediary Technoexport Foreign Trade Enterprise as project No. 74—still cannot return home. The wife of one of them told us that on 12 August all these workers (most from the CKD Combine and Civil Engineering Works in Zlin) requested "a temporary stoppage of work on the grounds of the real possibility that the lives of Czechoslovak workers could be at risk." The contract was not disrupted, however. Moreover, the Iraqi authorities issue exit visas only against the customer's acknowledgement that the contract has been fulfilled.

The trade director of the "chemical industry equipment" group at the Technoexport Foreign Trade Enterprise, Engineer Vitacek, told us that the customer in Daura requires that one of the three sections of the construction be put into operation. He affirms that the first section is 99 percent finished, but there are none of the necessary experts in Iraq who would be able to put it into operation. When asked whether the remaining 32 fitters of the original 65 fitters could be regarded as hostages held by the Iraqi customer who wants to force the arrival of the necessary experts, Eng. Vitacek said that the word "hostages" was not used during the negotiations. The most recent negotiations (in Amman last week) were not successful, yet more negotiations are to follow.

L. Dobrovsky, Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman, told us that there are 59 Czechoslovak citizens in Iraq. Their return is complicated by the Iraqi law on foreigners, which had been in force for a long time prior to today's crisis. Sanctions for its violation are more severe now. This law makes foreign workers serfs because it does not allow them to leave Iraq without a letter of

recommendation written by the Iraqi partner. It could be possible to temporarily halt all the contracts, but a serious danger would arise that the unpredictable Iraqi authorities—changing their opinion each day—would not issue any exit visas to our people. L. Dobrovsky rejected accusations made by relatives of detained Czechoslovak citizens that our authorities are not making enough of an effort in this matter. In these days diplomatic negotiations are being held in Prague and Baghdad and—on the initiative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—the Technoexport general director will leave for Baghdad to talk to our workers, whom we hope we will be able to get home as we did the 436 Czechoslovak citizens in Iraq and Kuwait.

Dubcek, Tyumen Delegation Discuss Oil Supplies

LD1110153990 Prague CTK in English 1412 GMT 11 Oct 90

[Text] Prague, 11 Oct (CTK)—Czechoslovak Federal Assembly Chairman Alexander Dubcek expressed conviction here today that the agreement on the 1990 oil supplies, due to be concluded between Czechoslovakia and the Tyumen region of the Russian Federation today, is the first step on the path towards longer-term agreements.

At a meeting with a visiting delegation of the Tyumen region, he pointed out that the agreement gives social certainties to Czechoslovak people employed in the oil-processing industries and helps supply the Soviet market with goods lacking not only in the Tyumen region. This will also be reflected in social certainties of the Soviet working people.

The Soviet partners said that, after the signing of the agreement, the expected volume of 500,000 tons of oil will be channelled to Czechoslovakia until the end of this year. Mutually advantageous deliveries will continue in the next years as well, they added.

The Tyumen area delegation arrived in Czechoslovakia on October 7 for trade talks on partially cushioning problems caused by dwindling oil supplies from the Soviet Union.

Government Issues Statement on Soviet Refugees

AU1210130790 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 10 Oct 90 p 1

["(rd)"-signed report: "A Warning for the Soviets"]

[Text] Prague—On the subject of the controversial news conference about the Soviet refugees organized by the Soviet side on Saturday [6 October], Martin Fendrych, press spokesman for the government commissioner for refugees, told us the following yesterday:

"We are drawing conclusions from the factual testimony of staff at the refugee camp in Zastavka near Brno and from the actual testimony delivered by local citizens. All of them have unambiguously described the alleged Soviet citizens as a professionally trained military commando unit. It is hard to imagine that the alleged tourists would surround the camp just when Lieutenant Colonel Lukanin was demanding the hand over of the Soviets and at the same time was threatening to shoot. The arrival of the parents of soldier Abolentsev is also suspicious. They were transported here through a military air corridor and, therefore, did not even pass customs control. The Soviet command did not tell us that Abolentsev's parents wanted to talk about his fate. We have not received a written request by General Vorobjov, who allegedly wanted to meet the soldier, either."

According to Martin Fendrych, two more soldiers who asked for political asylum are hidden in a safe place. A third soldier escaped from the camp along with two Soviet civilians last week. What happened to them is not known. It cannot be discounted that they have headed toward the borders with Austria or Germany. For this reason we have asked these countries for cooperation. The press spokesman also urged the Soviet command to stop its illegal activity and not to contact people who asked for political asylum through the consular department of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Havel Welcomes Gorbachev's Nobel Peace Prize

LD1510131990 Prague CTK in English 1210 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Prague Oct 15 (CTK)—"Mikhail Gorbachev has significantly contributed to the acceleration of inevitable social changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe," Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel said today when asked by CTK about his stand on the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.

"If this appreciation contributes to a peaceful and calm transition of the Soviet Union to a society of equal nations and citizens, we welcome it warmly," Havel said.

Foreign Minister Interviewed on Talks in U.S.

LD1110103990 Prague Television Service in Czech 1830 GMT 10 Oct 90

[Italicized passages are recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier held a press conference early this evening on his return from the United States. The conference ended about an hour ago, and Milan Tomanek has this report on it:

[Tomanek] Returning today from his longest foreign trip—it took him to New York and Washington—Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier told newsmen that in addition to taking part in multilateral talks, he held bilateral talks with his colleagues from Italy, Japan, and Saudi Arabia on our current problems with oil.

[Dienstbier] *They stressed in particular that we should not delay any longer with the analysis of our losses and our needs, and that we should present our requests and*

needs as soon as possible to both the EC, the Group of 24, and to any bilateral partners. Naturally, we also had talks with many ministers about oil, including with Prince Faysal, the Saudi Arabian foreign minister, whom I invited to visit Czechoslovakia and who would like to come in December to establish diplomatic relations, and we can also take that opportunity to discuss certain oil questions as well. I also offered our Czechoslovak chemical defense unit. Prince Faysal welcomed it greatly, and through our embassy and their embassy in Washington the details and conditions for the transfer of that unit to the Middle East are to be worked out as soon as possible.

[Announcer] At a meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, Minister Dienstbier pointed out the political consequences which could ensue from any ongoing reduction in Soviet oil supplies, and how that situation could affect our people's attitude to the Soviet Union. Minister Shevardnadze agreed with our foreign minister that agreements must be adhered to, but he also drew attention to the current Soviet difficulties.

Asked to what extent the Western countries are prepared to compensate the losses caused by the oil crisis, the minister said this:

[Dienstbier] *In my view—and this also arises from these talks—specific (?replies) will result from the extent to which we manage to present serious and in-depth analyses, and this is what they are also expecting from us. In other words, if we can manage to make a serious analysis of these matters and put forward specific plans, then we will be able to count on some support.*

[Announcer] On the CSCE signatory states' foreign ministers' meeting, Minister Dienstbier remarked that the most important demand was that the new democracies in Central Europe should demonstrate their will not to thwart the agreement on conventional disarmament which is being drafted for signing during the November summit in Paris, and that these states should come to an agreement, and despite certain existing differences of views that they should agree on how to divide up the proposed quotas in the context of reducing weapons levels.

Asked whether, after his talks with President Bush, it was yet known when the U.S. President's visit to Czechoslovakia could take place, Minister Dienstbier replied in these words:

[Dienstbier] *President Bush is prepared to come to Czechoslovakia, but the problem lies in the fact that at the moment he is not in a position to assess what time he has available in view of the Middle East crisis.*

Bilateral Customs Agreement Signed With U.S.

AU1510151590 Prague CTK in English 1844 GMT 11 Oct 90

[Text] Prague Oct 11 (CTK)—Representatives of Czechoslovak and U.S. Customs Officials ended here today their three-day discussions by signing a government agreement on mutual assistance.

During their talks they exchanged experiences from the struggle against illegal drug traffic.

Klaus, Austria's Lacina Sign Investment Agreement

LD1510194190 Prague CTK in English 1509 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Vienna Oct 15 (CTK correspondent)—Czechoslovak Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus and his Austrian colleague Ferdinand Lacina signed an agreement on the protection of investments between the two countries here today.

Minister Klaus told CTK that the agreement legally guarantees the inviolability of investments of one country in the other, as well as the transfer of profit. He noted that in practice this has actually existed before the signing of the document. Since the beginning of May, 176 agreements on joint ventures have been signed between the two countries.

The Austrian minister described the agreement as an impulse to a substantial intensification of economic contacts between the two neighbouring states.

Havel Receives Luxembourg Foreign Minister

LD1110172890 Prague CTK in English 1603 GMT 11 Oct 90

[Text] Prague, 11 Sep (CTK)—Luxembourg Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Jacques Francois Poos was received by Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel today.

According to presidential spokesman Michael Zantovsky, Mr. Poos is convinced that Czechoslovakia's joining the European Community (EC) is inevitable but will not take place until after a period of transition.

Vaclav Havel spoke about the prospects of Czechoslovakia's full EC membership but agreed that a transitional period was necessary. He told Mr. Poos about the country's economic situation and oil problems. Mr. Poos spoke about a trade agreement which will give Czechoslovak products access to EC markets. So far this has been hampered by prices. Some EC importers and exporters have accused Central and East European states of dumping prices.

He said that influx of industrial goods from Western Europe would continue despite fears that it might cause some unemployment and proposed creation of mechanisms which would lead to a customs union.

The Luxembourg minister, whose country will chair the EC in the first half of 1991, said that the prevailing opinon in the EC is that Czechoslovakia has an advantage over other countries in its development and that its reform effort will be successful if it preserves its unity. He sees new political possibilities for Czechoslovakia in

its participation in the Council of Europe which would entrench it in the system of human rights and political plurality.

Mr. Poos was also received today by Federal Assembly (parliament) Chairman Alexander Dubcek. They discussed Czechoslovakia's effort to gain an association status with the EC.

Mr Poos and Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Zdenek Cerveny dealt with economic cooperation, mainly joint investments, especially with a view to material and energy saving and participation in the construction of an oil pipeline which would link Czechoslovak to the West European network.

Sympathy for Czechoslovakia's effort to introduce a market economy was expressed by Mr. Poos in his talks with Deputy Economy Minister Ladislav Novotny. Mr Poos said that direct contacts were necessary between foreign trade experts and industrialists. Czechoslovakia would welcome Luxembourg's experiences from restructuring in metallurgy as well as cooperation in other branches.

IMF Director Pays Visit, Examines Economy

LD1210232990 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1730 GMT 12 Oct

[Text] Federal President Vaclav Havel received in Prague Castle today Michel Camdessus, chief director and chairman of the office of the executive directors of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), who arrived in Prague earlier today. While in Czechoslovakia, he intends to examine the nation's program of transformation and determine what kind of external support there will be in accordance with the outcome.

According to Michal Zantovsky, the president's press spokesman, his impressions have been very good so far. In the course of several weeks he will prepare financing for Czechoslovakia for one to two years. He believes it will be relatively easy to acquire support from the other partners in the world's financial institutions and in the European communities.

Michel Camdessus also had talks with Jiri Dienstbier, deputy federal prime minister and minister of foreign affairs. They primarily discussed Czechoslovakia's integration in international economic institutions, as well as cooperation with the IMF. The distinguished guest was also received by Alexander Dubcek, chairman of the Federal Assembly, and Federal Premier Marian Calfa.

A news conference was held in Prague late this afternoon, which was attended by our reporter, Barbara Tacheci; this is her report:

[Tacheci] We accepted Czechoslovakia back in the IMF with enthusiasm, said Michel Camdessus at the start of the news conference. It is not only you who need the IMF, but the IMF also needs Czechoslovakia to be more universal.

Mr. Camdessus did not make any secret of the willingness to help us comprehensively transform our economy. At the same time, however, he admitted that he was more than well aware of our difficulties caused by the disintegration of CEMA and the further oil shock. I have no doubt about the future success of your economy, he went on to say, providing three conditions are met: the existence of a comprehensive reform program, a strong stabilization program, and the willingness of world institutions to help you.

Michel Camdessus also expressed satisfaction with the government's reform concept. I asked whether he has arrived with concrete recommendations for our government, and he replied that details would be discussed in the course of next week. The Czechoslovak Government is quite clear about all the steps toward transforming your economy. The IMF, however, has had experiences assisting other countries in similar situations; therefore, we assume that your government will learn from our experiences. At this moment we assess your program as a good one, Michel Candessus, the IMF executive director, declared.

Currency Devalued; Official Comments

LD1310034190 Prague CTK in English 1954 GMT 12 Oct 90

[Text] Prague Oct 12 (CTK)—The Czechoslovak Government Presidium decided today to decrease the rate of exchange of the Czechoslovak crown for commercial and noncommercial payments (the measure does not concern the tourist rate of exchange) by 54.54 per cent, i.e. to the level of 24 crowns for one U.S. dollar from October 15, 1990.

The measure was announced here today after a press conference with International Monetary Fund Managing Director Michel Camdessus. Czechoslovak Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus and President of the State Bank of Czechoslovakia Josef Tosovsky, who also attended the conference, said that the measure is not connected with the current visit of Michel Camdessus and discussions with the International Monetary Fund but that it is aimed at preventing a negative development of the balance of payments of the state in freely convertible currencies.

The change in the rate of exchange is the first significant step in the realization of the economic reform which must be followed by further system measures, especially in the sphere of prices, Tosovsky said.

Michel Camdessus was received late in the afternoon by Chairman of the Federal Assembly (parliament) Alexander Dubcek.

Further Reportage on Second-Round Elections

Independents Perform 'Outstandingly'

LD1510173590 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1200 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] The independent candidates performed outstandingly in yesterday's round of local elections in the contest for the mayors' title, and on the basis of votes cast for small lists. The citizens' votes decided the new leaders for 142 settlements and 122 of the leaders are nonparty members. Regarding individual constituencies, the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] was the most successful, followed by the joint candidates of SZDSZ-FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats], while the independents are in third place, having surpassed candidates of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], FIDESZ, the Smallholders' Party [FKgP], and the Christian Democrats [KDNP]. On the basis of the list-votes, SZDSZ performed best. In this area the parties finished in this order: MDF, FIDESZ, Hungarian Socialist Party [HSP], FKgP, and KDNP.

Interior Minister Balazs Horvath considers the turnout in the second round of the local elections to be satisfactory. According to Horvath, there was adequate interest, so no change to the electoral system is justified. Adjustments, however, are possible; for example, he said it was conceivable that the range of settlements that directly elects mayors would be increased, because more people in these villages went to the polls than elsewhere. At the same time, he adheres to the position of maintaining the turnout limit in the first round.

More on Nationwide Results

LD1510201390 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1700 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Andras Kerekes report]

[Text] Let us look at the results. We have not yet had such a comprehensive summary.

In the mayoral elections, 2,911 communities succeeded in electing mayors, and 19 will have midterm elections. Preserving their sweeping success in the first round, the independents obtained 82.9 percent of the mayoral posts—that is, 2,412. In second place is the Independent Smallholders Party [FKgP] with 203, followed by the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] with 68, Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] with 56, and the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] with 52. The other parties and social organizations obtained less than one percent of the vote. Five mayors were elected as independent candidates of ethnic minorities.

The so-called small list elections for communities of 10,000 inhabitants or less: there were elections in 2,923 such settlements, and two places will have to have midterm elections. There are 20,478 representatives; of these 14,578—71.2 percent—are independents; next, in second place with 6.2 percent is the FKgP; the MDF follows with 4.3 percent; SZDSZ with four percent; KDNP with 2.8 percent; Agrarian Association with 1.3 percent; and Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] with 1.1 percent. A total of 172 members of representative bodies were elected as candidates of ethnic minorities.

In communities of over 10,000: in individual electoral districts, 2,105 representatives were elected as follows: 361 for the SZDSZ; 356 for the SZDSZ and Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ] jointly; 314 for the independents; 252 for the MDF; 176 for the FIDESZ; 126 for the FKgP; and 119 for the KDNP.

From electoral lists in 164 communities 1,954 mandates could be obtained: 405 for the SZDSZ; 357 for the MDF; 298 for the FIDESZ; 198 for the MSZP; 157 for the KDNP; 153 for the FKgP; 97 for the SZDSZ-FIDESZ jointly; and some other coalitions.

Finally for the Budapest assembly for which participation was 35.4 percent: SZDSZ 34.7 percent; MDF 27.3 percent; FIDESZ 18.2 percent; MSZP 7.3 percent; KDNP five percent. All others obtained less than four percent.

Finally, let me add that the Department of Self-Government of the Ministry of Interior issued a report which summarizes the tasks of the transitional period. Among other things it states that, in the interest of the uninterrupted continuation of essential services for the population, the council specialist offices must continue to operate until the new self-governing systems are established, so that there is no vacuum in responsibilities.

FIDESZ Official Welcomes Poll Results

LD1510223490 Budapest MTI in English 1729 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Budapest, October 15 (MTI)—The most important aspect of the elections was not the victory of the opposition, but the defeat of the ruling parties, Viktor Orban, head of the Federation of Young Democrats' [FIDESZ] parliamentary arm, told the press on Monday.

Orban said it was decisive how the force, which had triumphed at the parliamentary ballot, would react to an eventual defeat at the local elections. He added that the reactions from the governing parties had so far been restrained and promising.

He said that in the individual constituencies his party had concluded an electoral pact with the Alliance of Free Democrats in order to increase the chances of the opposition. With regard to the appointment of the mayor of Budapest, the agreement calls for the two parties to discuss the matter in the light of the election results. The Federation of Young Democrats will sit down at the conference table with the Alliance of Free Democrats after consulting its own representative body.

Liberals Wins in Most Major Cities

AU1510214190 Paris AFP in English 2014 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Budapest, Oct 15 (AFP)—Hungary's liberal opposition won the majority of seats in major cities in the second round of nationwide municipal elections on Sunday [14 October], according to provisional official results released here Monday.

The main opposition party, the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), won 34.7 per cent of the vote in Budapest, in front of Prime Minister Jozsef Antall's conservative Democratic Forum (MDF) with 27.3 percent. Trailing well behind were the pro-ecology Young Democrats (FIDESZ), the former ruling-communist Socialists and the Christian Democrats.

In Budapest, voter turnout reached only 35.4 percent in the second round, even lower than in the first round held two weeks ago which was invalidated when the percentage poll was below the minimum required 40 percent. Following the poor showing in the first round, Sunday's elections went ahead without a minimum required turnout.

In cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants, the SZDSZ won 20.7 per cent of the vote, the MDF 18.3 per cent, FIDESZ 15.3 per cent and the Socialists 10.1 per cent. Smaller parties made up the difference. In towns with a population of less than 10,000, turnout was high enough in the first round of voting to avoid a second round. In these towns, independent candidates won 82.9 percent of the seats.

Antall's Statement at MDF News Conference

AU1510153690 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 11 Oct 90 p 3

[Report by Balint: "There Is a Way Out for Hungary, and There Is Progress—The Yalta Peace Treaty Has Become Obsolete"]

[Excerpt] At a reception on 10 October of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], Prime Minister Jozsef Antall emphatically said that "local self-governing bodies are not agencies put in place by the government." This was a reference to the former system of local councils. Antall continued: "Local self-governing bodies are elected by the local community, and they make their own decisions; in fact, they have to make their own decisions concerning the affairs of their community." The prime minister greeted some 100 mayors who had already been elected to office, and he took this opportunity to stress how important it was to create national unity and economic stability in Hungary, if only to win sympathies abroad. Antall also mentioned existing social tensions—felt all around—which certain circles want to use to create disorder; this was probably a reference to the opposition. Antall said: "The Hungarian people know perfectly well who their enemies and friends are, and they know what they have to do to inspire confidence abroad and at home. Allow me to add that if a country's economic situation is bad, and if living standards are falling, then it is natural for people to be in a bad mood. We cannot expect empathy for our ideas and our spiritual dedication from people who cannot pay their electric bill, or who cannot buy their children winter shoes."

In the second passage of his speech, Antall said that there was a way out, and that progress was possible. Progress is only possible, however, if trust is maintained. We have to inspire confidence abroad to receive investments, and we have to uphold this confidence, given that half of the capital granted to the former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe has accumulated in Hungary. We should also inspire confidence in each other. If we do not feel how important it is for this country to want to be born again, then we have lost. If no one trusts their partner, or the other side, or the leaders of this country, then it will be impossible for us to progress. [passage omitted]

SZDSZ Parliamentary Faction Leader Resigns

LD1610044190 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1700 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] [Announcer] At the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] news conference, Peter Tolgyessy announced that he is resigning his office as leader of the parliamentary faction. Here is more from Kata Nagy.

[Nagy] Peter Tolgyessy, leader of the parliamentary faction of the SZDSZ, offered his resignation at the party meeting this morning. The resignation was accepted by a large majority after a lengthy debate. Ivan Peto was asked to carry out the duties of the faction leader.

According to their explanation, there have recently been many criticisms of the work of parliament. There has also been criticism in parliament of the work of the SZDSZ faction from both press and public opinion. Now, in their electoral success, they think they will take the criticism to heart and try to form a new image which will gain public sympathy.

In reply to questions from representatives of the press, they said there was no connection between the resignation of Peter Tolgyessy and the Hordo case.

In connection with the latter, Peter Hack said they were relieved that the ominous sentence had not been pronounced; however, relations between the governing parties and the opposition must be civilized. If this does not happen, parliament will be able to carry out their task, the joint legislation.

Government Submits Court, Tax Bills to Assembly

LD1510222890 Budapest MTI in English 1725 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Budapest, October 15 (MTI)—Speaker Gyorgy Szabad announced at the Monday afternoon session of parliament that the government had submitted the bills

on the amendment to the criminal law and the establishment of local courts, as well as bills to do with various dues and taxes, and asked the relevant committees to discuss the documents.

He also announced that the government had handed in the draft parliamentary resolution which proposes extending the validity of the 1990 provisional property policy guidelines. The draft is expected to come before parliament on Tuesday.

Coalition Parties Reach Agreement on Land Issue

LD1610043190 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1700 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] [Announcer] An agreement has been reached between the three parties of the coalition on the land question. This was mentioned at the news briefing of the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP]. Julianna Szamado reports.

[Szamado] The KDNP calls the local authority elections a moral success. Expressed in figures, it means that the party's proportional representation in the self-governments totals 10 percent. In the small settlements, 72 of the 150 mayoral candidates were successful. In large towns with over 10,000 inhabitants, they placed fourth or fifth.

The coalition discussions on the land question were mentioned at the news briefing. A statement has been drafted on this, and it has been signed by the Independent Smallholders' Party, the KDNP, and the Hungarian Democratic Forum. It says, verbatim, that they take cognizance of the decision of the Constitutional Court, and that they will seek a solution, taking this as their point of departure. They consider it necessary for further questions to be taken to the Constitutional Court, which would clarify the possibilities for transforming agriculture. They feel that it is necessary to provide compensation regardless of the object of property, according to uniform principles, and of an amount to be determined later. Thus the agreement has come about—this has been announced—and it has been signed by representatives of the parties.

National Unemployment Figures for Aug Published

AU1510151990 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 12 Oct 90 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Some 56,000 Registered Unemployed"]

[Text] The National Manpower Center has finished processing its regional data for the month of August 1990: According to this data, there were 45,518 registered unemployed at the end of August. Thus, the national unemployment rate has reached 1.2 percent; however, rates are much higher in certain counties. For example, in Borsod-Abauj-Zemplen County, the unemployment rate stands at 3.4 percent, in Nograd County it stands at three percent, in Szabolcs-Szatmar-Bereg County it is 2.8 percent, and in Heves County it is 2.2 percent. At the same time, the number of open jobs totalled 33,732 at the end of August.

According to preliminary data, some 11,000 first-time workers had also registered with unemployment offices by the end of September 1990. It is estimated that a greater number of these first-time workers will find employment because they accept low wages and unfavorable working conditions. Furthermore, among the young unemployed, the number of young unemployed who have appropriate vocational qualifications is higher than usual. The government is subsidizing the placement of these young people through a special fund of approximately 200 million forints.

At the end of 1989, there were some 25,000 registered unemployed (this represents an unemployment rate of 0.5 percent), whereas at the end of 1990, Hungary expects to count some 80,000 to 100,000 unemployed (that is, an unemployment rate of two percent.)

Romania Questions Intentions on Bilateral Relations

Ministry Finds Note 'Incomprehensible'

LD1610095890 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 0500 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] Romania is ready to solve problems with Hungary through bilateral discussions. At the same time, Hungary would like discussions which would lead to specific results. This was the conclusion reached at the meeting between Ion Iliescu, Romanian head of state, and Ernoe Rudas, new Hungarian ambassador to Bucharest. The meeting took place on the occasion of Ernoe Rudas presenting his credentials to the Romanian president.

We should note here that the Hungarian Foreign Ministry finds the Romanian note made public yesterday, which questions the intentions of the Budapest government concerning bilateral discussion, incomprehensible.

Foreign Ministry Replies to 'Obscure' Note

LD1610044690 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1900 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] The Hungarian Foreign Ministry considers the Romanian note published yesterday, which questions the intentions of the Budapest government in the settlement of bilateral relations, to be obscure.

The Bucharest Foreign Ministry's statement is in reply to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry's verbal message at the beginning of October, in which Romanian authorities were requested to do everything to prevent people from using the 6 and 23 October celebrations for provocations.

According to the Hungarian Foreign Affairs spokesman, the message at the beginning of October did not merit

the Romanian accusations; therefore, a reply will be given to these in an appropriate manner.

Lebanese Denied Entry; Seize Border Guards

LD1210231690 Budapest MTI in English 1750 GMT 12 Oct 90

[Text] Budapest, October 12 (MTI)—A serious incident occurred on Thursday evening in Curtici, on the Romanian side of the joint Romanian-Hungarian border crossing station.

A Lebanese group of 120 people, who on the previous evening had been denied entry to Hungary as a result of not meeting the conditions of entry, again applied for entry into Hungary on the Pannonia international express train on its way to Hungary. The two Hungarian frontier guards—who fulfilled their duty in a lawful manner in accordance with service regulations—again denied entry. They were then surrounded by the Lebanese, taken into one of the compartments, and not allowed off the train.

The two guards did not lose their presence of [word indistinct]. They passed their guns to the border station's officer on duty, through a window. As a result of the common stand of the Hungarian and Romanian border representatives, the guards were set free two hours later, and the Lebanese also got off the train.

No-one was injured in the incident.

Defense Spokesman on Possible Presence in Gulf

AU1510180390 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 12 Oct 90 pp 1, 5

[Interview with Defense Ministry Spokesman Gyorgy Keleti by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given: "Defense Ministry Reply on the Gulf Issue"; first paragraph is NEPSZABADSAG introduction]

[Text] Independent Parliamentary Deputy Bela Kiraly submitted a proposal to the parliament's Defense Committee on 10 October, according to which Hungary should send a so-called mixed Army unit to the Gulf, a unit made up of volunteers. Aware of the aforementioned proposals, Gyorgy Keleti only spoke about the possible departure of a group of medical experts on Hungarian television.

[NEPSZABADSAG] It seems that the Defense Ministry is reserved about this proposal. Why?

[Keleti] There is no reservation implied here, but we think that, taking a lot of things into consideration, the possible presence of the Hungarian Army in the Gulf should primarily be of a humanitarian nature. After giving the matter serious consideration, we think that sending a military unit would imply long-term training and special preparation, and there are presently no possibilities for such long-term instruction.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Does this mean that the Hungarian soldiers are not properly trained for such tasks?

[Keleti] Our soldiers are trained for European climates with adequate equipment. They are also trained to adjust to the local topographic features, but these basically differ from the conditions in the Gulf area. I would like to mention a few examples. If our soldiers took over the U.S. military equipment on location, as stipulated in the proposal submitted by Bela Kiraly, they would have to go through comprehensive training for several weeks, training which would include the use of weapons, vehicles, radio equipment, and so on. At the same time, the lack of an adequate language of cooperation with the other soldiers would also lead to a serious problem. Not only the high-ranking officers, but also the squad commanders should know English, for example, for their cooperation with the other units, including a thorough knowledge of military expressions. The Hungarian soldiers' uniform is also inadequate to the conditions prevailing in the Gulf area, and the supply of armed Hungarian units with food and equipment would also present a serious problem. I repeat: We would propose sending a medical unit.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Do you have any concrete ideas about this?

[Keleti] Yes. Defense Ministry officials held a meeting with Hungarian Army commanders and professionals on 11 October. As a result of this meeting, a plan has emerged with various versions, and its final version will be drawn up soon. Selecting the members of the planned unit would be carried out strictly on a volunteer basis. The creation of such a unit is based on a basic condition: Following a request by the UN Security Council, a majority vote of the Hungarian parliament would be needed for the dispatch of such a unit, as stipulated by the Constitution.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Rumors have it that many people have already volunteered for such a unit.

[Keleti] A considerable number of people have recently volunteered in the Defense Ministry, people who are ready to volunteer to be dispatched to the Gulf. We told all these people that their intention to volunteer is commendable, but we are unable to consider them before the parliamentary decision which, of course, will be fully published.

Antall Departs for Six-Day U.S. Visit

LD1510222590 Budapest MTI in English 1719 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Budapest, October 15 (MTI)—Jozsef Antall, prime minister of the Repubic of Hungary, left on an official visit to the United States of America on Monday.

Mr Antall and his entourage will begin their six-day packed schedule in New York on Tuesday morning.

In New York, the prime minister will hold talks with leaders of several giant American companies and financial institutions, together with representatives of American Jewish organizations. He will also give a lecture in the Foreign Relations Council, and meet representatives of Hungarians in America. The various ministers and financial officials accompanying Mr. Antall will hold separate talks with their American counterparts.

Wahsington will mark the peak of the visit. Mr. Antall will hold talks with leading American politicians, legislators and representtatives of Hungarian organizations, on Wednesday. In the evening, he is to attend a dinner in the Congress building, hosted in his honour by the Center for Democracy organization, and Representative Tom Lantos.

On Thursday in the White House, President George Bush and Prime Minister Antall will have a tete-a-tete, followed by discussion between the two government delegations. Later on, Secretary of State James Baker will receive the Hungarian delegation for a lengthier exhcange, and the prime minister will also meet other members of the American administration. In the evening, he will attend a gala dinner in the White House, where he will have the opportunity to hold further talks with President Bush, as well as prominent government figures and legislators.

On Friday morning, the prime minister will hold a press conference. The delegation will then travel to Los Angeles. The California programme includes talks with businessmen, representatives of local Hungarians, and former President Ronald Reagan.

The prime minister will leave Los Angeles for Budapest on Saturady.

Antall Comments on UK Visit, Party Rally

LD1310041990 Budapest Television Service in Hungarian 1830 GMT 12 Oct 90

["Brief report" by Prime Minister Jozsef Antall on his visit to the United Kingdom; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] I do not think that I would be a good reporter; therefore, I can only relate briefly that I attended the annual conference of the British Conservative Party. This is extraordinarily significant because in Great Britain the Conservative Party has been in office under the leadership of Prime Minister Thatcher for over 10 years. From our point of view, the conference was especially significant because one of the principle issues was the payment of close attention to Eastern European changes.

It was also a very great honor for the Hungarian delegation that we had been given a long applause; indeed, it was a standing ovation. We were given minutes-long applause as a welcome by the Conservative Party rally of several thousand people. I was able to speak at this conference, greet the Conservative Party, and speak about the changes in Hungary and issues in Eastern Europe.

Prime Minister Visits Netherlands, UK

WA1510180190

For reportage on the visit by Prime Minister Jozsef Antall to the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, including reports on his talks with Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers and UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, please see the Netherlands and United Kingdom sections of the 15, 16 October West Europe DAILY REPORT.

Bishop Tokes Gives News Conference in Hospital

AU1510125090 Budapest MTI in English 1921 GMT 11 Oct 90

[Text] Budapest, 11 October (MTI)—Nationalism and Romanian-Hungarian conflicts greatly hinder the restructuring of ecumenical relations, Laszlo Tokes said, at a press conference held in Budapest on Thursday.

This was the first public appearance of the reformed bishop of Oradea, who was seriously injured in a car accident in Hungary on August 7. Mr Tokes said he had reiterated his earlier appeal to leaders of the Romanian religious denominations, to which he received only three replies. He proposed to hold a meeting in mid- December, to commemorate the Romanian events that took place last Christmas, and the memory of the heroic victims.

The bishop is also striving to promote the cause of Romanian-Hungarian reconciliation in his open letter to the Romanian opposition. It is his firm intention, Mr Tokes wrote in the letter, to serve general social, political, and economic renewal in Romania. The interests of ethnic Hungarians in Romania and the Romanian nation cannot differ. On the other hand, the peoples of Romania and Hungary depend on each other, in view of their geography as neighbours, their history, and similar social problems. Mr Tokes called on the opposition forces, and their representatives, who are committed to national reconciliation and the democratic transformation of Romania, to open dialogue.

Discussing the Romanian situation, Mr Tokes said that many representatives of the dictatorship continue to be active. The spirit of Ceausescu is alive, and although progress has been made, advancement is beset with difficulties.

The bishop said he is making a good recovery, and will return home by the end of the year.

Citizens Committees Support Walesa for President

LD1510041590 Warsaw PAP in English 1825 GMT 14 Oct 90

[Text] Warsaw, Oct. 14—The National Conference of Citizens Committees, which held a meeting in Warsaw today, firmly backed Solidarity leader Walesa in his presidential bid.

It called on the Sejm (lower house) to dissolve itself no later than the end of 1990. The conference opposed the philosophy of "the separating line" understood as a process of destroying documents and cleaning the personal files of people who held or hold important posts. It demanded that all documents be preserved in untouched form and made available to a special commission to be set up by the first Sejm of the Third Republic.

The presidential elections drew the most heated debate. The programmatic commission proposed three variants of resolving this issue: support for Lech Walesa, support for Tadeusz Mazowiecki and not taking a stand endorsing any of these candidacies. Some 91 votes were in favour of the first variant, 7 in favour of the second, 35 for the third. As a result, the conference adopted a resolution reading that citizens committees programmatically favour political freedom, pluralism and democracy and refer to the presidential elections from these positions. This means that every candidate should have equal chances to reach the mass media while the presidential campaign should proceed in the spirit of political culture and respect for the contenders' reasons. Taking into account the dominating stance of citizens committees, the conference has extended firm support for the candidacy of Lech Walesa, the resolution reads.

Acting at the motion of the Constitutional Commission, the conference passed a resolution on the constitutional debate. The new constitution should be passed by a new, fully democratically elected parliament and the role of the current parliament should be to draw up its draft.

In another resolution, the conference states that the current Sejm is a seasonal entity, as was seen when it refrained from tackling the issue of its self-dissolution. The citizens committee conference called on the Sejm to put to detail the date of its dissolution, suggesting that it should do so no later than the end of 1990.

The conference decided to make it possible for a special meeting to be held in the case of an emergency social-political situation in Poland. The programmatic commission has been authorized to handle this.

The Citizens Committee National Conference will convene on November 18.

Walesa Answers Questions at Warsaw Election Rally

AU1510143390 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 10 Oct 90 pp 1, 2

[Krzysztof Gottesman report: "Walesa in Warsaw"]

[Text] A fight between Walesa supporters and a small group of Solidarity 80 adherents ended Lech Walesa's election rally in Warsaw, attended by about 2,000-3,000 people.

Walesa quickly reached a common language with his audience, and his words were well received from the very beginning. Almost everything he said earned applause. He answered questions on all the most important topics. He viewed his presidency and his role in political life in general as "supervision so that everything in Poland takes place in accordance with social feelings. Above all, the president must keep an eye on the government and parliament."

As far as economics are concerned, Walesa would like a market economy, though he realizes that the present situation rules out the full introduction of a market economy. "I will do everything I can to give everyone the chance to go into private business and thus become independent," he said. "People from large plants, 70 percent of which are unprofitable, should find a place for themselves in small businesses. The large plants can be turned into bakeries or museums of Marxism and Leninism."

Although the Solidarity chairman stressed several times the fact that he shares the same roots as Tadeusz Mazowiecki, several statements by him implied criticism of the government. For example, he said that the latest arrests of a group of political police generals who were involved in the killing of Father Jerzy Popieluszko are just an election ploy.

Many people asked Walesa about people from the former apparatus who are quite successful in business today. "There is no collective responsibility, but everyone who owes Poland something has to be called to account," said Walesa.

He referred to the past several times. For example, he mentioned the heritage of communism, thanks to which "the blanket is too short these days." He also discussed more recent history, the first "Solidarity era" and the "roundtable." He defended that era and his own actions, claiming they were the only ones possible under the circumstances at the time. He described the dissolution of the Polish United Workers Party as a watershed. He said that the "roundtable" accord ceased to be valid the moment the party ceased to exist, and a new parliamentary election should have taken place. But it did not, and that is why the concept of "acceleration" came about. Walesa thought that a very low level of social commitment is also one of the reasons for the present situation. "Poland is already yours," he said. "Now we can mold it according to our own recipes and desires."

Traditionally, Walesa ended his rally with a plea for support. The response was a sea of raised hands. When he asked if anyone was against him, there was no answer. During the meeting he received several presents, including a bingo set, a picture of the Virgin Mary (a present from Poles in Leningrad), and another picture with a patriotic-religious flavor. Another present for Walesa was the song that was sung by the participants: "I had a wonderful dream in which Walesa assumed the nation's seat.

"At last we received real prosperity and a mountain of meat."

Prior to the rally, Walesa met representatives of the National Federation of Solidarity Factory Committees—people representing over 160 plants. They expressed their support for Walesa.

Opening the rally, Michal Boni, chairman of the Solidarity Mazowsze Chapter, said: "We should get rid of our apathy, so that we do not have a president who is isolated from the people, but one which is united with the people. The skies that are clearing up are a good sign for Poland."

Walesa Meets Christian Citizens Movement Leaders

LD1510230190 Warsaw PAP in English 2017 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Gdansk, Oct. 15—Solidarity Leader Lech Walesa met today with the leadership of the Christian Citizens Movement to discuss the presidential campaign.

Representatives of the movement conveyed to Walesa an invitation to take part in the second conference of the Christian Citizens Movement.

Walesa Statement on Press Titles Criticized

AU1510153990 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 11 Oct 90 p 1

[Roman Kurkiewicz report: "Whoever Holds Power Has the Press"]

[Text] Walesa's statement about taking over press titles from his political opponents has been confirmed by his press spokesman.

Asked at Tuesday's [9 October] Warsaw Steel Works meeting why he still has no daily of his own in light of those that carry slanderous statements about him, Lech Walesa replied: "They will see to it that the papers are being run well, and then you will take them over."

Asked to comment on the statement on Wednesday [10 October], Andrzej Drzycimski, Lech Walesa's press spokesman said: "Yes, they will be taken over by democracy, because free elections will see the emergence of new political forces, which will also want to have their own publications. They will be faced with a choice: They will either have to start up papers from scratch, or they will take over those that have suffered political defeat. The example of the 'Prasa-Ksiazka-Ruch' Workers' Cooperative Publishing House provides the best answer."

Drzycimski said: "The press is governed by its own laws, including the laws of the marketplace. If the readership exists, then a particular political tendency will have its own organ. It has to be remembered that every change in the political system causes changes in the structure of the press."

It seemed that we had broken with the communist system in Poland. The totalitarian system, which came into being in Russia in 1917, was accompanied by calls of "Seize what was seized!" In the name of "historical justice," private and cooperative property was destroyed in this way. In Poland, after 1945, it was this principle that led to the disappearance of mills, factories, shops, and newspapers that were not owned by the state. This does not come as a surprise, because "every change in the political system prompts changes in the press system," as Mr. Andrzej Drzycimski puts it.

However, I think that in a democratic, free market state, there is no place for changes in ownership that involve "taking things over from those who have suffered political defeat," because "new political forces want to have their own publications."

A public statement about transferring newspapers to the political victors can be interpreted as a threat not to tolerate an opposition and, therefore, to suspend democracy.

Alongside a democratically elected parliament and an independent judiciary, a free and independent press is one of those irremovable pillars of democracy and one of the main elements guaranteeing the existence of democracy.

Mazowiecki Assures Farmers of Agricultural Reform

LD1510082290 Warsaw Television Service in Polish 1830 GMT 14 Oct 90

[Report on Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki's presidential election campaign activities in Krakow on 14 October; Mazowiecki's remarks recorded]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Six weeks are left before the presidential elections. Today Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on a day off from work, started his campaign. [passage omitted]

In the Jagiellonian University Collegium Chemicum farmers from the peasant Solidarity association were alread waiting. Referring to rumors circulating, the prime minister stated that not a single square meter of land received by peasants as a result of the agricultural reform would be taken away from them.

[Mazowiecki] We will demonopolize and privatize those enterprises which supply agricultural products. We will introduce competition so that farmers are not sold things at too high a price and so they do not buy on the (?black market). That is not easy, but we are going to do this consistently. I have asked for an analysis and at the next government meeting tomorrow we are going to examine it. I requested an analysis of everything that has and has not happened [passage indistinct] cooperative, but to really carry out demonopolization here and create conditions for competition.

[Announcer] The next point on the program after a walk around Planty [park in Krakow] and the Old Town was a meeting with the inhabitants of Krakow in the Philarmonia building.

[Mazowiecki] We cannot withdraw or change our course half way. Our policy must be flexible but professional

and consistent. We cannot afford new amateur experiments now. Thus people should not succumb either to the advice of doctrinaires or the shouts of demagogues who have magic ideas up their sleeves for healing the Polish economy. [applause] Reconstructing state authority requires the government to be subordinated to the law and not conversely. We are also directed by that principle when examining the responsibility of state functionaries of the former nomenklatura. Whoever abused their authority and acted to the detriment of the state or citizens must be answerable to the law. If the accusations made against him are proven, he will (?suffer) the appropriate punishment. No one can take advantage of an official position for personal profit and evade responsibilities, nor can they be permitted to use the law for political revenge and settling accounts with opponents. [applause] I decided to run in the competition to save the brittle Polish democracy incalculable upheavals. [applause]

[Announcer] During the prime minister's walk in Krakow a group of skinheads tried to upset the congenial atmosphere.

Solidarity 80 Opposes Walesa, Mazowiecki Bids

LD1310192290 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1800 GMT 13 Oct 90

[Text] Late yesterday evening a meeting of the authorities of Solidarity 80, the union led by Marian Jurczyk, ended in Stargard Szczecinski. Kornel Morawiecki, [Freedom Party, formerly Fighting Solidarity] and lawyer Wladyslaw Sila-Nowicki [Christian Democrat Labor Party], who are running for president, came to the meeting. Both men tried to gain the trade unionists' support.

This morning, Marek Bienkowski, head of the organizational department of Solidarity 80, informed us of the contents of the adopted resolutions.

[Begin Bienkowski recording] The National Coordinating Commission of Independent Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarity 80 resolves to express a critical assessment of the candidacy of Messers Lech Walesa and Tadeusz Mazowiecki for the office of president because neither of the above mentioned candidates provide the personal and programmatic conditions guaranteeing working people an improvement in living standards in the immediate future and they are also not free from the undemocratic connections and alignments which originate from Magdalenka [talks leading up to the roundtable talks] and the roundtable period.

Second, we express the hope that the candidates for the office of president, Messers Leszek Moczulski [Confederation for the Independence of Poland], Kornel Morawiecki, and Wladyslaw Sila-Nowicki will manage to reach political consensus and put forward a joint candidate for the office of president of the Polish Republic, who has in his program the defense of the fundamental interests of the working world, also in the sphere of property transformation. [end recording]

Those were excerpts from the resolution of the Solidarity 80 National Coordinating Commission. It was decided that support will be given to that presidential candidate whose program is in line with views of the supporters of Marian Jurczyk.

Candidate Morawiecki on Rivals, Future Changes

LD1510225390 Warsaw PAP in English 2014 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Warsaw, Oct. 15—Candidate for presidential office Kornel Morawiecki held today a press conference, attended by the leader of the Solidarity 80 Warsaw chapter Seweryn Jaworski, who said that his organization had criticized the candidatures of Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Lech Walesa.

Jaworski said that (among three candidates: Morawiecki, Moczulski and Sila-Nowicki) Solidarity 80 would support the one who could guarantee in his programme the "supreme role of the interests of the nation and the Polish state, successful economic development, and defence of the basic interests of workers, also in the sphere of economic transformations."

Meanwhile, Morawiecki declared his intention to make deep changes in the system of wielding power, state's internal, external and social policies and economy. Referring to his rivals Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Lech Walesa, Morawiecki said he believed the two came from the same camp of agreement with the communists, and added that the political battle they were conducting is only on the surface.

In reply to a question by PAP, Morawiecki opined that Walesa was his most dangerous rival in the presidential race.

Presidential Candidate Sila-Nowicki Meets Press

LD1510225790 Warsaw PAP in English 2016 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Warsaw, Oct. 15—Chairman of the Christian-Democratic Labour Party Wladyslaw Sila-Nowicki, running for the presidential office, held a press conference here today.

Sila-Nowicki, presenting his motives for taking part in the presidential race and outlining his programme, said that he wished to introduce a democratic system for Poland, a system based on freedom for which the Polish nation fought for the past 45 years.

As a president he would like to guarantee fully democratic elections to the Senate and Sejm. Only parliament elected in free elections will have the moral right to adopt a new constitution, said Sila-Nowicki.

Farmers Solidarity Names Janowski for President

LD1510224890 Warsaw PAP in English 1922 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Warsaw, Oct. 15—The spokesman for the Solidarity of Individual Farmers said today he hoped the National Council of the union would accept Gabriel Janowski as a candidate for the nation's presidential office.

The presidium of the union decided to name Janowski as a candidate in reply to PSL's [Polish Peasant Party] decision to name Roman Bartoszcze as its candidate.

At the beginning of the campaign, the union agreed that none of the candidates were able to mobilize the political energy of farmers. They said that, despite their respect for PSL Chairman Roman Bartoszcze, he had no chance in gathering the majority of rural population around him.

Minister Hall on Presidential Election Campaign

PM1510151690 Lodz GLOS PORANNY in Polish 20 Sep 90 pp 1-2

[Interview with Minister Aleksander Hall, member of Council of Ministers for Cooperation with Political Organizations and Associations, by GAZETA PORANNA correspondent Henryk Sroczynski; place and date not given]

[Text] [Sroczynski] What course can we expect the election campaign to take?

[Hall] The first question, which requires careful consideration, is the choice of dates for the presidential and parliamentary elections— dates which would be best from the viewpoint of the state interest. As regards the election campaign itself, of course we cannot hope to avoid a forceful stressing and emphasizing of the differences between the contenders. However, I believe that all political forces should make every effort to ensure that this election campaign is conducted in the spirit of respect for proper political procedures and for all opposing sides. It would not be good if particular interests were to supersede state interests. This is because, regardless of who wins the election, who becomes president, and who enters parliament, the extremely difficult problems troubling this country will still be with us and the rulers will have to challenge them. It would be very dangerous if someone were to win the election, so to speak, on the wave of easy promises. He would then face an extremely difficult task ahead.

[Sroczynski] Can we assume that there will be no shortage of demagogic maneuvers on the part of many smaller political groups which can boast no political or economic programs of their own?

[Hall] Of course, there is always a threat of such a development. But I hope that we are all learning a lesson in democracy and that it will be an effective process which will enable society to distinguish between what is responsible and what is irresponsible. I believe that society will prove that it is deeply rational when it comes to making most important and momentous choices.

[Sroczynski] In your opinion, what would be the most advantageous configuration of forces in the Sejm?

[Hall] I believe that we should take care to avoid the principle of extreme proportional representation in drawing up our new electoral law. This would bring us a very considerable fragmentation of votes and I would be inclined to be apprehensive about a parliament which contains several dozen different political groups.

[Sroczynski] And what about the choice of president? How should this be done?

[Hall] You can see very clearly that society wants the whole nation to choose its president. I too believe that this is necessary. The president chosen in this way would be truly in possession of a genuine national mandate. To tell you the truth, however, I believe that a proper definition of the scope and range of presidential powers is much more important. There is nothing more foolish than choosing the person first and then beginning to wonder about what powers he should be given. In my opinion, too little time is allocated to consideration of this question.

[Sroczynski] In what function and in what role would you place Tadeusz Mazowiecki after the presidential election?

[Hall] I can answer this question only in a very general way. I believe that Poland needs the present prime minister very much, as indeed it needs all that he represents, that is, his specific political line. Consequently, I feel that continuation is very strongly recommended here. Any analysis of a possible alternative function and role for Tadeusz Mazowiecki would be premature.

[Sroczynski] What do you think of Lech Walesa as a presidential candidate? And whom would you name as a potential rival candidate?

[Hall] I believe that any citizen, and especially someone as eminent as Lech Walesa, is entitled to run for president. Nevertheless, I believe that we cannot allow the ultimate choice to be decided in a plebiscite or in to be forced in any way that would take advantage of the present confusion. The choice which the nation will have to make should be made by way of selection from a group of serious candidates. I could not approve of a situation in which Lech Walesa would not be confronted with a challenge of an alternative candidate.

[Sroczynski] Who could be that alternative candidate?

[Hall] I would not like to discuss names at this point. But I believe that he certainly should have a serious rival candidate or several rival candidates.

Linguistic Blunders Enter Presidential Campaign

AU1210083090 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 9 Oct 90 p 3

[Stanislaw Turnau commentary: "I Will Win, Because I Am"]

[Text] Lech Walesa began his presidential campaign in true American style with the slogan: "I will definitely win, because I am the best." This slogan is as old as politics and advertising itself.

I doubt whether it will ultimately benefit Walesa. We do not live in America and we are not bombarded by a relentless stream of such advertising. If we take a look behind the slogan, the words: "I am the best," only betray a lack of humility on the part of their speaker. As regards Walesa, it is hard to interpret them in any other way. Walesa, when asked about Mazowiecki's decision to stand for the presidency, answered with irony and contempt that he did not expect to be competing against his former "adviser" (shown in the television program "Wiadomosci" on 6 October).

Mazowiecki began his campaign in a more friendly manner. In his television interview with journalists he displayed modesty, tact, and humor. On Saturday, he personally greeted Marshal Pilsudski's daughters who were returning to Poland to settle here for good (also shown in "Wiadomosci").

The good start made by the prime minister was blemished by the linguistic blunders made by his supporters. They: "Welcomed with greetings...." They asserted that they: "Would not repeal the road they had set out on," and warned against "destabilization." Absolutely correct sentiments, but if the words are wrong, one has to seek the correct alternatives.

The organizers of the prime minister's campaign can draw comfort from the fact that the Center Accord was also falling into similar linguistic traps: "Lech Walesa being a president of all the Poles...." And an even better one: "By choosing Lech Walesa you are chosing a Poland tailored to your expectations." Now, where have I heard that one before?

Schedule of Election Preparations Published

AU1510205290 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 10 Oct 90 p 2

["Election Calendar"]

[Text] The 25 November 1990 date for the elections is now official, for a decree to this effect by the marshal of the Sejm has been published in the Law Journal of 5 October, issue No. 68. This decree also lays down the deadlines for certain administrative activities. Here they are:

By 9 October 1990, the appointment of the State Electoral Commission;

By 11 October 1990, the appointment of voivodship electoral commissions;

By 21 October 1990, the public announcement of the number of voting districts, their boundaries, and the seats of district electoral commissions;

Twenty days from the publication of this decree, the reporting of presidential candidates to the State Electoral Commission for registration, together with statements by the candidates that they agree to run for president;

By 31 October 1990, the appointment of district electoral commissions;

By 10 November 1990, the publication of information on the presidential candidates, and the publication of lists of voters;

By 15 November 1990, the appointment of trustees for the State Electoral Commission, voivodship electoral commissions, and district electoral commissions, to watch over proper election conduct;

25 November 1990, the presidential elections.

Jastrzebski Named New Warsaw Voivode

LD1510213290 Warsaw PAP in English 1625 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Warsaw, Oct. 15—The chairman of the Council of Ministers appointed today Bohdan Jastrzebski Warsaw's new voivode.

At the same time, he recalled Adam Langer from this post and thanked him for his work.

Future of Citizens Parliamentary Club Discussed

AU1510154690 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 13-14 Oct 90 p 2

[Agnieszka Jedrzejczyk report: "Will the OKP Survive?"]

[Text] Will the Citizens Parliamentary Club [OKP] continue to exist? Will its presidium step down? Could the club change its structure and become a federation of political groupings?

We understand that these were some of the questions that were asked at Friday's [12 October] meeting between the OKP presidium and representatives of the political groupings within the club. The OKP is to provide answers to these questions at a closed session that will be held on 24 October.

Center Accord representatives attending the meeting proposed that the presidium should become a body representing various political forces. It was also suggested that the club be dissolved. However, the consensus of opinion was that the club should continue to operate.

The Center Accord already has a "shadow presidium." Changes in the presidium will probably take place at the OKP's 24 October meeting. We understand that this was a subject that was also discussed at the OKP Center Accord group's meeting on Friday. The Center Accord is counting on obtaining 130 votes in the club (which has 252 members) and the possibility of winning over those who are still undecided. It has also considered the possibility that the Citizens Movement Democratic Action may leave the club.

Sejm Session Assesses Economic Program

Balcerowicz Addresses Session

LD1110210490 Warsaw PAP in English 1807 GMT 11 Oct 90

[Text] Warsaw, Oct. 11—Vice Prime Minister Leszek Balcerowicz presented an assessment of how the economic programme had been implemented in the first half of this [year], while speaking in the Sejm (lower house) today. Here are the highlights of his address:

—The realization of the economic programme resulted primarily in curbing inflation which dropped from 78 per cent last January to 1.8 per cent in August. Market supplies improved, full supplies of goods to shops were ensured and lines were eliminated.

—The zloty got consolidated and the dollar's black market exchange rate was eliminated.

—Structural changes now taking place and evident booms are reflected in the rise in investment imports from Western countries and foreign trade surplus, an increse in the production of consumer goods and an intensive development of private sector.

—However, the economic development is threatened by external factors, primarily consequences of the Persian Gulf conflict, switching over to a new system of squaring accounts in trade with the USSR and a drop in exports to Germany.

—Difficulties have to be overcome by opening the economy to cooperation with other countries, considerable reduction of the Polish debt and accelerating changes in the economic system.

—Privatization of enterprises and the creation of competition are the main two directions of changes in the coming period.

—It will not be possible to fully privatize the entire economy by the end of 1990 and enterprises where ownership changes will not be made will be allowed to turn into a one-person company of the state treasury.

—Liberalization of limitations to wage increases is to take place along with progressing privatization and competition created in the market.

—The inevitable costs of changes are growing unemployment and the number of bankrupt enterprises that will be much greater than this year.

—We have to make important collective political decisions. However, their making cannot threaten the most important thing, that is, the restructuring of the economic system.

In November, the government will submit the guidelines of the socioeconomic policy and a draft of the 1991 budget to the Sejm.

Session Passes Program Bill

LD1110231390 Warsaw PAP in English 2117 GMT 11 Oct 90

[Text] Warsaw, Oct. 11—Deputies' discussion in parliament's lower house focused today on economic issues also touched upon by Leszek Balcerowicz and Wladyslaw Baka in their Sejm addresses.

Earlier, Sejm Speaker Mikolaj Kozakiewicz said that the house would discuss on October 12 a motion submitted by the prime minister to recall Aleksander Hall from his ministerial post so that he could engage himself in the presidential campaign of Tadeusz Mazowiecki.

The Sejm once again postponed the change of the chairman of the Supreme Board of Control Nik.

The deputies who accepted the government-adopted direction of the economic reforms presented their doubts as to their implementation. They said that a market balance had been achieved but it caused pauperization of many people. They opined that the situation brought about the need to correct the governmental programme.

After the deputies' discussion, the floor was taken once again by Vice Prime Minister Leszek Balcerowicz who pointed to incoherencies in deputies' addresses. He said that the tax system could not be eased at the same time when the budgetary expenditures grew and the inflation was being curbed.

Balcerowicz called it unreal to make deep changes in the present programme. Their introduction would mean the creating of a completely new programme, he said.

The chamber passed the bill on the implementation of the economic stabilization programme and on the state budget.

Bank President Addresses Session

LD1110231790 Warsaw PAP in English 1947 GMT 11 Oct 90

[Text] Warsaw, Oct. 11—Addressing the Sejm today, president of the Narodowy Bank Polski Wladyslaw Baka said:

—Recommendations of the Sejm to stop financing the budget deficit by the emission of empty money are consistently observed.

—An important feature of a new money policy is the adoption of the principle of a real interest rate, exceeding the index of price rises.

—The taken steps contributed to rebuilding society's confidence in the Polish zloty.

—For the first time in our history, the dollar swiftly loses its value in the home market. Its purchasing power, calculated into possibilities to purchase goods, dropped by over 60 per cent by the end of September. In the coming months, it will not be necessary to change the zloty's exchange rate towards the dollar.

—Convertibility of the zloty was not threatened even for a moment. On the contrary, owing to considerably increased currency reserves, by over 3 billion dollars, reliable foundations were laid for strengthening the position of the zloty and for solidifying its convertibility into foreign currencies.

—It is still necessary to maintain considerable hard currency reserves. When the situation is more stable and when at least some reserves acquire lasting character, they will be immediately used to promote investment.

—In the coming future, banks will start withdrawing credits from unprofitable enterprises. The hitherto liberalism brought about a paradoxical situation when there were very few bankrupt enterprises despite a 30-per cent drop in their production.

—The struggle against hyperinflation, chiefly by reducing incomes, prevailed in the first half of this year. Now, it is time to implement the second stage of the programme combining anti-inflation measures with creating conditions for animating the economy.

—Structural changes should be fostered by the possibility to draw credits abroad. In five years, the sum of these credits can exceed 10 billion dollars. Their use requires the working out of a proper system of turning these credits into economic potential. The most urgent task is to create such a system.

Privatization Plans To Be Presented to Sejm

AU1110145790 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 6-7 Oct 90 p 2

["WZ"-signed report: "Privatization Plans"]

[Text] On Friday, Waldemar Kuczynski, minister for ownership changes, presented the government with a draft bill that has been prepared by the Ministry for Ownership Changes for the privatization program that is intended to cover the rest of 1990. The draft, accompanied by government amendments, is to be presented to the Sejm on Monday.

Commercialization or Initial Privatization

Those enterprises that must still wait for conventional privatization will be commercialized, that is to say, they will become companies with state participation. Their management boards will be given more autonomy and this will enable these companies to be managed without too much state interference. Members of these boards will be in a similar position to company owners.

Board members will be selected from factory crews (up to one-third of the board), the state treasury, and the general public. Selection of candidates is to begin very shortly. Only the best candidates will be elected to the management board and they will have to undergo appropriate training before being allowed to assume their seat.

Commercialization is to be voluntary. The incentive to factory crews will come from the reductions of additional payments in commercialized firms.

The First 100 in Six Months

The most spectacular will be the privatization of share capital. After the conversion of the largest state enterprises into state participation companies, shares of these companies will be offered to the best employees (up to 20 percent on preferential terms) and then to "all those who may be interested."

In order to avoid a large dispersion of share capital, controlling packets of shares in certain companies will be offered to the highest local and foreign bidders. It is now well known that the following enterprises have been chosen to be privatized first, namely: "Exbud" (Kielce); the Silesian Cable Factory (Ciechowice-Dziedzice); the Krosno Glassworks; the "Fampa" Paper Processing Machine Factory (Jelenia Gora); the "Warszawa" Rolling Mill; the "Prochnik" Factory (Lodz); and the Inowroclaw Meat Processing Plant. Subscription of shares in the first three firms will already begin in November or December 1990.

There is still a chance that four more firms could join the list of "seven." The possible firms are: the Swarzedz Furniture Factory; the Bytom Garments Factory; "Tonsil" (Wrzesnia); and "Otmet" (Krapkowice).

It is estimated that approximately 100 firms will be in the process of privatization by the end of the first quarter of 1991.

The first emission of free privatization coupons [bezplatnych bonow emisyjnych] is projected sometime in 1991.

There are 200 Firms Ready for Privatization

Small- and medium-size firms will undergo privatization through liquidation [prywatyzacja likwidacyjna], this means that they will be sold or leased. In some cases this may be to partnerships formed by its own workers. The ministry has received 200 applications for liquidator privatization and 150 firms out of these 200 are judged suitable for this method of privatization.

The ministry is not yet in a position to give any firm figures for this type of privatization in 1991. Accelerating this type of privatization will, however, simplify the procedures for valuing the capital of these enterprises and facilitate the sale of firms through the application of loan funds (leverage method buyouts). The purchaser will have to provide a down payment and pay off the rest in installments.

Dispute Over Warsaw Press Titles Outlined

AU1510154390 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 11 Oct 90 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Divorce at the EXPRESS?"]

[Text] On Wednesday [10 October] the staff of EXPRESS WIECZORNY issued the first edition of EXPRESS—a Warsaw daily. It promises to provide breakfast-time reading consisting of a little sensational news, a lot of reports on matters of topical importance, and gossip obtained from well-informed sources.

The new title, which has been registered with a court, is being published by a cooperative connected with the staff of EXPRESS WIECZORNY. The "Prasa-Ksiazka-Ruch" Workers' Cooperative Publishing House [RSW] Liquidation Commission has given its approval and is financing the publication of the new daily. The journalists maintain that they will do well out of it. Newspaper kiosks had run out of the 4,000 copies of the first edition by 10 o'clock in the morning.

The paper's staff had written a letter earlier to the prime minister in which they stated that the liquidation of the RSW concern was not being carried out in accordance with the law, and that EXPRESS WIECZORNY had become the subject of political battles taking place behind the scenes: "At the beginning of July, Liquidation Commission Secretary Andrzej Grajewski informed our editor in chief that the commission was being subjected to strong pressure from the Center Accord, which was seeking to acquire our newspaper."

The chairman of the Liquidation Commission, Jerzy Drygalski, told EXPRESS in writing that he is still not in a position to tell the staff what the future will hold for them.

The paper's editorial board maintains that staff have precedence regarding acquisition of the title. The final decision rests with the government.

The staff says that if they lose their EXPRESS WIECZORNY, they will continue to publish the daily EXPRESS, but without giving up their struggle for their old title.

Council of Ministers Approves Radio, TV Amendments

LD1610062590 Warsaw PAP in English 2317 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Warsaw, Oct. 15—The Council of Ministers held a meeting presided over by Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki today.

The government accepted amendments to the law on radio and television presented by the TV and Radio Committee chairman and adopted a draft law on public radio and television institutions.

The amendments pertain to:
—The powers of the National Radio and TV Council to set the maximum airing time for commercials,
—issuance of permits for the creation and airing of programs,
—an increase of the share of foreign subjects in the initial or stock capital from 20 percent to 33 percent for which permits can be issued to create and air programs.

Under the draft law, the "Polskie Radio i Telewizja" authority is to be divided into two separate state units, the "Polskie Radio" and "Telewizja Polska."

Radio and television are to be managed by: the board of trustees, the general manager and the programmatic board.

Jaruzelski Phones, Cables Gorbachev on Award

LD1510212590 Warsaw PAP in English 1623 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Warsaw, Oct. 15—In a telephone call today Polish President Wojciech Jaruzelski congratulated Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev on his winning the Nobel Peace Prize.

During the course of the conversation, President Jaruzelski sent his best wishes to the Soviet president.

Jaruzelski also sent Gorbachev a congratulatory cable.

Walesa Sends Congratulations

LD1510224490 Warsaw PAP in English 1934 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Gdansk, Oct. 15—Today the 1983 Nobel Peace Prize winner, Lech Walesa, sent his congratulations to the 1990 Nobel Peace Prize winner, Mikhail Gorbachev, president of the Soviet Union.

Walesa Greets Pope on 12th Anniversary

LD1510224690 Warsaw PAP in English 2012 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Warsaw, Oct. 15—Lech Walesa has sent a letter to Pope John Paul 2 in connection with the 12th anniversary of the latter's pontificate.

Conveying his best wishes and asking for more prayers, Walesa assured the pope that he would do everything necessary to ensure that the construction of democracy in Poland does not diminish the role of the Christian values that had created the Polish nation.

Government Holds Weekly Session 12 Oct

AU1210191190 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1850 GMT 12 Oct 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 12/10/1990—Today, the Romanian Government assembled, under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Petre Roman in its weekly working meeting. The communique issued at the end of the meeting, says, among other things:

Minister of Culture Andrei Plesu showed that, after the revolution, in a relatively short time, the number of newspapers grew from 500 to about 1,500, while applications for new publications licensing is ever increasing. Concomitantly, news-print quantities diminish every quarter. For well-grounded reasons, only 17,500 of the required 34,000 tonnes for the fourth quarter can be supplied. The minister pointed out that for a large number of newspapers and other publications demand falls 20-25 percent below print.

Under the circumstances, the government has to choose between augmenting pulp production at the expense of the national timber reserves, already exhausted by irrational dictatorial policies and therefore likely to seriously affect environment, and importing large quantities of paper, which implies, for immediate needs alone, a several million-dollar extra-burden on the country's budget.

After the variants were debated the government decided not to intervene through administrative measures and to raise the tax on forest—the lowest in the world at present—set up a bureau for the registration of the applications for paper which will be supplied according to free market principles, and undertake firm action to protect national forest stock to the end of preserving and restoring the quality of the environment.

Wishing to support the press, the government decided to ask for the help of great paper manufacturing countries.

The government discussed next variants of the salary reform to the end of submitting a bill to Parliament for debate and approval.

Analysing the report on the technical, economic and financial situation, as well as the prospects of car manufacture by Oltcit S.A. Craiova joint venture, the government adopted a communique that will be released.

After surveying a package of measures for the passage to price liberalization and social security, the government worked out a draft resolution which stipulates: Prices and tariffs are set freely by taking into account economic agents and in keeping with the provisions of Law No. 15/1990 on the basis of the concerted action of demand and offer conditioned by the existence in the economy of at least three suppliers of the same commodity, operation and service, a provision applicable to both autonomous companies and commercial units, and to the economic units to be set up within the legally established interval.

To implement the social security programme it is stipulated among other things that the retail prices and tariffs of energy, fuel and rent should remain unchanged and temporary subsidized from the state budget—25 billion lei at the level of 1990. As for basic food, some industrial products and important services for the population influenced by the new retail prices and tariffs they are to be compensated through fixed sums granted to each person, both employees and pensioners. It was suggested that those prices remain unchanged at least one year. As for fruit, garments, knitwear, footwear a.o. [and others] as well as a number of services the prices and tariffs of which evoluate freely an average monthly foreseeable rise index of prices and tariffs is to be calculated to serve salary and pension indexation.

Senate Meets; Roman To Present Report 18 Oct

AU1510190690 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1712 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 15/10/1990—The Romanian Senate resumed works in plenum on Monday. This week's proceedings are expected to focus on the bill of commercial companies.

Senate President Barladeanu announced that a meeting in plenum of the two houses of Romania's Parliament would be held on October 18, where the prime minister would read out an account followed by debates.

Details on Senate Session

AU1510213290 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 2055 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 15/10/1990—Romania's Senate resumed the debates on October 15 afternoon on the bill of commercial companies. The MDUR [Democratic Association of Hungarians in Romania—UDMR] senators were not present. Twelve more articles of the bill were endorsed after two-hour debates.

The MDUR senators entered the session hall after that. Senate President Alexandru Barladeanu demanded from Senator Karoly Kiraly a clear answer to his appeal regarding the MDUR group's stand on last week's incident (when the MDUR senators left the hall because of the word "Romanian" in Article 93 of the bill).

Senator Karoly deplored the situation but said the MDUR maintained its statement and demanded the NSF [National Salvation Front—FSN] majority group to state that on the mediation of the text between the specialty commissions of the two houses the MDUR standpoint would be taken into consideration.

The NSF group leader, Senator Vasile Vacar, said that the NSF vote had to be understood without any discriminatory tendency, as the wording in the bill was meant to encompass the Romanians everywhere. Also, Senator Vacar showed dissatisfaction with Senator Kiraly's explanation about the labelling of the NSF as Iron-Guardist.

Senator Attila Verestoy of the MDUR said: "We regret to have used this word in an official communique, just as we regret the labelling as such. We want to return to normal. We are sure that the force of reason, that prevails in the Senate proceedings, will win."

Alexandru Barladeanu, whose presence and activity were helpful in calming down the spirits, said: "Let us congratulate ourselves for being able to go on with the proceedings of the Senate as it was elected by the Romanian people."

The Senate resumes proceedings on October 16 at 9:00 hrs.

Radical Democratic Party President Resigns

AU1510190890 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1715 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 15/10/1990—The Standing Committee of Action of the Radical Democratic Party of Romania [RDP] analyzed in a meeting the situation created following the resignation of Costel Niculae from the office of RDP chairman and from the party leadership, upon the RDP leadership's request, pursuant to his repeated violation of the party's rules.

The party's leadership also mentions that Costel Niculae no longer has any official capacity with the party.

* Need for New Opposition Forces Stressed

90BA0325C Bucharest CUVINTUL in Romanian 17 Sep 90 p 2

[Radu Portocala article: "The Opposition Often Posed as the Victim"]

[Text] If the situation in Romania was and continues to be so unclear, this is largely due to the absence of any opposition structures under Ceausescu. And in spite of appearances, this absence continues to be felt.

When the traditional political parties reappeared in January, we might have thought that this was a positive phenomenon. When dozens of other groups joined them later, the spectacle became downright comical, not to say alarming. It reflected the tragic reality that Romania shares with all the East European countries: the complete dismemberment and pulverization of the society—the perverse but not uncalculated effect of communism. Evidently, Romania no longer has a homogeneous civil society, but a multitude of more or less isolated individuals; it no longer has a public opinion, but an infinity of personal opinions, contradictory more often than not.

In the first stage, the parties congratulated themselves on their continuously growing number of members. An extremely unpleasant intuition made me ask myself whether, by a misplaced liberation reflex, people may have been joining several parties at one and the same time. Numerous confessions soon verified my apprehensions. At the same time, they raised another question: What did the opposition parties represent to the Romanians? Undoubtedly, nothing very precise. And then the first—and probably worst—mistake of these parties became evident: They presented ridiculous facsimiles of political programs to a a nation in complete disarray. It is indubitably inconceivable that, after 45 years of stupid absolutism, anyone should attempt to involve an entire nation in the politicoeconomic game with programs of at most one page!

Ignorance led to haste, and haste to fogginess. The Front played the card that was unexpectedly offered to it and won, spreading doubt and panic. The Romanians are no less ready for democratization than others; but the opposition presented this democratization in a form that scared them off.

The outcome is more than obvious: The elections were not won by the Front, but lost by the opposition. Simply because the opposition was ignorant and did not take the trouble to be. No one denies the difficulties with which the opposition candidates had to contend; equally incontestable is the fact that the Front did everything possible to deprive them of normal communication. Nevertheless....aside from continuously posing as the victims, the parties did not have much to say. To use a word that has become totally eroded in Romania but that is entirely in place here, their contribution was not in the least constructive.

The situation worsened after the elections and the present prospects are not in the least encouraging. The very small parties continue to uselessly mix up everyone, thus playing into the hands of the authorities (which is actually not a Romanian specialty); the "large" parties have become small: Some are on their way to disappearance, while others have become embarassing annexes of the power. We are thus coming to an alarming question: If the National Salvation Front and all its pre-eminent members were to disappear tomorrow, who were capable of leading the country?... What genuine politicians emerged after more than six months of sterile chaos?....We cannot think of an answer.

On 22 December there was much talk of the political vacuum left behind him by Ceausescu. (Empty words, since his succession had long since been ensured....) Soon we found ourselves in a situation of political plenty, which was, however, terribly deceptive, because no personality stood out from this magma about whom we could say: This is the future president of the country.

As long as this confusion persists—because of the stubborness, vanity, frustrations, and compromises of some people—Romania will remain in constant danger, namely in danger of not being able to advance because of the lack of a viable alternative.

The "historical" parties decided to ignore the past 45 years that the country experienced. They wanted to retie the knot where it had broken, and that was their second

fundamental mistake. The Front, as a continuity solution with hopes for improvement, was preferred by a crushing mass of voters who, after all, where only half wrong.

Today the solution appears perfectly clear and obvious. It consists, first of all, of uniting the Romanian political scene through alliances and mergers among parties, then of establishing new, modern groups in step with international politics and capable of generating genuine public figures. Only the emergence of a new opposition capable of assuming the role—perhaps even more thankless than that of the government—of putting up an intelligent opposition could give Romania's political developments a real chance. Its primary attribute must be modern realistic reasoning. This is what we miss most, and this is what we can dare to expect from the young people that some insulted and others ignored, and who today are better known and appreciated abroad than in their own country.

This is not the first time that such a thing happens, but it better be the last!

* Communique on Brasov Meeting of 'Resistance'

90BA0325B Bucharest VIITORUL in Romanian 13 Sep 90 p 2

["Communique"]

[Text] The first meeting of the Romanian Resistance was held in Brasov on 7-8 September 1990 at the intiative of the 15 November 1987 Movement. The meeting was attended by representatives of the following organizations: Timisoara Society, the Group for Social Dialogue [GDS], the Association of Former Political Detainees of Romania, GID [Independent Group for Democracy], CADA [Action Committee for the Democratization of the Army], the Democratic Antitotalitarian Forum of Cluj, the League of Bucharest University Students, ITB [expansion unknown], the Pro-Europe League (Tirgu Mures), delegations of Jiu Valley miners who participated in the 1977 strikes, the 21 December Association of Bucharest, the 22 December Trade Union of Zarnesti, and the 15 November Association of Brasov; press envoys from: ROMANIA LIBERA, 22, EXPRES, ATLAS, NU, OPINIA, BARICADA, VIITORUL PNL [National Liberation Party], TIMPUL CAPITALEI, CATAVENCU, ALUTUS, GAZETA DE TRANSILVANIA, ASTRA, 15 NOIEMBRIE; and representatives of the television studios of Bucharest, Cluj, Timisoara, and Brasov.

The participants in the dialogue noted that human rights violations did not stop after the revolution. This serious situation damages Romania's image abroad, prevents us from joining the ranks of the civilized nations, and slows down the process of democratization. The government must carefully study the human rights issue and as soon as possible ensure the necessary conditions for fully implementing them. This can be a first step toward overcoming the old communist practices. The participants expressed the belief that the penal code must be amended in alignment with international legislation.

We note with anxiety the unprecedented increase recorded in emigration. Hundreds of thousands of Romanians are seeking refuge outside the country. The reason they are abandoning their homes, families, and native land in dramatic conditions lies both in the impotence of the present regime to ensure the democratic process and in the growing poverty of the people, which leaves no hope for attaining a decent lifestyle in the foreseeable future. The government is the only one capable of taking the necessary decisions to stop this trend of mass emigration and to prompt those who left prior to the present communique to return.

Romania's economic situation has never been as bad. The symptoms of the economic crisis are complete disarray in industrial activities, an unclear and unstable agrarian policy, fast price increases, inefficient and incomplete utilization of the manpower, discriminations in the salary policy, and food shortages.

In this situation, the government delays the implementation of even those economic reforms it promised in its program. The contradictory measures adopted on free initiative and privatization substantially contribute to the chaos. The only solution to this situation is to implement a resolute program for the transition to a market economy. Recently it is being said with increasing frequency that the Romanians have stopped working. We resolutely reject the circulation of such erroneous views. The economic chaos created by the government is responsible for the inefficient work. In order to show results we need a legislative framework apt to motivate people to work, to create conditions for implementing the principles of a market economy, and to guarantee that the fruits of labor will be enjoyed by those directly involved in production and services.

Aside from the points announced in the agenda of the meeting, the participants also discussed other issues of major interest:

—In connection with the critical situation in Maramures-Sapinta, the signatories of this communique stated that they are carefully following the events and that their position is definitely on the side of the peasants against the abuses of the administration. At the same time, the view was expressed that holding this trial in Brasov is not only unjustified, but it can create additional tension in a city already plagued by special social tensions.

—We have taken note of the Appeal of the Popular Front of the Moldavian Republic: We join in its requests and support them as historically justified.

—We are of the opinion that CADA's principled position that the army must not in any way be implicated in politics is a positive factor. We agree with the view that the army must defend the integrity of the national

territory and not serve the interests of any party, group, or person. The participants support the continuation of CADA's activities.

—We note the harmful character of the press campaigns conducted by certain newspapers and many television programs. Disinformation, incomplete, belated, and tendentious information, incitement to violence, and denigration of certain persons or organizations can only contribute to deepening the crisis.

Lies destabilize the country, not truth.

—We want to call attention to the existence of a guided process of division among ethnic, social, professional, and religious groups and within each group, designed to divert attention from the serious problems with which we are confronted.

In view of these negative phenomena, the participants pointed out the need for solidarity among all those in favor of the democratization of the Romanian society. We view this meeting as the beginning of an active solidarization and of recognition of the commmon interests of the workers, intellectuals, students, peasants, and military men.

There is only one solution for our political, economic, social, and moral disaster: solidarity among ourselves in defense of the universal human rights—the only guarantee of freedom.

Issued in Brasov today, 8 September 1990.

* Chances for Opposition Parties Weighed

90BA0325A Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 15 Sep 90 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Serghei Mesaros and Dinu Patriciu by Sorin Rosca Stanescu; place and date not given: "An Alternative to Government Policies"; first paragraph is ROMANIA LIBERA introduction]

[Text] A democratic state must have a politically polarized society. If there is a national consensus, then it should explicitely be on understanding this elementary truth. The NSF [National Salvation Front] won the 20 May elections and is now steering the country's destinies; as such it deserves praise for its successes and it carries the responsibility for all the negative consequences of governmental decisions. However, even the government party can become more coherent, wiser, and stronger only if the opposition has an increasingly sound and clear say in the country's political life. Having a strong opposition is in everyone's interests: intellectuals, workers, and peasants equally, regardless of their political orientation. This is the only chance for the country's democratization. These were the ideas that prompted us to establish this new column. By organizing roundtables, talks, or analyses on the situation of various parties we hope to clarify the distinction between specific and common objectives. In other words, we will attempt to find out what unites the opposition and what are the profound resources that may turn it into a genuine political force and an alternative to the policies of the government party. And obviously, by studying the processes that have occurred since December we can together learn from our own mistakes. Not coincidentally, we will open this series with two well-known political leaders, Messrs. Serghei Mesaros and Dinu Patriciu. The first, leader of the National Democratic Party [NDP], grasped that, after the initial period of political euphoria, the splintering had to be neutralized by establishing (according to him, a center) coalition, while Dinu Patriciu initiated a particularly interesting experiment for a historical party, designed to rejuvenate the party and anchor it in the immediate realities. After the due organization process, the Young Wing of the National Liberal Party [NLP] promises to become a vigorous group to be reckoned with. And now let us hear them.

[Stanescu] Talking of the chances of the opposition, I think it would not be uninteresting to consider the intellectuals. At a time when the political parties need the intellectuals more than at any other time, it seems to me that most of them are politically engaged, but not within the parties.

[Patriciu] As we all know, any human attitude is political. After 45 years of imposed absence of politics, the intellectuals are warry of parties. This is not mere laziness, I would rather describe it as an inhibition.

[Mesaros] Let's call it social cowardice. During a certain period the intellectuals were the most handicapped elements of the society. They had to make compromises in order to survive. Let's see what is happening in the other East European countries in which revolutions have brought about a market economy. In all those states, the intellectuals were the catalyst for this process of transition. They were the vanguard. Except in Romania, where our intellectuals kept their distance until a power formula took shape. Now, only now, are they speaking out in favor or against. Look at all the new parties: each one suffers from a shortage of culture and intelligentsia. We opted for technocrats, which is the most correct formula from the viewpoint of social efficiency. In general, however, our voters chose to remain in a holding position. So currently politics is the domain of second rate people, those automatically subjected to constructive or nonconstructive criticism by the intellectuals, who remain above politics. The response 'I don't deal in politics' is almost general among cultural circles. I can only describe it as social cowardice at this point, when this holding posture creates the biggest problems in the political structure.

[Patriciu] My view on this point is somewhat different. The technocrats and to a lesser extent the cultural intelligentsia, massively went for the NLP ever since January. Even when our doctrine was not clearly known, our liberal spirit brought to us a large number of those who fully experienced the vices of the communist system. Because of the intransigence of a very small core

of leaders, these people were rejected at the central level for various reasons. This is the phenomenon that the young wing is now working to correct. And the intellectuals are returning to us: university professors, enterprise directors, and technical cadres from industry. We continue to miss the cultural intelligentsia, which is a very serious problem, because those are the people who can convey the message. We need them to adapt a well structured ideology to the prevailing reality.

[Mesaros] How can you outline a national cultural model? Tragically, there is no cultural model in Romania at the present. What can be more shameful, regardless of the political position of those I'm referring to, than the fact that in the elections in Bucharest the independent lists that chose prominent cultural figures did not succeed in sending even one representative to Parliament. Neither Dinescu, who represented one orientation, nor Liiceanu or Paler, who represented a different one, won sufficient votes.

[Patriciu] Precisely because they refused to have an ideological program. They were hovering somewhere in midair and people rejected them precisely because they did not present a position. Now, however (judging by my contacts in the cultural world), the intellectuals are becoming polarized.

[Stanescu] Speaking of the intelligentsia I cannot help thinking of the student movement. Everywhere in the world the student movements gave the opposition real chances. We don't nee to think any farther than the East European countries.

[Patriciu] While the political uninvolvement of the leaders remains a handicap (for example, I think that Marian Munteanu should be in politics), the same thing cannot be said of the students in general.

[Mesaros] Throughout the world, student movements serve as a barometer of the political situation. Everywhere in the world the students serve to indicate the mood of the people to both the rulers and the opposition; they are the vanguard of the next political movement. Student organizations have harbored the most intensive unrest and political movements of basic coloring: radical and protest movements. This is a special environment. The most important is that we, not only the authorities, but all those involved in politics, should learn how to read this barometer. And here we need great political and social ability in order to realize early enough just what the student movement represents. This is precisely why I salute the student movements. We must have the ability to detect their meaning and understand their substance; from this viewpoint, if the student movements were incorporated in one political party, we would lose this extremely sensitive gauge.

[Patriciu] If the student movements became integrated in a political party of whatever nature, they would lose precisely this attribute of spontaneous reaction to social conjunctures.

[Stanescu] Mr. Patriciu earlier suggested a distinction between the students' leaders and the masses of students. Were you referring to the fact that the students could join various parties while preserving unaltered their character as a student movement?

[Patriciu] One extraordinary example is that of the Civic Forum in Czechoslovakia, in which the students were the catalyst and organizing element of the entire movement. They hastened the process of change, and this is what should have happened in our country, too. The students of Romania can be the most dynamic element of the process of change.

[Mesaros] I would like to contrast the students to our intelligentsia, because the cultural homogeneity of the students, their actions, and their position took the place of the current of opinion that the intellectuals should have created prior to 20 May. A student opposition certainly existed. It was self-generated and not imposed in any way. It had a uniform character. Our intelligentsia was not capable of achieving the same thing. That is why I think that those young people, those students, will indeed provide us with a technocratic and cultural intelligentsia.

[Stanescu] I feel obligated to ask: aren't you judging the intellectuals too severely? After dozens of years of forced uniformity, could they have been expected to produce first class political figures?

[Patriciu] After the dictatorship was toppled, the mood in Romania was evidently anticommunist and antitotalitarian. I think that the date of 28 January was a decisive moment, when the parties requested the establishment of the PNUC [Provisional National Unity Council]. Local elections would have been important. Local elections could have produced leaders from the bottom to the top of the hierarchy. In reality, the process was forced and the political leaders played a pronounced negative role. And this has to come from me, the one who came up with the PNUC title in the evening of 27 January. The second mistake was the imposition of the system of party lists, because it produced a depersonalized parliament. A party list is an intermediary between voter and parliament that in fact violates and stifles the revolution.

[Stanescu] I ask myself whether there is any chance in Romania that, before the next elections, the opposition will be able to come up with a coherent view supported by all the parties.

[Mesaros] I think that the process of fusion and clarification will be completed by the time of the next elections and that the issue of the opposition will then be posed differently. Alliances will be forged and monolithic parties will be created and integrated within a few political currents. We may well be confronted with extremely curious alliances, not opposed blocs, but perhaps opposed groups, structured according to various conjectural interests.

[Patriciu] I hope that by the time of the next elections we will be able to surmount the obstacles and achieve the two major parties required to balance the power. Social-democracy on the one hand and liberalism on the other will provide the necessary equilibrium for the socioeconomic mechanisms.

[Mesaros] While you are an idealist, I at the moment am a pessimist. I think that the social conflict will deepen. That will make it necessary for the political scene to become more radical. We may end up with a clearly established leftwing and an opposite rightwing movement, with two, three, perhaps four political currents inbetween. Unfortunately, in our country we have a political conflict along ethnic lines that seems to persist and even grow stronger, which implies national parties. In fact, they don't have any right to exist, because they express only conflictual interests.

[Patriciu] Nevertheless, I think that at this time we must and we can establish strong movements by renouncing our pride and ambitions.

[Mesaros] On this point we remain political opponents. I represent the idea of a center between two political extremes. Consequently, I promote the need for a moderating and compressing center which, when the political stage tilts too far left, can pull to the right, or the other way round, depending on the situation. You are in favor of polarizing the political scene in two camps, I am in favor of the classical balance that permits modulation and conciliation, in other words, eliminates confrontation.

[Patriciu] It is one possible scenario. In a well operating democracy, however, the middle does not oscillate like that.

* 'Resistance' Meeting Called 'Moral Parliament'

90BA0339A Bucharest VIITORUL in Romanian 13, 14 Sep 90

[Marilena Popescu report: "The Meeting of the Romanian Resistance—A Special Session of the Moral Parliament"]

[13 Sep p 2]

[Text] On 7-8 September Brasov hosted a meeting of the Romanian Resistance initiated by workers members of the 15 November Movement. Brasov, a representative center of workers' anticommunist resistance, organized the meeting because, like in other workers centers throughout the country, here too, "the workers have realized the artificiality of the diversions attempted in the most authentic communist style to create the impression that there are irreconciliable contradictions between the interests and thinking of the intelligentsia and the workers in Romania." The meeting was attended by associations, leagues, movements, press representatives, and independent personalities.

The fruitful dialogue between the Brasov hosts and the guests served as a first step toward crystallizing all the forces engaged in the process of real democratization of the country. This step is of an historic importance, because the people of Brasov endeavored and succeeded in attaining solidarity among workers, students, intellectuals, and military men through what unites them: their concern for pulling the country out of the economic, social, and moral morass into which it has been rapidly sinking after the Revolution of December 1989.

To paraphrase E. Cioran, after making the necessary changes, today in Romania "we know that we are free, but we don't feel free"; hence, the organizers of the meeting attempted to tackle some of the painfully topical problems of Romanian postrevolutionary totalitarianism. The four topics suggested for discussion were: 1. Respect for the universal human rights in Romania; 2. Emigration; 3. The government's program: achievements and prospects; 4. Why don't people work in Romania? These questions captured the interest of the meeting participants and elicited intensive and penetrating discussions and exchanges of ideas designed to dispel the smoke and fog that envelop Romanian reality more harmfully than ever. "Where are we? Who are we?" were the sobering questions raised by Mihai Gheorghiu, leader of the League of Students. And because "if we don't have frankness we don't have anything," frankness was the moral demand of the discussions.

What actually is the Romanian Resistance? The definition of the concept proceeded from the strikes of the Jiu Valley miners in 1977; the significance of the anticommunist demonstrations of 15 November 1987 was highlighted, when for the first time in Brasov people shouted "Down with the dictator," and as Mr. Mircea Sevaciuc, leader of the 15 November Movement stressed, "because Ceausescu was a product of communism, the people shouted 'Down with communism.'" (In 1880 Mihai Eminescu had said: "Brasov is the most revolutionary city in Romania.")

Mr. Constantin Dumitrescu (who pointed out that he was participating in the meeting as an individual, not on behalf of the AFDP [expansion unknown]), threw "a bridge over time" and stated that the "Romanian Resistance" began in 1945 and for 15 years was the most dramatic and intensive anticommunist resistance in East Europe. We do not have the right to give up out of tiredness or discouragement. The Iasi students in 1987, the University Square in Bucharest on 21 December, the University Square in April-May 1990 are stages in the resistance of the Romanian youth that have become a part of our history. "Begun in December 1989, the Romanian Revolution has probably not ended and will never end" (Marian Munteanu).

What the Romanian anticommunist resistance lacked was solidarity. The diabolical reprisal apparatus, which for decades of "mine darkness," as described by Miron Cosma, leader of the Petrosani miners, defended the "revolutionary achievements" of the red bourgeoisie,

and relegated especially "the rebellions of the intelligentsia to an individual level" (Ana Blandiana). With securitate cars guarding their gates, with disinformation, and with the inability of "warned" intellectuals to get close to the hotbeds of revolt—the Jiu Valley, Brasov—any attempts at solidarity failed painfully.

The Romanian Resistance, Mihai Gheorghiu concluded, is in fact "the entire Romanian nation, profoundly traumatized by communism; this is something we should never forget."

Report on Observance of Universal Human Rights

Universal human rights are still grossly violated in Romania. Abusive arrests were still made after 22 December 1989; physical and psychological pressure is still exerted on detainees during interrogations, and they are deprived of their right to legal defense. Examples of such treatment have become notorious throughout the world. Progress is slow along the path of the rule of law. Attempts are made to curtail the right to demonstrate. The Romanian law is still not in line with international law. Detaining people without a court warrant and arrests made in order to intimidate the opposition will not persuade either us or those whose moral and financial credit we need that Romania is really making progress toward a legislation and institutions apt to allow the existence and observance of the principles of a state of law. The penal code must be immediately amended.

Romanian Postrevolutionary Emigration

The second topic of the debates, emigration, elicited discussions aimed at pinpointing the causes of this alarming phenomenon. In Romania's history, emigration rose to alarming levels before—in 1938—and there was mass emigration after 1945. After the December Revolution, Romanians were expected to return from the diaspora, but that did not happen.

Who is emigrating? Of course, the "social misfits," but there is also a hemorrhage of Romanian intelligence across the border; our technical elite, physicians, professors, engineers, humanists, and artists have joined the brain drain that "governmental cynicism" does nothing to stop. Disappointment, despair, lack of faith in the leadership, fear of violence, the persistence of a police state rather than a state of law, and the economic morass are some of the causes of the phenomenon. Emigration, said Mihail Sora, is an "escape from a reality perceived as a dead-end. Personally, I think that it is everyone's duty to stay here, so that we can all rid ourselves of the guilt of having to cooperate because of the fear spread throughout the fabric of the society." The exact number of emigrants is not known, and reports vary according to sources between 200,000-800,000. According to a report by the Brasov county police, 4,700 people have left from Brasov alone, many of them professionals.

Mircea Sevaciuc (of the 15 November Movement) said: "The workers are saying that nothing has changed while they had hoped something would. Three Western firms canceled their cooperation with the Brasov trucks enteprise after the 13-15 June events. The nomenklatura trial failed to be held in Brasov. Some 100 people died in the revolution and 200 were wounded, but nobody was found responsible for it. Members of the 15 November Movement were followed by the securitate for two and a half months." "We have been slandered as allegedly having been bought off by the Peasant Party and the liberals," said Anghel Vasile, chairman of the 15 November Association. "We are the same people we were in 1987, people who don't want communism anymore in our country. We were those who had hopes after 22 December 1989. The lack of faith in the leadership has remained the same. If the present leadership has indeed abandoned the communist dogma, why do those who took a stand against communism continue to be ignored, those who were deported in 1987? Is none of those who were the first to shout 'Down with communism' good enough for a secretarial seat in the prime minister's cabinet?

"After 15 November 1987 some of us had our work contract cancelled on the basis of Article 130 paragraph i. We were rehired without monetary rights. Since 30 January this year we began sending memoranda to the prime minister. We discussed this with him personally, but without any results. We don't trust the present leadership of the country!"

Mr. Mircea Sevaciuc said: "People are leaving because what is happening in Romania is not normal. The government and the president don't realize that they cannot hold back people with lies anymore. Everyone knows that politicians lie, but after 45 years of lies, we need truth."

There are ways to curb the emigration phenomenon: establishing a state of law instead of a police state, economic recovery, restoring the government's credibility in the eyes of the Romanian and international public, and increasing contacts with Romanians in the diaspora.

[14 Sep p 2]

[Excerpt] On 8 September at the meeting of the Romanian Resistance, Marian Munteanu, who was directly involved in and affected by the 13-15 June events, spoke about the observance of the universal human rights and briefly presented the University Square phenomenon. On 21 December, several thousand people there rose against communism and the communist nomenklatura, thereby losing their fear. But the manner in which subsequent changes were made—not radical enough—caused dissatisfaction among those entitled [to protest] by the fact that they participated directly or morally in the 21 December events, and prompted them to continue the process begun then until the ideals of the revolution will be fulfilled. Certain press publications, which was declared completely free, and the Romanian Television, capitalizing on the enormous credibility they won during the revolution, began a process of systematic

disinformation of the public, sowing discord and manipulating the large masses. The miners were victims of the manipulations of the progovernmental press and television, which grossly deviated from their obligation to provide correct and objective information. The demonstrators supplied the television with 150 hours of taped material of the University Square events for the correct information of the country. "The miners' actions in Bucharest are understandable, but only God can forgive them."

The delegation of Jiu Valley miners invited to the meeting as participants in the 1977 strike, felt ambushed because, as it turned out, the heroes of the 1977 miners' strike were the same as those who went into action in Bucharest in the middle of June.

The leader of the League of Jiu Valley Miners Trade Union, Mr. Miron Cosma, highlighted the fact that the miners viewed the discussion as an insult to the strikers, but he admitted that there was some truth in Marian Munteanu's statements. The atmosphere of the discussions became extremely tense. Only "some"? Mr. Munteanu asked. "Some," the miners' leader reiterated. At that point, Marian Munteanu left the presidium table followed by all the other guests: Radu Filipescu, Mihai Sora, Ana Blandiana, Stelian Tanase, Constantin Ticu Dumitrescu, and Mircea Sevaciuc. The talks seemed stalled at a critical point. The tension was eased by an inspired appeal to solidarity by poetess Ana Blandiana. We quote from her address: "Why are Romanians emigrating? Not because of the lack of food or heat, but because of lack of solidarity. The lack of solidarity is the greatest disaster of the Romanian people. Is solidarity absent from our chemical makeup? We have come here to demonstrate that solidarity is possible. The only way to unite is by telling the truth. Solidarity is the superlative of freedom."

Mr. Adrian Moruzi of the Group for Information and Social Dialogue "Opinia" of Brasov, appealing to solidarity, said that "the Romanians are not emigrating; they are escaping because they have lost hope. The ones who stay are the ones who still hope. We must be united by hope, reason, and love." Mr. Doru Mihit of the Timisoara Society, said among other things: "We know how difficult things are in your mines, but do you know how scared we are because we have stopped communicating?"

The vice chairman of the League of Miners Trade Unions, Mr. Ilie Torsan, took the floor and said that a parliamentary commission has begun aninvestigation in the Jiu Valley. The conclusions of the investigation will probably shed due light on the events that give us no peace.

The second day, Saturday 9 September, a decisive step was taken toward reconciliation. From the presidium table, Mr. Miron Cosma, leader of the Miners League, greeted the Alliance for Romanian Resistance, noting that the strikers felt honored to be invited to Brasov and thereby obligated to clarify the events of 13-15 June. "We will struggle by all possible means to find out the truth and present it to you. We will do everything possible to find the true moral instigators. This was an attempt to create division among social strata, and the miners were the first to fall into that trap. They had not planned what happened on 13-15 June. They wanted to go to Bucharest and Timisoara to lay wreaths on the graves of the heroes of the revolution."

The audience stood up and applauded this statement, which had demonstrated what needed to be demonstrated, namely that only frankness could make the miracle of national reconciliation possible. On the stage, the leader of the League of Students, Marian Munteanu, and the leader of the Miners Trade Unions League, Miron Cosma, embraced. The gesture was viewed as a symbol of historic importance. The virtues of dialogue had won. The dialogue between students and miners will continue, that being the wish of both sides.

The communique issued by the Executive Bureau of the League showed that the miners proposed "an active resistance and a continuous struggle against all forms of extremism."

Equally notable were Mr. Mihai Sora's remarks: "A continued structure recreates the reality that generated it, inserting the fogginess of untruth between what it does and what it says. They must do what they say and admit what they do. The elected authorities must serve the electorate: the etymology of minister is servant." Along the same line, Mr. Filiti of the 15 November Movement of Brasov said: "Each one of us must do his duty as well as possible, beginning with park workers and ending with the country's president," and added in another context: "If inciting Hungarians against Romanians and the other way round is a sign of 'patriotism,' then forgive me, but there are only a handful of 'patriots' left in Romania."

Pertinent and profound analyses of the political and economic situation in Romania were delivered by Mr. Stelian Tanase of GDS [Group for Social Dialogue] and Adrian Cristescu of the Machine-Building Department. "The Government was voted in," Mr. Stelian Tanase said, "but it does not have support, being undermined by its own bureaucracy. There can be no prosperity without democracy. We can struggle against corruption and despotism only together, workers and intellectuals." A clear analysis of the current situation was made by Mrs. Smaranda Enache, who also spoke about the "embargo on information, which is filtered down to us."

Mr. Eugen Draga, member of CADA [Action Committee for the Democratization of the Army], said: "The Romanian army, from soldier to general, must be persuaded that it has to defend the people, not serve the interests of an individual or a group of individuals. No bullet must ever again be fired by any soldier at the breast of an unarmed fellow man."

"While the Constitutional Assembly can afford to go on Parliamentary recess, the Moral Parliament will always

be on duty, without a break," said Mr. Vasile Gogea. The Moral Parliament, a felicitous expression that became the symbol of achievement, was also taken as the title of the present articles.

On Sunday 9 September a meeting was held in the Assembly Square with the participation of several thousands of people and guests from various leagues, associations, movements, and independent personalities.

Mr. Marian Munteanu's appearance on the balcony was expected with great interest. Here in Brasov, like in many other parts of the country, Marian Munteanu stands for "Down with communism," and "Freedom." Those were the slogans that were chanted at the meeting. The speakers talked about the need to dismantle all the communist structures and to achieve national reconciliation and solidarity, which are not possible without the practice of truth at all the levels, and about the need for economic, social, and moral recovery, which can be attained by issuing laws designed to combat the existence of overlapping structures that generate chaos, ensure observance of the universal human rights, and democratize the army, whose only mission is and must be to defend the interests of the people. The "Communique" carried in VIITORUL, too, was read out.

In an atmosphere of general enthusiasm and continual chanting of "Marian Munteanu," the guests were escorted to the ARO Hotel. The police, about whom the organizers stressed that it has become a democratic institution in Brasov, watched over the meeting tactfully and even elegantly.

The Moral Parliament ended this special session having achieved a first step not only toward changing Romania's image, but toward changing Romania itself. Will the next meeting of the Romanian Resistance be held in the Jiu Valley at the invitation of the miners?

* Current Situation in Peasant Party

90BA0326A Bucharest DIMINEATA in Romanian 16 Sep 90 p 3

[Interview with Ilie Paunescu, member of the Steering Committee of the National Christian-Democratic Peasant Party (PNT-cd) by Florin Radulescu-Botica; place and date not given]

[Text] [Radulescu-Botica] The Peasant Party ideology is currently represented by several political groups because of the schisms in the PNT-cd. Along this line, Mr. Ilie Paunescu, what are the chances of promoting the fundamental ideas of the national-peasant program?

[Paunescu] I am pleased to note in your very first question a slight polemic nuance, which is not bad at all; it stimulates me. It will make our discussion all the more lively. I prefer discussions in which the interlocutors hold different positions. Debates that only ape differences of opinion in order to come to an agreement at the end, of which the reader is aware from the beginning, are senseless. And now, to return to your question, allow me to pick out two words: "ideology" and "schism." We normally avoid the first word. First of all, because the word "ideology" lost its traditional significance—a study of ideas—toward the end of the past century to become the Marxist definition of a basket of views, beliefs, and even practices belonging to a certain mentality—a certain class, political orientation, or period. Secondly, we avoid the term "ideology" because it stirs up memories of many disasters linked in our century to the theories of major criminals like Hitler, Stalin, Gheorghiu-Dej, Pol Pot, Ceausescu, etc. As for the idea of "schism," I would not use it in the context to which you referred, because it implies a break of some magnitude, whereas the splinters that fell off the trunk of our party in the recent months or the group of several people whom the PNT-cd excluded and who are now scurrying to get together the 251 members required to establish a party—as per a ridiculous and harmful law—constitute completely negligible factors. They do not constitute a schism, nor can they affect the chances of the national-peasant program. So I suggest we move on to another topic really worthy of discussion.

[Radulescu-Botica] The PNT-cd by definition aims at representing the interests of the peasantry. Nevertheless, we are witnessing a paradox: No peasant has made it into Parliament through your party....

[Paunescu] Just so, unfortunately! I would even go further and stress that, in certain regions of the country like Moldavia and the Baragan, PNT-cd won, according to the results published after the 20 May elections, only a tiny number of peasant votes. The reason for what you call a paradox is extremely sad. During the electoral campaign, the entire opposition, but primarily our party, was barred from carrying out propaganda activities in villages. Countless attacks, some of which ended in fatalities and serious injuries and others perpetrated even on foreigners, journalists or representatives of Western democratic parties, demonstrated that the overwhelming majority of authorities in villages, not unlike those under the Ceausescu regime of terror, were determined to break the contact between us and the peasants. Then came election day, when two extremely effective methods were used against us in all the villages in certain areas. On the one hand, our candidates received threats to their persons, families, and property, which had to be taken seriously. You understand what I mean. Threats of the type, "hey, mind what you do, or your children may wake up orphans!" or, "look here, I dreamed last night that your house was on fire!" In the circumstances, many gave up running. On the other hand, activists of the authorities often cast the ballot themselves, instead of the villagers. We received reports from various parts of the country that such people were seizing the ballot forms from the hands of women, old people, or other citizens who were waiting by the boths, applying the rose stamp on them, then returning them to the simple

woman or man to drop into the ballot box. So, in such conditions, how could villagers make it to Parliament through our party?

[Radulescu-Botica] What is the position of your party concerning the so-called "problem of Transylvania," i.e., eradicating the present conflicts between Romanians and Hungarians? In fact, not long ago, the PNT-cd leadership held a dialogue with the UDMR [Democratic Union of Romanian Magyars], when it undoubtedly had an opportunity to deal with this question.

[Paunescu] I must stress two things: The PNT-cd is faithful to the attitude formulated by Iuliu Maniu on 1 December 1918, when the great patriot and democrat said that we had no desire to become, from an oppressed people, oppressors of other ethnic minorities. Secondly, it is our firm belief that currently there is no "Transylvanian problem," except in the minds of people sufficiently naive or dangerous to artificially fan such a problem. The democratic Magyars—who make up the great majority both in Hungary and in Transylvania—solemnly and repeatedly stated that they didn't want to raise the matter of borders under any circumstance. Our party leadership believes that this is the most opportune moment to achieve reconciliation and cooperation, in the fundamental interests of both countries and nations, like the reconciliation and cooperation between two other civilized Western nations, France and Germany. During our talks on 9 September, when party Chairman Mr. Corneliu Coposu and I had a lengthy discussion with Mr. Geza Domokos, chairman of the UDMR, Spokesman Odon Bitay, and Sandor N. Szilagyi, member of the Executive Committee, they reconfirmed our certitude that they shared our political objective: reconciliation and cooperation. Both nations and states are interested in resolving the old conflict between them and finally finding the best means to cooperate as closely as possible. This is as obvious as the guilt, lack of patriotism, and desire to undermine the progress toward democracy of those who strive to maintain an extremely harmful anti-Magyar psychosis among the masses and among some honest political leaders.

[Radulescu-Botica] At the 20 May elections your candidate for the presidency was Mr. Ion Ratiu. What are his present ties to your party?

[Paunescu] I am surprised at your question. I thought everyone knew that Mr. Ion Ratiu is a prominent member of our party—in his words, a devoted member—that he is the leader of our parliamentary group, elected by secret ballot, and so forth. There is mutual esteem and appreciation between us, and that not from yesterday and not just for the near future. I can reassure all those who may be harboring certain hopes: The "ties," as you put it, are very sound.

[Radulescu-Botica] Parliament has reconvened. Do you plan any legislative initiatives, individually or within the parliamentary group to which the PNT-cd belongs?

[Paunescu] Yes, several. Speaking for myself, as a journalist and writer, I would like to obtain from our parliamentary group a legislative initiative designed to end the current discussions around the Press Bill. I think that the most effective way of ensuring the freedom of the press is that our deputies—alone or in agreement with others—do everything incumbent on them to ensure that Romania's future Constitution feature an article literally reproducing the first amendment of the U.S. Constitution. You undoubtedly remember it. I am referring to the text that forbids Congress—or the Parliament, in our case—to pass any law apt to curtail the freedom of the press, which is essential for any democratic regime. In view of the fact that some Parliament members are inclined to vote on the Press Bill before the Constitution, I think that our deputies may be well advised to take the initiative and propose a law containing only two articles. The first would quote the U.S. First Amendment, while the second would specify that this legal provision will be included in Romania's future constitution.

[Radulescu-Botica] Speaking of Parliament, what do you think of its work? Do you think that a truly democratic field of action is ensured for all the political parties represented in it?

[Paunescu] I am sorry, but my reply has to be negative in view of the experience of our representatives to date. This topic has many implications for which the scope of this conversation is not sufficient. I suggest we postpone any further discussion on our viewpoint in this matter for a later date.

[Radulescu-Botica] Your party leadership recently met with the president within the framework of the dialogue that the latter initiated to become acquainted with and align the positions of the major political forces for the purpose of ensuring greater socioeconomic stability. What was your contribution to that discussion, and what were the outcomes of the meetings in your opinion?

[Paunescu] I would like to begin with the most pressing, purely practical requests made by our delegation. So far, the PNT-cd has not received damages for the losses caused by the barbarians who ransacked our central headquarters and other party offices on 14 June. At the 7 September meeting Mr. President Ion Iliescu assured the PNT-cd leadership that the damage payments will not be delayed. Similarly, the DREPTATEA newspaper, whose premises were vandalized on 14 June, has not yet been allocated a new office. The president gave us firm assurances in this respect, too, but, once again, we are forced to note that these assurances have yet to be implemented. I was disappointed that President Ion Iliescu did not make any pledge about opening and allowing the free operation of an independent television station, which is an essential factor for the real democratization of our country. We also note that in very important areas, like human rights and the transition to a market economy, all we get is verbal promises. There are again political prisoners in Romania. We demand the

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of all of them, without exception. Western firms are not investing in Romania, and this is an irreplaceable loss for an economy like ours, whose crisis is very worrisome. As long as we don't have the most flexible and liberal legislative framework possible and as long as bureaucratic mechanisms do not operate promptly and efficiently, foreign capital will go to other markets, and the solution to our crisis will be continuously delayed, something that will have disastruous effects on the very substance of the Romanian economy.

[Radulescu-Botica] In your opinion, what are the priorities of the current period?

[Paunescu] Adopting the truth as the fundamental principle, and easing and dispelling the atmosphere of hatred created and systematically maintained by certain forces, some of them hidden, who are poisoning our public life. Democracy is inconceivable in a country which is daily bombarded with the most shameless lies, in a country in which the spirit of tolerance remains an apparently utopic goal while realities are forged by incitement to hatred, continuous and deliberate rumor-mongering, and the encouragement of an oral and written press amazingly primitive in the manipulation of verbal violence, slander, and disinformation.

[Radulescu-Botica] After the revival of political pluralism, the PNT-cd was the target of various accusations. Do you believe that the competent bodies have shed sufficient light on those questions, or have they reneged on their duties?

[Paunescu] The accusations to which you refer are the deluge of slander against which I was just protesting, while the bodies I primarily have in mind—although you may be thinking of different ones—are those on the top "floors" of the television. Healing the political climate in Romania, cultivting the truth, and establishing a spirit of tolerance, without which no democratic regime can live, must begin there, with the mass media, primarily the television, which must be purified of the elements and spirit that emit lies and hatred is such a harmful manner for the entire social and political body.

* Defense Minister on Current Priorities

91BA0004A Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER in Romanian 25 Sep 90 pp 1, 2

[Interview with National Defense Minister Victor Atanasie Stanculescu by Horia Alexandrescu; place and date not given]

[Text] [Alexandrescu] Minister, I would like to begin this interview by asking you for a short ouline of the current concerns of the Romanian Army.

[Stanculescu] The Army has tightened its ranks and is marching in instruction tempo to regain its strength and demonstrate its unity. The youth has made its contribution by launching the idea of democratization, which must now be implemented by all of us, from minister to conscript, by definitively eliminating all the influences of the past. We must promote those who deserve to be promoted, who are capable and willing to work to assert themselves; the freedom of expression of those who will be the leaders of tomorrow will allow us, who come from the past, to confidently pass on the command to our successors! The country must be able to have faith in its Army and help it in its reconstruction, because the Army needs to be well equipped, well fed, and well endowed to be able to fulfill its missions, and so that the people can continue to find in it a factor of stability and of complete and permanent trust.

[Alexandrescu] What are in your view the most urgent requirements of the moment in Romania?

[Stanculescu] The country needs unity, it needs the people's work, and it needs peace! There is corruption, and crime is on the rise. The dozens of 'parties' that have mushroomed have used up the state's money without doing anything for the country! Many of them don't even exist anymore, except in the files of the courts with which they registered. On the other hand, the relations between the Romanians and other nationalities are being subjected to dangerous incitement. People's minds are also being poisoned by certain newspapers, whose irresponsible staff indiscriminately throw mud at anyone, and the situation is exacerbated by absenteeism in both houses of Parliament, where members show no interest in fulfilling their duties toward those who elected them. Moreover, anyone can attack the country's basic institutions without eliciting any firm and definitive riposte from them. The hopes of democracy are tarnished by people who want to go back to or maintain their dominant positions by violating basic principles and distracting the people's attention from the great difficulties affecting the entire country.

[Alexandrescu] Your comments are very harsh, minister! Harsh, but realistic! And since you mentioned our difficulties, what is your view of the economic situation?

[Stanculescu] The economy is being sapped from the foundation and is tottering under the leadership of inexperienced technocrats. It also suffers from lack of oxygen in the form of loans funneled to priority areas and to the most urgent requirements of a suffering society. Unemployment, inflation, and economic stagnation hover over the country like a dark cloud. The administration, the parties, the schools, the church, and the press must act now, before it is too late, to enable the nation to begin rebuilding a new country without extremism, either right of left-wing. Europe is moving, and within this movement we must reconsider our alliances, not forgetting that many are ogling our land!

[Alexandrescu] What measures should we take?

[Stanculescu] We must have a strong Army, an energetic leadership, and a firm and respected foreign policy, so that we can prove that as a European country, Romania can proudly join the family of democratic and civilized countries, where trust and mutual assistance is the basic

law governing the great alliance that is the 'European House'! As a Romanian and as the minister of national defense, I want to appeal now, before it is too late, to strive to achieve full unity and to get down to work so as to be offered exactly what we request today and so that in our turn we will have the right and means to give those who need and request. Every one of us must work for this country now, when it is taking its first hesitating steps from the abyss of the dictatorship to the light of genuine democracy and the freedom afforded by the December Revolution at the cost of many young lives, a freedom that we must never again forfeit!

[Alexandrescu] We want to thank you, Minister, for this interview; we are convinced that your warnings and your appeal to national unity, work, and democracy will be heard by everyone!

* Parties Face Shortage of Young Cadres

90BA0304C Bucharest AZI in Romanian 1 Sep 90 p 1

[Tudor Balteanu article: "The Party's Cadres Reserves"]

[Text] Do not worry, we are not talking about the UTC [Union of Communist Youth], but about the youth organization of the National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party [NPP]! And in fact about all the other parties, too.

One of the vital problems of the parties at this time is that of cadres reserves. The next elections are not that far away and when the time comes, the struggle will be decisive. In all probability, the majority of the main actors of the previous electoral campaign will no longer be featured on the marquee. For example, bar a miracle, leaders like Ratiu, Cimpeanu, or Leon cannot have more than a negligible chance. "Genuine" intellectuals with political ambitions (Liiceanu, Paler, Bacanu, S. Tanase, etc.) also strike us as irremediably compromised. Not to mention old leaders like Coposu, Sandulescu, Lup, etc. So what will then be our choice? Hard to tell now. That is why we view the issue of promoting young, credible, competent, and charismatic cadres as a priority for all the parties.

Willy-nilly we must admit that the NSF [National Salvation Front] is best off from this viewpoint. Its situation as a party is not brilliant, but being in power gave it a chance to run in some of its cadres. These are primarily the governmental team which, if it does not make blunders and ensures a smooth transition, has very good chances of reaping the fruits of public gratitude. These people are young and have so far done their job competently—two indispensable conditions for any future leader. Moreover, they will also have the advantage of political experience, which most of their rivals will lack.

And then there is the large NSF parliamentary team, which is not only the most numerous, but also meets most of the above quality requirements. A seat in Parliament is the minimum requirement to become a competent representative of the people, one American congressman said.

And finally, there is the party, with its young reserves, about whom we don't know much, because aside from several ministers, the mass media has not devoted much attention to other Front personalities. Perhaps it is yet too early. Maybe after the fall conference. The press may bear some of the responsibility, but there is no doubt that the party is at fault: its propaganda section should endeavor to project a public image of party personalities and introduce promising young people to the public, throw them into the arena. Until then, we will have to be content with reading in ROMANIA LIBERA that Romania's future leader is Marian Munteanu! The Front would do well to take an example from the efforts made by some of the press to present Marian Munteanu in the posture of a martyr, an enlightened mind, and a Great Leader. As for the historical parties, the situation is much less promising, and that is not the fault of the "authorities," but their own fault. The NPP leadership is still in the hands of the old men, even if some cosmetic corrections have been made; and we got a sample of their kind of politics in the previous electoral campaign. The only chance there would be to have a Romanian Christian-Democratic Party [RCDP] established separately and without "history" by young and professionally trustworthy people, and to bury the more than compromised NPP. We are astonished to see that although so many parties have been formed in this country, we still don't have a serious Christian-democratic party. That is to say, one anchored in West European experience, not in historical illusions and dreams of revenge.

Changes are already underway at the PNL [National Liberal Party]. The "Young Wing" gives us reason to hope that we will have a modern and credible liberal party, instead of a political association of pensioners. There, young leaders are known and have supporters; they still have to demonstrate their professionalism and good faith and draw to them men of substance from various areas. Which should not be too difficult. And, although they promise to be the main political opponents of the NSF, we can only wish them success.

The Romanian Socialist Democratic Party [RSDP] does not exist. What "reserve cadres," what "future generation" can there be in a party in which young activists can hardly make contact with their own "leadership," which seems to be floating somewhere in an other time dimension... Anyway, the public hasn't heard anything anymore about this party, whose only salvation may be an alliance with the... NSF. Which, of course, cannot happen as long as Mr. Cunescu is its leader.

As for the "historical" parliament members, most of them are pensioners and mediocre professionals. Their chance of coming up with substantial politicians in the next two years is insignificant.

The "center" groups forever assembling and splintering have so far offered only mediocre names or below (for example, N. Leon). To begin with, they must clarify their ideology—that they don't yet have—which will decide their specific electoral platform. But if they continue with the same people, whose caliber is no greater than that of the newspaper OBLIO, their prospects don't look good.

The extremist, "extra-parliamentary" opposition (the Group for Social Dialogue [GDS], the "leagues" and "trade unions," and the "apolitical" groups) will probably continue to carry on in the same style as until now and will endeavor to promote certain figures, i.e., new "Havels." After the Liiceanu fiasco, we do not know which writer will now be pushed to the forefront. In any case, GDS men of (intellectual and moral) value don't seem eager to enter politics, while those who hold the loudspeakers don't appear to possess many intellectual and moral qualities. Moreover, they totally lack any political experience: in this area their consistent demonstration of naivete is not only endearing, but also potentially dangerous. The chances of finding new outstanding leaders here seem to us minimal. So what we have here is a static situation. As for Maries, Dinca, etc., forget it. We agree with Marian Munteanu, who naturally saw them as belonging behind bars. At least for profiteering, if nothing else.

Generally speaking, we note that the "extremist extra-parliamentary opposition" continues to put forward very low quality leaders, fished with money from neighborhoods of ill repute, something that clashes unpleasantly with its "intellectual" pretensions and makes it even less credible.

The Front, on the other hand, doesn't seem to have made any further attempt to attract more intellectuals (especially from humanistic fields) to its side. The group that looks more promising from this viewpoint is the MER [Romanian Ecological Movement], which will be a serious opponent at the next elections.

In conclusion, at the present we don't notice any serious concerns with preparing "cadres reserves" and introducing new figures to the public where they do exist. Which means that we continue to live with the propaganda images of April-May, and were anyone to ask us who the next candidates likely to win are, we wouldn't know what to say.

* Machinations To Create Confusion Deplored

91BA0004B Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 25 Sep 90 pp 1, 2

[Nicolae Prelipceanu article]

[Text] I had a friend who, every time I said anything sarcastic about some expression of idealism, some good deed, or some "hero of our times," used to say to me jokingly: "Is nothing sacred to you?" It was a thrown remark, on which he may have reflected, but I never did. It was an expression that predates us and will no doubt still be around after we... However, current events often serve to shake the dust of indifference, incomprehension, or forgetfulness from words or expressions, and this is what happened to "hold nothing sacred." Events have a great hermeneutical value that we must take into consideration. What good did it do to have dictionaries and even to consult them: Even though I understood what I was reading, it didn't click. The reason is that certain types of memories need practical and real arguments to retain something.

Around 1989, when the Romanian dissidence began to develop more harmoniously than could have been expected in the circumstances of ceausist communism, it suddenly struck me: What if many of the names that were unexpectedly coming into the favorable limelight of foreign radio stations and publications were nothing but the puppets of an ingenious manipulator; ingenious is actually not enough said, a real genius! For years we had been hearing of people who every once in a while were said to be attempting some form of protest against communism or only against Ceausescu, but their names would disappear one after the other, erased by the securitate from any record, including, willy-nilly, those of Radio Free Europe, Amnesty International, etc. There were, or had been in Romania, too, brave and altruistic people capable of the supreme sacrifice of their being, whom the rest of us admired but also secretly or openly considered either mad or irresponsible, or thought that at least for a moment they had departed from the real world, the moment in which they had told the truth. As if we, the rest of us, were the ones living in the real world. As if we... The protests increased toward the end of the past dictatorship; new names appeared in the arena, about whom we thought/think that they received the due and deserved publicity. But as it turned out, some people were not allowed to sign certain protests—not necessarily the harshest or those directly aimed at the authorities—without any justified reason (and even though those people had done or said nothing to discredit themselves) and, when things began jumping in the communist camp, moderate and indirect protests—but still, protests—began circulating with relative ease among certain groups that previously had not been known for holding a certain attitude; from there, with the same relative ease, they moved toward the "imperialist agencies" publicly condemned at the time as they are now. All those names will come out into the brilliant light of the December liberation next to, if not in the place of the oldest, solitary dissidents buried in forgetfulness if not in the ground, too.

The explanation we may suggest now, when the danger of being described as people for whom "nothing is sacred" has not disappeared but no longer matters, is simple: some shadowy hand, the organization of grey eminences (OEC), has fixed up the lists of dissidents, adding its (viz., the securitate's) favorites to the real ones, well disguised of course until then, for two reasons: 1) to minimize the deeds of the real dissidents in case it was

found out that some dissident was only a securitate secret agent, or even leaking such a fact for the purpose of trivializing the dissidence; and 2) to ensure not only their survival, but their survival in power, either behind the scenes, as grey eminences, or in the limelight, as members of the "new structures." So that when the lists of heroes who fought before, when it was dangerous, were read, they should show all kinds of securitate and OEC men. So that when the need arises for new state leaders and new deputies, and when we legitimately want to remember the surviving heroes, most of them would be the same people who previously led, or at least secretly or openly profited from the situation. And now that the power finally is, God forgive us, in the hands of the people, incriminating evidence can be found in the files of genuine dissidents placed there by former and present OEC collaborators (experts in manipulating public opinion along the lines most comfortable to them), evidence showing either that they want to sell out their country, or that their names are spelled with double i, or whatever, just so they don't bother our brave dissident officers, those who were and continue to be on the inside.

The OEC move is masterful; so many balls are hit at once, that one gets dizzy just thinking about them. Anyway, one of the OEC's most important objectives, well on its way to being attained, is generalized mistrust by everyone in everyone and everything. If Doina Cornea, a Hungarian and a Jewess, wants to sell out Transylvania, you can imagine what the others are like! Here, however, it seems that the number of balls touched is somewhat too big, so that the opposite effect is produced. Indeed, someone may begin to wonder about the heroism of the officers infiltrated among the dissidents, and then the entire list of heroes may be contested. Then we will really understand what it means not to hold anything sacred; then we will be creating not the new man (who already exists but is, in the words of the poet, "merely a link, son") but even a new people to whom nothing is sacred.

In fact, the OEC has already used this method in other circumstances and on other opportunities. Once, a famous writer, probably close to the heart (?!) of the OEC, was caught in a plagiarism and exposed. All of a sudden, both he and others like him revealed—and tried to convince us of it, too—that Eminescu, Caragiale, and most of the classics of Romanian literature also "dabbled in plagiarism," as our original plagiarist merrily wrote somewhere, promising, moreover, to intensify his personal contribution to it! Not long ago, when noncommunist parties were allowed to exist, dozens of groups popped up, most of them faithful to those in power and undoubtedly established by the OEC. Was there an historical Romanian Social-Democracy Party? Then the OEC invented another party with exactly the same initials: the Romanian Socialist-Democratic Party. So, with the mere addition of two suffixes, -ist and -ic, the first one—an old and feared opponent of the RCP [Romanian Communist Party] since the beginning of the century—was thus neutralized. Was there a liberal party? The OEC comes up with another one, let's say liberal democratic, or liberal socialist, or liberal peasant (?!) party. Was there a National Peasant Party? Then the OEC establishes several others such as the agrarian, agricultural, democratic peasant, etc., so that the bewildered voter is reduced to going for the handiest solution: the FSN [National Salvation Front]. There used to be an old joke in the Radio Erevan series: Someone asked what was the correct name, Schubert or Schumann; the answer—Shostakovich. The same thing here: For whom should we vote, the PNL [National Liberal Party], PNT [National Peasant Party], the Agrarian Party, etc.? Answer: FSN. This can help erase the trail thoroughly and for a long time and, taking advantage of the people's disarray, the government party can fix its next undeserved supremacy.

This is one way of building a box with a double bottom, a double or multiple fake world, and of achieving the desired effect: Ensuring that no one will believe in anything, so that all of us, an entire nation, become capable of believing in anything, i.e., in what the OEC discretely dictates.

* Brucan Television Interview Scored

90BA0318B Bucharest AZI in Romanian 9 Sep 90 p 2

[Traian Branea article: "Mr. Brucan Offers 'Valuable Recommendations'"]

[Text] Professor Silviu Brucan [S.B.] can't sit still for a moment. He cannot stand not to have his name constantly mentioned—for better or for worse, it doesn't matter which. The main thing is that his name should be heard, and so far we must admit that his method has borne results. Consequently, Mr. S.B. talks and talks, more often than not at random. Thus, at midnight on Wednesday 5 September we were once again privileged to hear him in a television program (what else?!) which, in contrast to his previous appearances, failed to elicit either amazement or indignation. It merely confirmed Grigore Moisil's theory that ideas launched for the purpose of shocking begin by being paradoxical, continue as banalities, and end as prejudices.

Mr. S.B.'s prejudice is that although he resigned from the FSN [National Salvation Front] Council in February, in April predicted that the FSN will lose the election, in May deplored the FSN victory and at the same time announced his withdrawal from politics, he feels duty-bound to give us (all too frequently for the time of the public) "valuable recommendations."

Ever since his frequent TV appearances immediately after the December Revolution, he has been aware of the impact of his gestures and statements: He pounded on the desk in studio 4, practiced a "little denunciation" on the same opportunity, magnified his role in the anticeausescu struggle, and instantaneously hundreds upon hundreds of citizens called and thousands others wrote letters to the television to protest. It did not matter

that he was the target of abuse. He was even pleased to note the large number of such proofs of "sympathy." And that's why he keeps at it...

Neither viewers nor readers had to strain too much to figure out the thought processes of Mr. S.B.: As soon as he notices that there is too little talk about him (or that he has been forgotten, which is of course an unbearable state of affairs), he sits down to write, and if Mr. Emanuel Valeriu is not on vacation in Mamaia (coincidentally, Mr. S.B. was in Mamaia, too, but not for the music festival; he "composes" a different sort of song), he starts blabbing in front of the cameras.

What is noteworthy about his performances is not the frequency of his appearances on television nor the length of his perorations (although those are not negligible either) but his ability to achieve the contrary effect to that desired: he cannot manage to neutralize his insignificance in the country's politics (the obsession that doesn't give him peace); on the contrary, he has succeeded in self-trivializing himself by the above method.

There is no point in repeating what Mr. Brucan told us on Wednesday when everybody wanted to go to sleep. That "our situation is worse than Albania's," that "opposition leaders were elected in Hungary and Bulgaria," that "our leaders are moving in a closed circle," and that the "FSN is in shambles" we can read any day in a certain type of newspapers, which thus repeat some of the "musings" of Mr. Brucan—until recently abused and detested by the respective press, but now praised like a classroom "snitch." But if we still devote this article to him, after in several previous issues we mentioned his "exaggerations" (to put it euphemistically) about his contribution to the program documents of the Revolution, it is in order to note that in the absence of arguments, he "makes up" errors, disasters, and other misfortunes, something that confirms not his political independence, but his independence in relation to the truth.

Mr. Brucan "doesn't know" that a permanent and constructive dialogue is carried out with the parliamentary and extraparliamentary opposition (something that was remarked by U.S. Senator Robert Dole), that the number of people employed in private enterprises is no longer 20 maximum, that the opposition keeps scolding Messers. Iliescu and Roman for paying "working visits" and taking other actions precisely in order to familiarize themselves with the "problems that need solving," and many other specific aspects of Romanian realities. Still, he is not to be criticized, because recently he has been spending a lot of time abroad: in South Korea to share his experience in the area of market economy (acquired while on diplomatic missions to the United States), and in North Korea to "instruct" the dissidents according to the standards related in the famous double interview for ADEVARUL.

Mr. S.B. has been adding a few new elements to his repertoire of journalistic "finds": He likened the privatization process in our country to a "tethered horse," accused those at the "top" of "not wanting to learn" (he was probably referring to the Brucan-patented recommendations), referred to Parliament members as "those smart-asses," and opined that Mr. Iliescu's response to him "denoted the opinion of people whose studies were restricted to the History of the Bolshevik Party—the abridged version" (Silviu Brucan remains piously silent about his own Marxist-Leninist works), called Mr. Roman an "airhead," and so forth. Those targeted will probably not respond to Mr. Brucan. Not worth the effort. In fact, Mr. S.B. is eagerly waiting for such a thing: to have the smallest attention paid to and for (any kind of) reaction to his vulgar, absurd, and embarrassing speculations. However, to ensure that the readers do not once again criticize us for not taking a position, we ask ourselves: how great must one's pride and resentments become before one can assert like Mr. Brucan: "A head will have to roll if in September the Common Market doesn't lift the penalties on Romania."

Let us sign off by citing a famous maxim: "Lack of responsibility is tantamount to a refusal to exist!"

* Brucan's Account of December Events Refuted

90BA0308A Bucharest AZI in Romanian 5 Sep 90 pp 1, 3-5

[Gelu Voican-Voiculescu article: "The First Document of the Revolution Was a Collective Work"]

[Text] To be sure anyone's memory may play tricks on him. But it is more serious when it is combined with a subjective partisan trend and dominated by an irresistible impulse springing from the imperialism of the ego. Mr. Brucan, with the quirks of a disappointed persons, wrongly claims authorship of the NSF [National Salvation Front] Council's first program. Blinded by exclusivism, he even confuses the sequence of events and colors the environment dramatically, adding a pathetic aspect to the whole picture to the effect that he drafted the whole text and even did so on his belly while the bullets whined infernally through the riddled windows, hitting the walls and woodwork of the library of the TV management's offices on the 12th floor.

Those pictures are fragmentary of course, but they are real, and so are those awful moments. But why should they be used pro domo in order to accredit a heroic-demiurgic picture divinely dominated by the figure of Mr. Brucan alone?

As a direct witness to those unforgettable days and nights, I am trying to reconstruct them from memory, which I hope will not play such troublesome but so totally advantageous tricks on me.

We all came to the TV station on the night of 22-23 December, or more accurately now at the start of 23 December 1989, after which we regrouped at the MApN

[Ministry of National Defense], where a command post was established at the Army's suggestion, aided by Mihai Montanu, whom we left there to represent us.

It was decided to draft a communique of the NSF Council to the nation, which was to be an outline-program as well. We all went into a conference room in back of the TV president's office. I actually remember that from his office we went through an anteroom (which opened on a bathroom) to the right into a room with some couches (where, a few days later, we saw Lina Ciobanu sleeping, brought there by I don't know whom). From this room a door opened on a room with a long table and a lot of chairs.

That is where the drafting of that first text was done, in peace and quiet as far as bullet fire was concerned, which at most was heard from far off. Otherwise, it was a noisy conference.

Ion Iliescu, Petre Roman, Dan Martian, Silviu Brucan, Sergiu Nicolaescu, Mihai Lupoi, Gena Iorga, Mihai Ispas, Magdalena Ionescu, Cristina Ciontea, a student, another student, Ilena Iliescu, and I.

I am not sure whether Dumitru Mazilu was there too, since he may have stayed at the CC [Central Council], or Emil (Cico) Dumitrescu, "the sailor" as we called him (he being a captain), who did not have to stay and came in and out quite often. Perhaps some more persons were also present but I no longer remember and I ask that no one take it amiss. For example, I cannot tell whether Vasile Neacsa was there or not. Alexandru Stark kept coming and going from the TV quarters, and he accordingly may have been there.

The discussions revolved around Ion Iliescu and Petre Roman. Dan Martian was writing, and not Silviu Brucan. An outline of the main points was made, after which the drafting properly speaking began.

A preamble was planned. Of course there were several versions. The text was improved by progressive additions, with everyone's participation. To be sure Silviu Brucan made an important contribution, along with Ion Iliescu, Petre Roman and Dan Martian, who commented while he was writing, as well as Dumitru Mazilu if he was there. We and the others sometimes contributed a word, sometimes a distinction... For there are some main authors of any collective work (And Silviu Brucan can be calm because he is one of them) and some more secondary ones. At any rate, it is difficult to single out each one's contribution. It is a matter of choices between two words, adding omitted points, rounding off, etc.

I remember the text began something like this: "We are experiencing a historic moment. The Ceausescu clan, who led the country to disaster, has been driven from power." Then I think that was followed by an accentuated tribute to youth's contribution to the revolution. It went on to explain the principles on which the NSF was founded, with the support of the Army and all the sane forces of the country, with emphasis on "without distinction of nationality." Democracy, freedom, and dignity were the key words and the takeover of state power by the NSF Council and the abolition of all the old structures were noted. The Higher Military Council was mentioned, which is under the CNSF [NSF Council] and was to be in charge of all activity of the Army and the Ministry of Interior.

The ministries and the central organs were to continue their activities under the CNSF.

The preamble concluded with the specific necessary measures to supply the population with food, electric power, water, heat, transportation, and medical care.

Then the presentation of the NSF Program began. It was to outline the main policies of the new regime succinctly but comprehensively.

At this point the discussions were lively, in an effort toward a clear, simple and concise formulation. The order of the principles and the priorities and rating of the ideas counted very heavily. There were many changes, revisions, references, indications, insertions, and rearrangements of ideas at other points.

Essential contributions were made by Ion Iliescu, Petre Roman and Dan Martian, who had frequent opportunities to systematize and classify while writing. At the same time it was all to be reduced to a brief and concise exposition. Silviu Brucan unquestionably made worthy contributions in addition to the above-mentioned persons and even right after them. His suggestions were heeded and often approved or inserted at various points. But that is a far cry from his pose as the "brains" of the movement and the sole author of the program, and it is a sad disregard of a collective work.

Silviu Brucan was neither then nor later the ideologue of the movement as, out of vanity, he likes to pretend. It is a leader complex.

He did a good deal of harm later by conferring this role on himself and especially by accrediting it in world public opinion, having greedily monopolized the contacts with the Western press while we were up to our necks in the new affairs.

To return to the program, which was the first and essential document, it is the result of our combined mental efforts. I repeat, our contribution and those of the others were rather limited, being confined to fragments of ideas, to improvements in the formulation, or to proposals of alternatives which, even if they were rejected, called for a refinement of the original text, which was ultimately finalized that way. It is significant that all our subsequent actions up to the Front's program in elections are based upon this first document. Even the program of the present government, despite its broad scope, is in accordance with it and it is natural that it should be. A demonstration of such exemplary consistency is rarely to be found, especially in a period as

troubled as that of a transition from a despotic to a democratic regime, when many deviation would appear justified. Our free participation itself, according to each one's capacities and inspiration, reflected the democratic and truly free spirit in which our team knew how to work. In trying to reconstruct it from memory, I can say that the program began by abolishing the leadership of any one party and announced the choice of the democratic pluralist system. Free elections were announced for April 1990. Then followed, as an essential point, separation of the powers in the state and election of the leaders for two mandates at most.

It was announced that the country will be called Romania, and immediate founding of a constitutional committee was discussed, followed by points about restructuring the economy, including agriculture.

Then came reorganization of education, including elimination of ideological dogmas and of the reign of lies and fraud. Of course the national minorities' rights and freedoms were a clear and important point.

The program, which made only 10 points in all although some were more extensive than others, concluded with a reference to foreign policy and especially to observance of international commitments including the Warsaw Pact and a reference to human rights.

I remember that I insisted on religious freedom and the right to travel in that last point. Finally the first idea was considered fully covered by "human rights and freedoms" and the needs and interests of human development, while the second one was added in the form of "the right to free travel." Then followed a list of the membership of the CNSF, about 40 members, the last of whom was Ion Iliescu. On that occasion we introduced the dissidents Doina Cornea, Ana Blandiana, Laszlo Tokes, and Dan Desilu in a place of honor at the head of the list, considering that because of their consistent attitude they were among the precursors of the revolutionary uprising that broke out in December 1989, in which we played an effective part.

Mircea Dinescu and Ion Caramitru were not with us at those moments. They had been active on TV at noon and in the afternoon of 22 December 1989.

The generals who were included (Victor Stanculescu and Voinea and Stefan Guse) were the Army representatives. Gen. N. L. Militaru was not in this first membership of the CNSF since he was still in the Reserve then.

Corneliu Manescu and Alexandru Birladeanu were not with us. I clearly remember that we had left them in the CC building in the evening.

We entered Cazimir Ionescu, Bogdan Teodoriu and Adrian Sirbu without their being there because we knew that we left them there at the CC with various tasks. The complete list of the revolutionaries under Dan Iosif who were controlling the situation in the CC building reached us later, when we reconstructed the expanded membership of the CNSF. Moreover I do not clearly remember whether Dr. Nicolae Manole was with us in that room or not.

Aurel Dragos Munteanu was not, but we entered him because he was known as a dissident. He came and joined us at noon on 24 December 1989. Then, I remember, I also knew Prof. N. S. Dumitru. Aurel Dragos Munteanu was, moreover, my only previous friend and we had last seen each other on the night of 20 21 December 1989, when I left him with some books... He was the only one I knew on the whole team... My only acquaintance... However unlikely it may seem to adherents of the idea of organized conspiracy, this is the simple truth: Nearly all of us actually knew each other then and we joined together in the rush of events that followed with overwhelming speed.

I also remember now my own surprise when under the circumstance of writing, Ion Iliescu, Petre Roman and still others, being tired, agreed to accept the energizing tablets and Efortex pills from my hand, swallowing them with no hesitation at all. It was proof that the confidence and team spirit of some exceptional partners was gradually stabilizing among us.

I am reminded of a funny incident. Among the members that were to be included there was a student named Ilena Iliescu with us then. We were concerned by the danger of misunderstandings about a kinship with Ion Ionescu, with the whole series of possible interpretations, especially since she even had the same name as Ion Iliescu's wife. The girl was finally persuaded that it was better to give it up and realize that she should not be included. She agreed almost with tears in her eyes...

As soon as the text was finalized I left for studio 4, where I gave it to Ion Iliescu to read.

At the end, he added that it was a matter of a provisional structure, that the list remained open, and that the CNSF membership would be expanded accordingly. He said that the few tens of names were of people who showed a spirit of sacrifice under the tyranny and who risked their lives fighting on the barricades in the days before. He made it clear that in order to supplement the CNSF membership he was awaiting proposals from all social categories and forces who fought and won.

The address concluded by mentioning that this communique was a first form of the program-platform of the new organ of state power.

Ion Iliescu ended with the words, "I have received a mandate to present it to you."

I presume this communique was published on 23 December in the newspapers that were printed then. It is the first action that was basic to the renovated Romania (Editors note: The communique actually was published in the papers on 23 December 1989, and we will reproduce it in facsimile in tomorrow's issue).

These are the facts about the first NSF program of which I am reminding you by an effort of memory. I helped to devise it and I can state exactly that it was done in the conference room on the 12th floor of the TV building without any bullets attacking us.

Silviu Brucan confuses that point with others when he speaks of lying on the floor on his b y. To be sure there were such dramatic moments in the afternoon of 23 December and on the eve of the 24th. We were all lying down under tables in the TV president's office, with some office lamps placed on the floor [intinsi pe jos]. Actually some texts would have been written even then, under those conditions. It is very possible that Silviu Brucan was also writing then in that difficult position. There was intensive shooting at the office and the bullets were hitting the woodwork of the library. Traces of their impacts are still visible (for the incredulous). At one point a helicopter began to fire on the level of our floor (12). The trajectories of the machine gun bullets can still be reconstructed. It was to hit a few of us.

I remember Capt. Paul Jerbas, who maintained all the telephone connections, and Alexandru Stark... Both were to be almost pierced by bullets. I remember Gena Iorga, whom I pushed aside instinctively at a last minute of inexplicable inspiration.

Yes, there were such moments. But Silviu Brucan was not the only one who experienced them and they had nothing to do with writing the first NSF program.

At about 0800 on the morning of 24 December 1989, I left the TV building at the last minute with a TAB [not further identified]... Then we were all nearly killed (It would have been for the fifth time—that for the skeptics...). The ground floor of the TV building was already lost and they were fighting for the second floor.

Our way out was madness... I remember clearly how, on the stairs, a person tried to aim a pistol at Ion Iliescu from behind. He bent down in passing under a half-broken glass door... As we all ran we collided with the terrorist, happening to rush into him in such a way that he could not fire effectively... We did not stop in our flight and the person fled through a corridor...

To return to truth and objectivity, with all due respect for Silviu Brucan's distinguished personality and his unquestionable competence, I have written these few recollections sprinkled with anecdotal details with regard that I cannot confirm the scenario that he has made up a posteriori.

What a pity! Silviu would have had and nevertheless has his place among us.

How regrettable is his lack of modesty combined with his lack of discretion! Nevertheless the part played in the action of the letter of the six is of unquestionable merit, compensating moreover for his more distant past in the Stalinist period.

But his paternalistic pose as sole mentor and doctrinal "spiritus rector" of our movement in December 1989, to which he aspires with the blindness of wounded pride, is untrue and accordingly unacceptable.

Journalists Protest 'Chaos' in Publishing

AU1510213090 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 2050 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 15/10/1990—The government, the ministries involved and state-run units made it possible for chaos to disseminate in all the sectors of publishing activity, from paper supply to magazine and newspaper delivery, says a protest given today by Romania's Journalists' Society the Federation of the unions of the whole press. The chaotic climate has made it possible for excesses to come up and maintain, rejected by proper journalists and by the public at large. First of all it is about the waste of paper, by printing a number of publications under any acceptable cultural and deontological level.

The government is criticized for its lack of interest in learning the journalists' opinion on that issue. Although Prime Minister Petre Roman made the promise to answer within seventeen days the "journalists' 25 claim note," it's almost one month since it was handed to the prime minister and it has not been answered yet. The protest also says that the government is preparing measures to be taken, of utmost importance for the destiny of many publications, without asking for Romania's Journalists' Society to make their contribution to them, as it would be natural. Nor gave the government any answer to the problems under debate, concerning a publicity stamp law and the project of an international press centre.

It is of ill-omen for democracy in Romania that the journalists' wishes and points of view on issues concerning their profession are of no interest, shows the protest. The government's work style hints to an overrating of administrative-economic levers and an underrating of dialogue, which the journalists' community feels its duty to pinpoint.

Petre Roman Attends Police Academy Ceremony

AU1410180890 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1633 GMT 14 Oct 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 14/10/1990—The students of the Baneasa Police Academy in the 1990-1991 academic year were sworn in on Sunday.

The festivity was attended by Prime Minister Petre Roman, Minister of the Interior Doru Viorel Ursu, Minister of Education and Science Gheorghe Stefan, Minister of National Defence Colonel General Victor Stanculescu, member of Parliament and representatives of political parties.

Constanta Railway Workers End Strike

AU1210135790 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0927 GMT 12 Oct 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 12/10/1990—Thursday October 11, 1990 work was resumed by the Constanta branch of the Railway Workers Free Union Alliance comprising four counties, viz: Constanta, Tulcea, Calarasi and Ialomita. Started Thursday morning, the 15-hour strike has incurred serious damage, negatively affecting operations in Romania's biggest port and in the plants and enterprises in the area. A dialogue opened between the union alliance leaders and representatives of the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Physical Planning, that will continue according to the union leaders, until solutions are found to all the claims.

* Disastrous State of Economy Deplored

90BA0307A Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 5 Sep 90 pp 1, 3

[Anton Uncu article: "What Is Happening to Us?"]

[Text] In only seven months of this year Romania has put on some performances which could hardly be equaled by any other country in Europe or even in the world. We have managed to turn one of the most radical antitotalitarian and anticommunist revolutions in Eastern Europe into social conflicts that have seriously compromised Romania's image in the world, and we have succeeded at the same time in discouraging the great majority of foreign stockholders who were once disposed to invest in Romania. We have managed to impair labor ethics drastically, to drive 880 industrial enterprises to the brink of bankruptcy, to log a loss of more than 25 billion lei in industrial activity alone, and to drive 800,000 Romanians out of the country... And the year is not over yet.

What is happening to us? The national economy is shaken to its foundations and meanwhile the government has nothing but an "antiseismic" paint job in the form of a mixture of general principles that Europe can applaud as much as it wants to but which cannot cover up the deep cracks that have been created. What with profiteering, thefts, little work and that too of poor quality, strikes, serious organizational dysfunctions, lack of money, resources, technology, control and servicing, the thief who steals with the aid of the corrupt guard, official or manager, and the politician who smiles telegenically or revolts demogogically out of concern for his own benefit rather than for the fate of the nation, the police can no longer cope and more personnel are needed. How far and how long? We are more concerned about the FSN [National Salvation Front], the PNT [National Peasant Party] or the PNL [not further identified], and we are so interested in what one or the other said or says and did or does that we do not notice that the national economy is rapidly going downhill and we cannot stop it. Let us not generalize? Let us not create a psychosis or a panic? Would we be right?

What is happening in Romania now is truly tragic for the future of the country. At the textile mills in Arad the whole daily output of 8,000 towels (look for towels in stores and you will see that they are entirely out of them) is sold to the employees of the enterprises, who sell them on the market in Hungary. And in order to travel to Hungary they take off en masse on Mondays. On those days almost two-thirds of the looms (980 out of 1,570) are idle for lack of manpower. Is this an isolated case, just one example singled out unreasonably? The same is true of the Arad Tricotajul Rosu Enterprise, the Pascani Curtains Enterprise, the Pucioasa and Slatina textiles enterprises, to Bucharest Dacia Enterprise, the garments enterprises in Resita, Cluj, Moreni (Dimbovita) and Marghita-Bihor, and the knitwear enterprises in Caracal, Bucharest, Oradea, Satu-Mare and Cluj. And the same is also true of the footwear factories in Oradea, Timisoara, Bucharest, Cluj, and Bacau.

Towels, curtains, gym suits, footwear, stockings and shirts are heading for Hungary, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Poland, and the USSR. It is a veritable trade epidemic that has contaminated all light industry. The same is true in all the other sectors: 120 tons of sugar were unrecorded at the Tandarei Factory and 40 tons more were stolen form Constanta port. There are massive thefts of yeast, powdered milk, eggs, and alcohol, sold later at profiteering prices. Installations for ethyl and methyl alcohol and gasoline and stores of toxic substances are unwatched and unguarded, facilitating criminal activity, which has reached alarming proportions. The storehouses for export at the Floresti Victoria Tire Enterprise are robbed regularly. With the cooperation of the enterprise managers and even of the directors, profiteering goes on in sets of motors, bearings (bearings worth 2.5 million lei were stolen from the Birlad Enterprise alone, and the management's attempt to recover the loss out of the employees' pay was abandoned for fear of a strike), sewing machines, washing machines, passenger cars stolen or sold cheap, batteries, lubricants, gravel, cement, copper, zinc, lead (N.B! bullets are made of lead!), rubber boots, soap, wood pegs, sets of furniture (two or three sets of furniture are stolen every day at the Buzau Nehoiul Enterprise), household glassware, valuable porcelains, color TV sets, freezers, refrigerators, rugs, and cigarettes. There are so many instances of it that you feel the whole country is cheating itself, profiteering on itself, robbing itself, and forgetting to work any more.

For God's sake! How would we understand each other from all that has happened here since 23 December 1989? What demon of self-destruction urges us to steal each other's hats and give them to others for a song? Why do we waste our freedom, as much as it is, in order to beggar ourselves?

If it goes on like this the economy will inevitably break down in a few years and the country along with it. If we do not learn how to win the economic battle the words of politicians, however pleasing they are to our ears, will be unable to save us.

* Brucan's Views on EEC Sanctions Discussed

90BA0325D Bucharest AZI in Romanian
13 Sep 90 pp 1, 2

[Gheorghe Armasu article: "The Ante Is Higher Than it Seems"]

[Text] Probably like other viewers interested in our country's present political life, we followed with some curiosity Mr. Silviu Brucan's televised interview a few days ago. On the one hand, the interview served to round or fill in certain traits, shadows, and lights, to the moral, political, and intellectual portrait of the interviewee; on the other hand, however, the interview revealed its significance only in relation to the phenomena and tendencies currently characterizing the very fluid political and social scene in postrevolutionary Romania.

Our attention was caught by Mr. Brucan's statement that "a head will have to roll if the Common Market doesn't repeal the sanctions against Romania in September." This is the only statement on which we will comment. It is to be assumed that the person who made the statement was not speaking literally of a head rolling off, but rather of the removal of some person from his present position. And if this is what was meant, then we have a few problems and questions about it.

In the problematic vision presented by Mr. S.B., the situation is more or less the following: Either the Romanian leadership accepts the criticism voiced at talks with Common Market bodies and the conditions raised by them, or the country will be deprived of access to Western technology; the country itself, being in danger of decapitation, must bow its head, and then the sanctions will be lifted. Otherwise, those who insist on isolating our country and bringing it to its knees, attracted by prospects like those offered by Mr. S.B. and other members of the opposition or the neodissidents, will do everything in their power to maintain the sanctions, and will thus be served up a "chopped-off head." In fact, the issue raised by Mr. S.B. is not a warning to the country's ruling circles—as it may have appeared at first sight—to do everything possible to straighten out the relations with the Common Market. It is a disguised threat, publicly proffered to those circles, and an encouragement to the foreign circles that, accompanied by Romanian voices inside and outside the country, are making economic aid conditional on a political clause and are now seeking to intensify their pressure by any available means and to accentuate the instability of the situation.

We do not know what information Mr. S.B. has about the EEC intentions and positions, but he clearly failed to present to the viewers his own position, some ideas, or perhaps even a program that can help avoid the above alternative. Does he not care how and at what price the present, artificially created we'd say, difficulties, in Romania's relations with the EEC, are solved? From the interview it was not clear what outcome he would welcome and what he means to do to help promote the country's interests in this situation. In this respect, as in other similar ones, the ante consists precisely of these interests, not of personal interests, political ambitions, or pride. Anyway, Mr. S.B. cannot be exempted from responsibility for the manner in which he raised the problem, its timing, and initiating the public discussion.

But, assuming that the EEC does not change the rules applied to Romania in September and that consequently our country will not receive the same treatment as the other East European countries, is there no other alternative than the one suggested by Mr. S.B.? In fact, with his "must," he did not offer any alternative, only an obligatory solution.

The manner in which Mr. S.B. raised the issue stemmed from the view he expressed during the interview, that "it is inconceivable that we should be able to modernize our economy without Western technology." It is clear that the developed Western countries are in possession of advanced technology and that our great neighbor to the east, bogged down in enormous economic difficulties and itself in search of aid and new technology from the West, has little to offer. But does this mean that we must blindly accept any technology from the West and no longer bet on our own tehcnical, scientific, and intellectual potential? We think the answer is obvious.

It is true that Mr. S.B. does not like the orientation of the 1920's liberals summarized in the motto "by ourselves," which he views as obsolete for the current conditions, but, in our opinion, we cannot ignore the views of many foreign representatives who visited our country after the December 1989 Revolution and who emphasized that no aid can substitute for the intensive and productive work of the Romanian people to modernize the national economy. The fact that each country's own efforts to achieve progress and prosperity is the primary ingredient is a widely recognized fact in the world.

Further examining Mr. S.B.'s statement we quoted at the beginning, we cannot help asking ourselves another thing: Who should be removed if Romania continues to be "penalized" by the EEC? As it transpired from the interview, the reference was not to the "signalman Paun" [from a popular poem], but a person or persons at the top (head) of the state hierarchy. It is not difficult to guess who Mr. S.B. had in mind, since during the same interview he was not stingy with the unqualified criticism and accusations of the president and the prime minister, who, according to him, do not want to continue the democratization of the country, are slowing down the privatization of the economy, "don't want to learn," "circle around in place," "show pronounced sectarianism," and so forth.

So far, nothing new or original there. Mr. S.B. did nothing but join—perhaps with a certain flair—the chorus of those who for a few months now have been exercising their voices in the University Square or in the streets shouting "Down with....!" and brandishing a poster that even the latter have now abandoned. Although Mr. S.B. assured us that he was at the side of

the NSF [National Salvation Front], for whose fate he was worried, he did not hesitate to adopt positions that squarely put him on the side of NSF's opponents.

We will pass over the question that Mr. S.B. should answer about how he thinks the respective person or persons viewed as responsible would be removed. We let that go because there are enough people and groups who, judging by their latest actions and positions, are currently busy writing and staging scenarios aimed at precisely that outcome.

Naturally, however, we come to another question: What head should be made to replace the one removed? We do not seem to lack pretenders who, of course not overtly but perseveringly, are smoothing their path toward the same goal. One such pretender may be one of the electoral losers who, despite his advanced age, has not given up the dream of taking the highest seat by climbing upon the antitotalitarian slogan. Or perhaps a certain intellectual thirsty for power who, abandoning his discredited elitist ideas, is now claiming an alliance with the workers with the populace that until yesterday he despised, and excessively praises the personality or personalities of writers who became heads of state in their countries. Another contestant could be a representative of the new generation, for whom caring mentors here and abroad are preparing a hero's halo and a launching pad. But—why not?—it could also be someone from among the NSF ranks, one viewed as one of the Front's founders, with particular merits won in the anticeausescu dissidence and in the December 1989 Revolution, who later skillfully distanced himself from the Front leaders and amassed political capital by criticizing them, exaggerating his own past merits, and diligently blowing his horn abroad in order to project a special image of himself there, but who recently has been trying to indoctrinate simple people here with his ideas by printing cheap—very cheap—pamphlets with his works, just like the defunct communist party used to do when it became legal. The more or less precisely identified candidates are making political, organizational, and propaganda efforts, and are striving to remain visible, always ready to.... take the seat of the one they want removed.

It would of course be naive to imagine that the struggle for power ended or abated after the electoral contest of May 1990; the political struggle continues, but it has not yet assumed a regular form. Mr. Brucan's interview and statements fit the logic of such struggles, which may appear strange at first sight; we have not heard him voice remarks or criticism either about the opposition or about the West. Was that unintentional? Was it an attempt at currying favor? Do some people assume the social role of always criticizing the existing leadership in order to stand out?

Of course, our comments on the statements and observations of Mr. S.B., who deserves to be admired for the courage and honesty of his views, are not intended as an attack on the principle of different opinions or on the freedom to express them, but stem precisely from the latter. It is the hope of the author of this article that Mr. S.B.'s scenarios will not come true, because the ante in this game in which all of us are in and whose outcome we would like to foresee, is nothing less than the future of our country, and botching this future would extract too high a price from all of us, old or young, in power or in the opposition, with or without a political affiliation, Romanians or of other nationalities, citizens of this delightful country.

* Implications of 'Greater Romania' for Europe

90BA0337A Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 18 Sep 90 p 4

[Corneliu Vlad article: "What Kind of Greater Romania?"]

[Text] Borders in Europe are nevertheless beginning to move. And even to change, in a way. Fortunately, however, there is no need to worry about it. There has been no violation of the principle of border inviolability. And thus, the border between the two Germanys is disappearing and that among the EEC members is becoming fainter by the minute. And everything is happening peacefully. No one is accused of or charges aggression. Evidently, like at any time of great and spectacular changes, uncertainties, fears, and all kinds of problems are also emerging. A frantic move to peacefully modify the political configuration of the continent seems to be underway. A new geopolitical universe is now nascent. The demiurge of this genesis, or at least his representative on Earth, is probably Gorbachev. The Soviet Union seems to have come to the (wise? farsighted? willing? forced?) conclusion that being a superpower is no longer either profitable or tenable, even at the risk that the Soviet Union itself, in its present form or at all, may well disappear simultaneously with the superpower status. This is being openly discussed inside the USSR and outside its borders. The process launched by Gorbachev's perestroyka is increasingly emerging as one of the most salutary—we hope—moments in the history of this century. But will the new division, or better said, the reformation of the world proceed without too painful birth pangs? Anyway, like in other domains, there is no shortage of scenarios. All these scenarios remain based on the durable theory of zones of influence. Is there still a question of struggle for zones of influence between the Soviets and the Americans in Europe (and in the world)? Less and less. There is increasing talk recently, however, of a Western and an Eastern area of Europe. The Western area refers not so much to the United States as to the EEC and what gravitates or may gravitate around it. According to most of these scenarios, Romania, like Bulgaria, Albania, and possibly Poland or Yugoslavia (at least partly), will continue to depend on whom they depended until now; the GDR is a natural situation; Czechoslovakia (the former socialist country most apt to adopt a market economy due to its economic structure) and Hungary (profoundly inspired by the spirit of westernalization)

seem to have better chances of ascending to and being accepted "in Europe" (meaning in the EC).

The redefinition of the zones of influence—because it seems that we cannot be rid of them, at least for the foreseeable future—goes even farther: there is open talk, uninhibited by the apprehension of evil historical analogies, of the crystalization of a German zone of influence and the maintenance of a Soviet zone of influence in tomorrow's Europe. For the reunited Germany—but which will not become (at least militarily) aggressive again—Austria in the first place and perhaps Czechoslovakia to a certain extent (also by virtue of historical relations) may become immediate partners, although it is difficult to predict in what form. The fate of Poland, which inspired the incomparably cynical joke that it is a country that cannot find its place on the map between Germany and Russia, is also rather difficult to define, much more difficult than that of the Baltic republics, which aspire toward the Scandinavian world, especially toward the model of Finland.

As always, the configuration of Central and East Europe remains the most unstable. Yugoslavia's federal formula is being put to a tough test by the centrifugal tendencies of Slovenia and to a lesser degree Croatia, where the Slavic world's fascination with the German image is stronger than elsewhere.

Hungary cannot manage to free itself from the syndrome of a small country (or made smaller, as some people say, thereby creating powerful resentment among the neighbors, mostly in Romania perhaps). With its nostalgy of the "Danube monarchy" (i.e., the former Austro-Hungarian Empire), with its stubbornly stagnant birthrate, its diaspora—nearby or across the ocean—which it is trying to organize into a coherent ethnic group, and with its great socioeconomic difficulties, Hungary feverishly spins all kinds of schemes for adapting to the new realities, without caring too much—which may not be a good idea—for the negative reactions it is involuntarily or deliberately stirring immediately outside its borders. Hungary would like to be "greater" at least through means that would not be perceived as "too pushy." There is talk, for example, of a possible revival of the Austro-Hungarian state formula, which of course, includes Czechoslovakia, Croatia, and Slovenia (interestingly enough, Transylvania is not generally mentioned in such plans; we hope that is because an irreversible fact has been grasped, and not because of a subtle political game in which Hungary will gradually take over this historically Romanian province). Another idea launched calls for the establishment of a Hungarian-Czechoslovak-Polish conglomerate as an antechamber of the EEC, but neither does this idea seem to find great favor among the potential partners.

Various hypotheses are also circulated about the eastern parts of the USSR (and its south-Asian regions), which go as far as to view the present union republics as completely autonomous and independent states (including the Ukraine and Byelorussia according to some people). In such a context, some even consider the return of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina to Romania.

But where do the various scenarios place Romania itself in the Europe of the immediate future? For the time being we will discuss only one view, belonging to a reputable Hungarian writer, economist, and political scientist, Laszlo Lengyel, and expressed—and this is also something on which we should reflect—in the Soviet weekly MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI. This is a particularly interesting viewpoint that we will take the liberty of reproducing here in its entirety, in the hope that the reader will not get bored reading it. Here it goes:

"The Romanians, rather than Romania, like the Germans, will be among the big winners of the 1990's. The most desirable and realistic solution can be the establishment of a Greater Romania, made up of two autonomous regions: Transylvania, with guaranteed equal national rights for the Romanians, Hungarians, Saxons, Schwabians, and Serbians; and Bessarabia (or perhaps Greater Moldavia), which should incorporate Romanian and Soviet Moldavia of today, observing the national rights of the Romanians, Ukraines, Russians, and Gagautzes.

"Romania's relations with Russia will of course be rather sensitive, as the latter will maintain its military and economic influence and as it is not interested in resolving the 'Moldavian problem,' and so will be its relations with Hungary, which has not abandoned its ambitions to annex Transylvania. It is nevertheless possible that such a situation may guarantee a certain amount of tolerance in Bucharest's approach to the nationalities issue. As for consolidating the positions of Romania's economy, two obligatory conditions are to preserve the Soviet Union's energy supplies and to avoid exacerbating the conflicts between Hungary and Romania.

"The Romanian economy will be favorably inclined to cooperate with Germany, but there will also be room left for others, especially France."

We must admit—first of all and anyway—that this excerpt from Mr. Laszlo Lengyel's article is apt to elicit a lot of commentary, and not only in a negative sense. His summarily presented ideas may well arouse passions both in Romania, in Hungary, in Moscow, and between the Prut and Dniester. But should we be apprehensive about that? After all, a spade will have to be called a spade sometime. In the end, a solution will have to be found for thorny issues. Is it perhaps too early to open these discussions? Mr. Lengyel dared to do so (in his own way, of course). In principle, however, is it good or bad that he did?

Naturally, as Romanians we cannot ignore the fact that the notion of Greater Romania is being mentioned again outside our borders, along the lines of a federal state (we would be happy to be proven wrong in this interpretation and in having unjustly suspected bad intentions along this line).

Speaking about the "multitude of small and hostile states" expected to appear in central and east Europe of the 1990's, the article also includes "Greater Romania" (Transylvania, Wallachia, Moldavia, and Bessarabia) among their number, something that reinforces us in ourinterpretation. So, as we said, we hope to be told that we were wrong to deduce from Mr. Lengyel's article that a Greater Romania should be considered, but only as a federal state. The discussion promises to be complex, and the risk of letting strong passions loose is great. But are not the risks of imposed silence or of half-uttered truths even greater?

Anyway, last but not least, we must note that in gentlemanly fashion, Mr. Langyel stated that Hungary "has not abandoned its ambitions to annex Transylvania." This is an act of honesty, and I would even say of courage, worthy of proper recognition. The kind of honesty and courage that should be shown by all those interested and involved in clarifying the complex and painful ethnic problems in this part of Europe, where the ghost of nationalism continues to roam with all its positive, but especially its nefarious, aspects.

Anyway, great or small, Romania will never be a federal state. There is no reason for such an unnatural creation.

* Price Decontrol Likened to 'Pandora's Box'

90BA0336A Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 19 Sep 90 pp 1, 3

[Corneliu Carlan article]

[Text] My heart fell when I heard the minister of state announce on television that the government has decided to liberalize prices, especially because he clearly let it be understood that this was to be a radical and implacable reform, by which the "Pandora's box" of free market prices was going to be suddenly thrown open.

Without free prices there can be no free market. This is an incontestable truth that we have tried to demonstrate to our readers in many articles dealing with the phenomena accompanying this type of economy, especially inflation. Reiterating well known arguments, the government representative this time told us that only freely set prices can pave the road for real competition among economic factors apt to stimulate production and profitability. Only when prices will reflect the real production and marketing conditions will we be able to stop the covert and illicit outpour of products toward neighboring countries and create conditions for the transition to a convertible leu.

Who untied the government's hands and allowed it to begin the price liberalization? Law No. 10/1990 on the reorganization of state economic units as autonomous bodies and commercial associations, whose Article 48 states:

"Autonomous units and commercial associations with state capital will be able to deal between themselves and in relation with third parties, whereby the prices will be decided by the conjoint action of demand and supply, with the exception of situations in which the Romanian market does not possess at least three economic factors marketing the same type of commodity, work, or service, and with the exception of cases in which prices are based on state subsidies according to a government decision."

Hence, one can freely set a price if one has at least two competitors and on condition that one is an autonomous unit or a commercial association. The point is that the deadline established by law for establishing such new types of economic units is due to expire in....six months.

This piece of information would have elicited a sigh of relief, except that, on rereading the text, we see another possible interpretation, which may explain the assurance with which Mr. Severin announced the immediate transition to free prices. Because it is possible to establish only one commercial association that produces a certain commodity, which is also manufactured by two other economic units, to become able to practice any prices one wants. So we don't have to wait six months; practically speaking, autonomous bodies and commercial associations can enter the market with all the price-setting prerogatives they want to exercise from the very beginning. With this interpretation, the government can justify its economic action without having to submit the respective measure to Parliament.

Every Romanian knows that the main problem of our economy is the huge gap between demand and supply for the great majority of products. Let us step into the shoes of the director of a management council of a state commercial association having to deal with the problem of high production costs caused by the fact that the plant does not work to capacity, salaries are high, and productivity is low. If I know that the firm's products will sell anyway, will be almost instantaneously swallowed by the market, will I not be tempted to raise the price of my products? Will I not think that this is an easier way to make a profit than by raising productivity and cutting costs?

As long as, whatever the production capacity of the economic factors, the latter are not capable of covering the demand for a certain product, the producers will in fact have a monopoly, be they two, three, or one hundred. Moreover, they can even agree among themselves on a price, because each of them knows he has a sure market for his goods.

How long will the economic factor be in a position to conduct such a policy? Theoretically, and even practically, until the volume of money in circulation has been extracted from the buyers and deposited in their accounts. In other words, we should not be surprised if a suit will cost in the stores 10,000-15,000 lei, a pair of shoes 2,000-3,000 lei, a color television set 100,000 lei, and so forth. Because the manufacturers will be able to ask whatever price they choose until the goods will be left

on the shelves for lack of money and no one will be able to buy anything. In other words, until people are completely impoverished.

In that situation, there will certainly be a balance between demand and supply. What strange financial arithmetic!

And anyway, who will keep track in the evonomy whether the law stipulation that there must be at least three economic factors to freely set prices, will be observed?

The above commentary is not a mere speculation on the text of a law. All we have to do is look over the fence to countries like Hungary and Poland, which for years have been trying to improve their economy, and which have not managed to use this mechanism of price liberalization as a genuine incentive to raise productivity and profitability.

We are being presented a charming, idyllic even image of competition. Three vigorous producers, fighting for the market, will brandish not the weapon of high prices, but, strangely enough, of low prices, of the lowest possible costs that can enable each one of them to keep afloat and make the biggest possible profit. Not at the expense of high prices, but through high turnover and efficient production. Thus, according to the government's concept, not only will the price of goods not rise, but who knows, one of these days the leu may even recover its purchasing power. Just when that day may come we were not told. But judging by mankind's experience, we don't know of any country that went through such a joyful experience, where prices, once raised, were brought down below the initial value.

Is there no other way but to follow the downward curve of abject poverty so that later, God knows when, we may expect a spectacular recovery and social wealth? The government had given us hopes in this respect: In its program concerning the transition to a new type of economy it promised to take a variety of measures to neutralize the negative effects of price liberalization. In other words, it was loudly touted that the people, cruelly oppressed under the former regime, will be firmly protected from poverty and sorrow by appropriate measures of social welfare.

Some will of course say that salaries and other revenues will be connected to the index of inflation. Or that the government will maintain control over the price of about 120 basic products. But it is clear that the effects of inflation cannot be contained by this kind of measures. They were not contained anywhere else in the world where such a thing was tried. At the most, the "medicine" was somewhat sweetened.

But as we are considering other people's experiences, let us look not to our neighbors, but farther afield, to France, for example. We were surprised to learn that, although we knew that it had a market economy, it was only in 1983 that the state began to relinquish its prerogatives concerning price setting. Until then it gradually opened a few valves at a time, until the gap between demand and supply was considerably narrowed. Moreover, the process of loosening the reins was generally completed only in 1986....And the French State continues to maintain price control over certain products. Of course, it is easy to give well meaning advice to others, but why urge others to do what you would not and have not done in your own country?

We hope to be correctly understood. As we said from the beginning, there can be no market economy without free prices. The problem now is to choose the optimal means of arriving at that reality, considering all the economic aspects and phenomena on the way.

Actually, what is it that we request? Not to act hastily. We must measure seven times before we cut once. The government (true, the provisional government, not the present one) made one mistake with Decree No. 54/1990 on free initiative, which was and must further be seriously amended before it is no longer called the "free marketeering decree."

Price liberalization may be a "Pandora's box" which, opened suddenly, may let loose all the sins of the Romanian economy. We expect a shock as drastic as a decisive blow into the face of a groggy boxer.

A respite of six months or one year would not be too long to thoroughly prepare for a price reform when we consider that others took decades to accomplish it.

We do not expect this article to produce much effect; we don't think that the government will be swayed by an opinion (especially if it remains solitary) that contradicts the policy it is considering. And perhaps it is the government who is right, not the press, because after all the government is the one responsible for implementing the program of transition to a market economy. But this view must be expressed, too, and God willing it will be proven a waste of words, and life will show that we were wrong and the government was right.

Kadijevic Meets With Iliescu, Ends Visit

LD1210165390 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1152 GMT 12 Oct 90

[Text] Bucharest, 12 Oct (TANJUG)—Army General Veljko Kadijevic, federal secretary for national defense, leading a delegation of SFRY Armed Forces, today ended a return visit to the Armed Forces of friendly Romania.

In addition to talks with his host, Romanian Defense Minister Colonel General Victor Stanculescu, and with other top military leaders, Gen. Kadijevic and his delegation visited some units and institutions of the Romanian Armed Forces.

Today, the federal national defense secretary was received by Romanian President Ion Iliescu, with whom he had long and substantial talks.

Foreign Minister Nastase Meets Chinese President

AU1410181190 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1630 GMT 14 Oct 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 14/10/1990—Saturday, 13 October 1990, the Romanian minister of foreign affairs, Adrian Nastase, was received by China's president, Yang Shangkun, whom he informed about the Romanian Government's concerns after the December revolution.

The Romanian minister conveyed the Chinese head of state a message on Mr. Ion Iliescu's behalf with thanks for the invitation extended to Romania's president to visit China.

The same day Adrian Nastase had talks with the Chinese foreign minister, Qian Qichen, talks considered by the Romanian minister as "very important and very useful".

Foreign Minister Visits China

WA1510150290

For Chinese reportage on the visit to China by Minister of Foreign Affairs Adrian Nastase, including reports on talks between Nastase and President Yang Shangkun and with Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, see the East Europe section of the 15 October and subsequent issues of the China DAILY REPORT.

* Polish Press 'Attack' on Romania Refuted

90BA0337B Bucharest AZI in Romanian 18 Sep 90 p 4

[Stelian Motiu article]

[Text] At least from a quantitative viewpoint, the Romanian postrevolutionary press has become overwhelming. Who has the time to scan it at leisure and at ease, who has the time to sit and think about the avalanche of assertions—most often than not, apodictic and indisputable—testifying to the sudden emergence of a host of political analysts of international caliber (people who until yesterday studied apiculture or the characteristic bridal dress of the Maramures) for which we should be the envy of any country in the world, so, as we said, who can afford to dwell on the web—or webs—of unfavorable propaganda being spinned about Romania?

Highest placed representatives of the new power structures established in consequence of the free elections of 20 May this year, concerned about Romania's joining the group of European and world nations as a partner—I repeat, as a partner, because Romania was never absent from this space of civilization and culture, only isolated, increasingly isolated—repeatedly highlighted, with a decency, clarity, and dignity that we have no right not to salute, that the country's current government is not after a spruced up image of the Romanian realities and is not interested in hiding the bundle of problems confronting the country. On the contrary, the government of this period of extraordinary difficulties that the National Salvation Front [NSF] assumed, is made up of people of courage, determination, and intelligence like Iliescu, Roman, Iordache, Severin, and the entire team, who have grasped that anyone who thinks like a Romanian must place the country's interests above any petty party interests; this government is made up of people who see the realities and are well aware of the significance, not always pleasant, of the idea of a "sacrificial government." The overwhelming majority of the country understands the enormous difficulties inherent in beginning to implement the structural reforms designed to finally topple a totalitarianism whose tentacles mercilessly violated the most sensitive areas of the lives of the Romanian citizens at the social macro and micro-level. That this is so is most convincingly proven by the options moderately and wisely expressed at the first free consultation of the Romanian electorate last spring.

The fact that irresponsible members of the "opposition" allow themselves to think that their notable contribution to the country's recovery consists of organizing contests—with prizes, of course—on a theme held dear by all those who occupy gilded seats (the green color of the dollars shows only after intensive use of the seat) in the relentless struggle against the national interests, of the type, "when and how will Iliescu fall?" is no longer a surprise to anyone. What may still be surprising is a certain "imperialism" of the anti-Romanian campaign, supported with vigorous logistic aid by local political and undisputable apolitical organizations, an "imperialism" which, no longer content with the old imperialisms, is annexing new ones.

After orchestrated attacks in the press of Belgium, France, etc., based on a lack of information that would leave the most interesting science fiction writers gaping and on historical ideas fed from Ten Dozen [120] Victoria Avenue, as the most aggressive and perfidious fifth column of the past half century in Romania will probably soon be renamed, we are now facing a surprising shift which history did not prepare us to expect: The Polish press has joined the chorus against Romania. Appealing to the loyal and sane solidarity that characterizes the Romanian-Polish relations is useless in this case, because the views that we are about to cite do not and cannot possibly represent the voice of the Poles. Especially since, as you will see, their sources are Romanian, or at least live in Romania.

The Etna Volcano Has Moved

In the popular ZYCIE WARSZAWY of 8-9 September, the journalist Rafal Wisniewski noted with amazing serenity that the recent "commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Vienna Diktat" almost ended in "serious events." The editorializing R.W. came to the conclusion that "according to observers, some of the Romanian nationalistic organizations intended to provoke the Magyar population into speaking against the Romanians who were marking the anniversary. In view of the situation, those familiar with the problems of Central Europe held their breath for a few days." We will

later show that these "observers" are also employed at 120 Victoria Avenue, and not only there. The logic of what followed was absolutely amazing: "The lack of understanding showed by Romanian officials, the freeze on the Budapest-Bucharest dialogue, and finally, the fact that many problems continue to remain unsolved, could have contributed to escalating Hungarian demands (more in Budapest and among emigrants, than in Transylvania). From demands for territorial autonomy for the region inhabited by the Magyar minority to the autonomy of Transylvania as a whole there is only one step." Such a situation was allegedly the outcome of the Romanians' "historical fear" of the Hungarians, as "an important element of the Romanians' national consciousness," a fear kept alive by the "Romanian authorities, whose crypto-communist style of ruling is meeting with growing opposition from the Romanians themselves...." Thus, such a situation should obligate us to pay convincing penance to the one "... with the triple crown...." [reference to the pope in a Romanian poem]. To talk of "historical fear" as an "important" element of our national consciousness is more than an error. This is a somewhat simpler "element." This is the unleashed offensive of a disconcertingly aggressive propaganda chorus whose soloists are unfortunately close to us. At times frighteningly close. These "soloists" loudly point out the "plays" required to bring Romania into a forced move position. And this is what, out of profound love for us, the GDS-ist [Group for Social Dialogue] editorialist (sponsored from here) of ZYCIE WARSZAWY also noted: "Currently, in connection with the elections for self-leadership are becoming more acute (It is interesting to observe the intimate relationship between linguistic incorrectness and the bad faith that only certified intellectuals are capable of—editorial note). The experts (not difficult to guess how they pull the most public chord a la Doina Cornea) do not exclude the possibility that a second phase of the Revolution may break out, this time against Iliescu and his comrades in the NSF. That could lead to civil war."

We do not wish to prolong a selfevident comment, namely that the scorn that our dear intellectuals harbor for the people—whose names we will disclose later as we promised and as they unfortunately deserve—is thus transformed without nuances in a deliberately antinational attitude.

Informers as Sources of Morality

Postrevolutionary revolutionary rhetoric has attained the highest peaks of irresponsibility in our country. Thus, we learned with a guilt feeling that a diligent member of the nomenklatura, whose sister escaped abroad, was and continues to be an indomitable dissident; that a person who was sentenced for embezzlement, for example, was and continues to be a resolute fighter not only against Ceausescu, but against communism itself; and that any failure in any walk of life was in fact a fighter. The great majority of these pronouncements ran and continue to run against what is often interpreted as a pejorative term: common sense. Let's be serious. Let's stay here and not imagine that if we appeal—as did, with the most deplorable results, the precursors of the current dictatorial ambitions of the unleashed GDS-ists—to other countries, no matter how deferently, we would have bigger and better chances of preserving what is our primary motivation, namely the direct responsibility for Romania's fate. Pessimistically speaking, I do not think that Romania's change stands a better chance other than betting on the real and profound rebellion of the youth, not that of street demonstrations, but that of competence, willing to quietly and calmly propose a simple wager to the present and especially to the future: the wager against history, against merciless history, a wager closed with the responsible courage we so badly need. Perhaps the generation that had the strength to oppose the historically most inexplicable monsterswill also have the strength to simplify as much as possible the relationship to the history we are living. Nevertheless, what is important is the fact that the majority of this generation no longer seems willing to accept lies, even when draped in the transparent veils of "opposition at any cost." Coming back [to the topic] we feel compelled to remark on a certain obsession that looks like an emblem on which the colors are difficult to match, but still, they match.

Thus, in the 31 August issue of the same ZYCIE WARSZAWY, a gentleman whose name I hope will be remembered by as many careful postrevolutionary analysts as possible, stated: "The easiest would be to say that the Romanians were not scared. The new wave of antigovernmental demonstrations in the center of the capital city must be ascribed to thesame motives as before. That is, to opposition against the authorities, which continue the old communist relations; against the government, which promises a lot but does almost nothing, nothing to implement the new economic mechanisms and to finally guarantee democracy; it is the same violent opposition as in January, February, and April—and later May and June—to the political philosophy of the NSF led by President Iliescu." The gentleman's name is Tadeusz Barzdo and he holds several views whose rigid originality appears to be too well paid to be argued. We would normally ignore such a stylistic impasse if the Poles themselves had not revealed the source of the "porous" democracy, as a most important lady writer of ours is wont to say rather early on mandatorily wasted mornings. We should become used to the idea of receiving rather without comment the friendly inquiries concerning the stage of advance of "rot" in "Denmark." Anyway, what is important to remember in this situation is the fact that the main, original, and undammed source, fed by the ambition not to sit still for a moment, can be located nowhere but on the streets of Bucharest, on these streets....

Let us go back to Victoria Avenue. The Polish newspaper noted that the author based his article mainly on "the statements of a notable Romanian intellectual, Gabriel Liiceanu." No one can persuade us that Mr. Liiceanu, "publicly abused in June by miners and printers," can

suggest—or "outline," as the Messianic Gabriel himself may say, despite his protracted and inexpensive sojourn among the worldly—a better solution for the first step of the end of our historical regress. Such a solution doesn't even seem necessary.

Another source of information generously cited by our disinterested (really?) denigrators was the barrage of "revealing" statements made by Messrs. Militaru and especially Brucan. "The two," ZYCIE WARSZAWY pointed out, "not only verified the accusations that the old communist nomenklatura, led by Ion Iliescu, stole the ideals of the December Revolution...."; they even went so far as to claim, with their familiar disdain for the Romanian people, that "another version of...was being planned (by whom? Mr. Brucan?) in Romania with Moscow's tacit approval...." On the same wavelength, Sorin Botez, a deputy chairman of the PNL [National Liberal Party], said, with the serenity of those who never assume the responsibility for anything constructive, that in one year and a half his party will take over the power, because the people "are realizing that they have been deceived."

As usual, one of the privileged sources of slander campaigns is the only political party in the world formed on the basis of ethnic criteria, the UDMR [Democratic Union of Romanian Magyars]. RZECZPOSPOLITA of 1 September quoted the secretary of the Tirgu Mures branch of that party, Laszlo Szepessy, who told Reuter that "we have fear in our hearts, fear of a provocation." As well paid hypocrisy never has anything to do with common sense, another UDMR leader, Octavian Buracu, noted with virginal metaphysical inclination: "the atmosphere is tense. People are worried and fearful...."

You are expected to understand that the entire responsibility for all this falls on the Front, which is not giving in to the unspeakable pressures to establish "independent" enclaves in Transylvania, who stubbornly continues to believe that we should have Romanian language schools there, too, with Romanian teachers, etc. But first of all, to have. Because our Polish friends at ZYCIE WARSZAWY attached to their editorial, "Transylvania—the Etna Volcano of Central Europe," a map of Romania on which Tranyslvania, Crisana, and the Banat are surrounded by a thick marker line, while Timisoara and Tirgu Mures appear with their Hungarian names. These hints need no commentary.

We would like to go back for a moment to 120 Victoria Avenue, to the GDS headquarters, to note another remark by our well informed Polish friend Tadeusz Barzdo: "It is difficult to discard the recent statement made by Andrei Plesu to Reuter, according to which President Ion Iliescu is a weak leader surrounded by weak advisers." Mr. Andrei Plesu is a minister, but he cannot ignore the fact that his revolutionary status comes from being a founding member of the GDS, whose tentacles know no forgiveness.

Disturbances Flare Again in Benkovac, Obrovac

LD1510163990 Zagreb Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] After several quiet days, disturbances again flared in Benkovac and Obrovac municipalities over the weekend. Last night, shots and explosions were heard in those municipalities and numerous barricades set up on roads were manned by armed guards.

Despite the barricades, morning traffic was moving along North Dalmatian Road, but with much difficulty. However, the Zadar-Gracasc-Zagreb Road is completely blocked. This is because of rocks scattered 500 meters from the Preziv tunnel. The rocks along the road appeared after two explosions caused by unindentified people last night.

The Zadar Secretariat for Internal Affairs told journalists that preparations have begun to send teams to clear that part of the Lika Road. The Zadar Secretariat for Internal Affairs also stated that the Benkovac Public Security Station filed charges with the municipal prosecutor's office against several people who set up barricades near Benkovac.

This morning, the Zadar Secretariat for Internal Affairs received several citizens who reported being maltreated over the past weekend. Some were even robbed by armed bandits along the roads of northern Dalmatia and Lika.

At the end of a news conference, representatives of the Zadar Secretariat for Internal Affairs stressed that since the new democratically elected government came to power not a single policeman of Serbian nationality has been dismissed. The alleged dismissal of ethnic Serbian policemen, reported by some mass media, is malicious and tendentious.

Towns' Residents Asked To Avoid Knin Roads

LD1510221690 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1616 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Zagreb, 15 Oct (TANJUG)—Presidents of Executive Councils of the municipal Assemblies of Imotski, Sinj, and Drnis today appealed to the citizens of their municipalities not to use roads in the Knin area on their way to Zagreb to attend the ceremony of unveiling the monument to Ban Josip Jelacic.

The appeal stresses that all those wishing to attend the ceremony in Zagreb should use alternative roads where barricades have not been set up in order to avoid undesirable consequences. At this moment we need to be dignified and should refrain from all activities which could be seen as provocations, and thus we should express the goodwill and dignity of the Croatian people, the appeal states.

Alliance Protests Suvar's Removal From Presidency

LD1510204790 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1448 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Belgrade, 15 Oct (TANJUG)—The parliament of Yugoslavia's Republic of Croatia disregarded the procedure envisaged under the federal Constitution when it recently relieved Stipe Suvar of his post of federal state presidency member from Croatia and elected in his place Stipe Mesic, until then Croatian prime minister, as the Socialist Alliance of Yugoslavia presidency set out today in a memorandum forwarded to the federal parliament.

The federal parliament is formally to proclaim Stipe Mesic member of the Yugoslav state Presidency by the end of the week.

The Croatian parliament did not inform the Socialist Alliance that it was instituting proceedings for Suvar's replacement, nor did it present a list of candidates on which all the republics and provinces are to give their opinions.

The federal Constitution specifies that a republican parliament must get the opinions of the other republics and the provinces on its candidates before taking the final decision on who will represent the respective republic in the Yugoslav state Presidency.

Poll on Status of Kosovo, Serbs in Croatia

AU0210160790

[Editorial Report] Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian on 26 September on page 5 carries a 4,000-word report by Slobodanka Bakic-Golubovic on the results of BORBA's public opinion poll on whether Kosovo should be a republic and whether Serbs in Croatia should have autonomy, entitled: "For Some Yes, For Some No—Peace for All."

According to the report, "BORBA's public opinion research center polled 420 people from 42 cities, that is, 70 people from each of the six republics, or, 10 people from seven cities in each republic. The center used the random sampling method (selecting every 30th person from the telephone directory). The poll was conducted in Ljubljana, Maribor, Murska Sobota, Celje, Novo Mesto, Kranj, and Koper (Slovenia); Zagreb, Varazdin, Osijek, Slavonski Brod, Sibenik, Rijeka, and Knin (Croatia); Sarajevo, Trebinje, Prijedor, Tuzla, Jajce, Mostar, and Bihac (Bosnia-Hercegovina); Titograd, Cetinje, Niksic, Bijelo Polje, Herceg Novi, Kotor, and Bar (Montenegro); Belgrade, Kragujevac, Vranje, Novi Sad, Donji Milanovac, and Zajecar (Serbia); Skopje, Bitola, Ohrid, Prilep, Kicevo, Kumanovo, and Strumica (Macedonia)."

According to BORBA, the poll researchers also wanted to conduct the poll in Pristina, but this turned out to be "impossible" because not many people wanted to take part in it.

The results of the poll are presented in two tables which depict in detail respondents' views together with the reasons why they expressed the opinion they did.

In addition to these two tables, the report also carries two bar charts which summarize the results of the poll presented in the aforementioned tables.

The following are the results of the poll as summarized by the two bar charts:

Table 1. "Should Serbs in Croatia Have Autonomy?"

[bar chart in percentages]

	Yes	No	Something Else	Do Not Know
Slovenia	37	50	10	3
Croatia	40	41	14	5
Bosnia-Hercegovina	44	33	6	17
Montenegro	80	3	13	4
Serbia	57	11	9	23
Macedonia	57	19	6	18
SFRY	53	26	10	11

Table 2. "Should Kosovo Be a Republic?"

[bar chart in percentages]

	Yes	No	Something Else	Do not know
Slovenia	29	59	8	4
Croatia	19	73	0	8
Bosnia-Hercegovina	8	79	5	8
Montenegro	4	94	0	2
Serbia	2	96	2	0
Macedonia	0	99	0	1
SFRY	10	83	2	5

Serbian National Council Not 'Parallel Authority'

LD1510183790 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1441 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Sarajevo, 15 Oct (TANJUG)—If the National Council of Serbs in the Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was constituted as "parallel authority", then this must be taken as a negation of the constitutional order of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia, said leader of the Democratic Alliance of Bosnia-Herzegovina Mirko Pejanovic.

He stated this on the occasion of the founding of the Serbian National Council of Bosnia-Herzegovina on October 12. The council was organized by the Democratic Party in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Pejanovic, who is one of the candidates for president of Bosnia- Herzegovina, set out that no party had the right to usurp the will of the people as a whole. At the same time, its organs cannot, without previously holding free elections, be proclaimed legitimate organs of a people.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a republic with pronouncedly mixed population. Nearly 40 percent are Moslems, 32 percent are Serbs, 17 percent Croatians, while the remainder is made up of other nationalities and of those who declared themselves as Yugoslavs.

FEC's Pregl Meets Kosovo Alternative Members

AU1610093290 Skopje FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT in Albanian 10 Oct 90 pp 4-5

[Blerim Reka and Emin Azemi report: "In a Constitutional Transition Period"]

[Excerpts] Pristina, 9 Oct—The recent visit to Kosovo by a delegation of the Federal Executive Council [FEC] headed by Deputy President Zivko Pregl will be remembered for an unprecedented incident which took place on the last day of its stay in Kosovo. Pregl, accompanied by Dr. Vlado Kambovski, federal secretary for jurisprudence, and Jovo Vuckovic, assistant secretary to the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs, conducted talks with the Kosovo League of Communists [LC] Provincial Committee and Albanian delegates to the Federal Assembly on Sunday [7 October], and were also, according to protocol, supposed to meet Momcilo Trajkovic, deputy president of the Serbian Executive Council. However, when the federal government delegation together with journalists arrived in front of the Kosovo Assembly building, they were met by an official member of the security services and were told that they could not enter the building because Momcilo Trajkovic had announced that he had no reason to meet them. Zivko Pregl made no comment on this intergovernmental (Serbian-Federal) incident, but merely gave a chronological account of the delegation's visit to Kosovo. It was reported that in the course of his visit Pregl had met face to face with Hysen Kajdomcaj, president of the Kosovo Presidency, and that this as well as the delegation's two-hour meeting with the Kosovo alternative was the reason why Momcilo Trajkovic refused to receive the FEC members and in his public statement even compared the FEC delegation with the delegation of U.S. senators led by Robert Dole.

Discussion With the Kosovo Alternative Is Inevitable

The second day of the FEC delegation's visit to Kosovo was spent in discussions with the Kosovo League of Communists Provincial Committee and representatives of the Kosovo Alternative. After hearing criticisms and accusations leveled by Zivorad Igic, Jados Zelenovic, and Caslav Bojanic in the vein of "Have they come as party leaders or members of the government?," and "The Kosovo Democratic Alliance [DSK] is registered with the devil, whose lieutenant is Kambovski," or "Going to talk with the DSK leaders means helping to

create a greater Albania," Zivko Pregl responded by saying that their reason for visiting Kosovo was to try and solve Kosovo's problems. Talking about the DSK's registration, he said that the Federal Secretariat for Justice is under no obligation to heed anybody's opinions. It must however act on the basis of the law; a person may be prosecuted for what he says, but not the program of a party. Regardless of what anybody may think, Pregl said, we cannot avoid discussions with representatives of registered parties. In connection with the demand raised at this meeting that the FEC should demand the prosecution of the Kosovo delegates who are in Croatia and Slovenia, Pregl said that the FEC is not a prosecuting body.

Representatives of the Kosovo opposition bodies and independent Kosovo intellectuals put forward their political views on solving the Kosovo problem in a two-hour conversation with the FEC delegation (Pregl, Lambovski, Vuckovic). Prof. Dr. Fehmi Agani [DSK Presidium member] said that the origins of the Kosovo crisis must be sought in hegemonist ideas and efforts to create a memorandum-style Yugoslavia [reference to the memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences on the past and future of Yugoslavia] and a united Serbia, denying the specific characteristics of Kosovo and Vojvodina. This hegemonist logic, he said, has had to be imposed by fresh repressive measures and the removal of what little autonomy was left to Kosovo. Agani and other representatives of the Kosovo Alternative criticized the FEC's standpoint announcing the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo to be unconstitutional, asking why Kosovo cannot be equal to the other federal units in Yugoslavia. The lawyer Bajram Kelmendi, chairman of the Council for the Protection of Human Rights, after presenting a "saddening exhibition" of photographs of killed, wounded, and beaten Albanians, also presented the following statistics: 10,922 Albanians were sentenced for political midemeanors between 1981 and 1989; between 1981 and 1986, 1,031 were sentenced for politically criminal acts by final court verdicts; according to a report by former Defense Minister Branko Mamula, courts martial in Yugoslavia sentenced 1,100 Albanians between 1981 and 1988; in the first six months of 1990 alone, 661 people were sentenced for politically criminal acts, and 2,284 others for political misdemeanors. Bajram Kelmendi said that the militia's firearms killed 74 people and wounded 214 others in 1989 and 1990. He also spoke at length about other forms of state repression (raids on homes, mass dismissals from work, segregation in schools, the closure of 3,000 private shops, etc.), down to the most recent form of this terror seen in the kidnapping of Dr. Bujar Bukoshi [DSK Presidium member] by four masked persons a few days ago.

The academician Gazmend Zajmi expanded on his original thesis that Kosovo has been in a provisional or transitional constitutional position since the discussions about constitutional amendments in 1968, which has deepened conflicts as time has passed. Criticizing the Serbian constitutional amendments of 23 March 1989 and their "acceptance by the Kosovo Assembly," in which the votes of the delegates at the meeting were not even counted and no heed was paid to ensuring the necessary two-thirds majority, he suggested that the federation should answer three key questions. The federation should first state clearly whether Kosovo is "Serbian" or belongs to all the citizens living there; second, whether the Albanians are a national minority or not; and third, whether the federation intends to solve the constitutional crisis in Yugoslavia with or without the Albanians.

Professor Dr. Hajrullah Gorani and Dr. Agim Hyseni, of the Kosovo Independent Trade Unions, spoke about cases of the grave violation of the labor rights of Albanian workers and asked whether there is any other example in the world of the state ruining the economy as in Kosovo. Meanwhile, Shkelzen Maliiqi, chairman of the Kosovo Social Democratic Party, said that there are two ways of settling the Kosovo problem. The first is the peaceful alternative, which implies a recognition of the political status of the Albanians and their minimal demands, the return of the Kosovo Assembly and Executive Council, the registration of political parties, free elections in Kosovo, the formation of a multiparty parliament, the return to work of all those who have been dismissed, the restoration of Pristina Radio and Television and RILINDJA, and the creation of a neutral federal commission. Any other alternative, Shkelzen Maliqi said, is the war option. [passage omitted]

Raids on Albanian Homes Continue

Police raids on the homes of Albanian citizens now seem to have become commonplace in Kosovo. The home of Islam Osedautaj in the Dardania quarter of Pristina was raided recently. A large quantity of gold and money to the value of 35,000 dinars was stolen, while the perpetrators of this raid left a message full of national insults pinned up with a knife! There was also a raid in the village of Baliq near Urosevac, in which the home of Shaban Bibaj was surrounded by four Pinzgauers and two militia cars. A revolver, a hunting rifle, and quantities of reading material were confiscated, and two members of the family were taken in for questioning. The home of the carpenter Adem Morina, the father of six small children, was also raided in Pristina. Ten militiamen armed to the teeth and several civilians looked for weapons. Finding none, they left without providing any explanation.

It is interesting that at 1000 last Friday [5 Oct] the Serbian police twice passed through the village of Prekaz near Srbica in five cars, aiming the barrels of automatic rifles at people. Real panic broke out when the school was surrounded, while the police photographed many houses as they passed through, especially that of Tahir Meha, who clashed with the police in 1981. The people of Prekaz are now in fear and anxiety lest reprisals similar to those in Pollate fall upon them in the coming days. [passage omitted]

Army District Head Meets Retired Slovene Generals

AU1510192090 Ljubljana NEODVISNI DNEVNIK in Slovene 11 Oct 90 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Talks With Retired Generals"]

[Text] Ljubljana, 11 Oct—As one in a series of regular meetings, Colonel General Konrad Kolsek, commander of the Fifth Military District, and his associates held talks with retired generals living in Slovenia in the Yugoslav People's Army Hall in Ljubljana yesterday. On that occasion, they discussed current political events in the country, and in Slovenia in particular.

Both sides have expressed their desire for all problems, including the question of leading and commanding the Slovene Territorial Defense Force, to be solved in a reasonable and rational political way which would conform with the latest stance of the SFRY Presidency.

Veterans Deny General's Statement

AU1510192690 Ljubljana NEODVISNI DNEVNIK in Slovene 13 Oct 90 p 4

[Letter from the Republican Committee of the Federation of the Associations of the National Liberation War Veterans; place and date not given]

[Text] "The statement on the talks between Colonel General Konrad Kolsek, commander of the Fifth Military District, with retired generals living in Slovenia says that the people present at the talks expressed their desire for all problems to be solved, including those involving the leading and commanding of the territorial defense force, to be solved in conformity with the latest stances of the SFRY Presidency.

"We, the participants in the meeting, state that such a stance was advocated by General Kolsek. Other participants were unified in recommending that the present complications in the sphere of the territorial defense in Slovenia should be solved in a tolerant and well-argued dialogue, as well as with respect for constitutional powers and responsibilities of the Republic of Slovenia for territorial defense."

On behalf of the participants:
Retired Colonel-General Franc Poglajen-Kranjc
Vice President Lado Pohar

Bosnia-Hercegovina Police Not To Be in Party

LD1510202990 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1547 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Sarajevo, 15 Oct (TANJUG)—The independent trade union of the internal affairs service in the Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina maintains that policemen in this republic should not be members of any political parties.

This stand was taken at today's meeting of the T.U. [trade union] leadership which assessed that those employed in other state organs also should not be party members.

Elections in Bosnia-Hercegovina have been called for November. Like in other Yugoslav republics, police in Bosnia-Hercegovina had been firmly linked to the ruling Communist Party.

Independent Montenegrin Communist Group Forms

LD1310175590 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1027 GMT 13 Oct 90

[Excerpt] Titograd, 13 Oct (TANJUG)—After Bar and Cetinje, Bijelo Polje has founded an Organization of Independent Communists [Organizacija Nezavisnih Komunista], independent in relation to the Montenegrin League of Communists and its organs. This organization will advocate the old communist ideals, free of chauvinism and Bolshevism, Yugoslavia as a federation of equal nations and republics, and Montenegro as a sovereign community, the guidelines of the party stress. [passage omitted]

Montenegrin Socialists Support Markovic's Party

AU1410213490 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 8 Oct 90 p 6

[Report on interview with Zarko Rakcevic, president of the Party of Socialists of Montenegro, by Dragoljub Vukovic; place and date not given: "The Left Is Not Residing Here"]

[Excerpt] The Party of Socialists of Montenegro has opted for peaceful but profound structural changes in the economic and political system of Montenegro and Yugoslavia. I think that these changes are different from the concept offered by the League of Communists of Montenegro and the Socialist Democratic Alliance. In contrast to them, our concept of restructuring the economy and the economic system of Yugoslavia, and our global perceptions of how Yugoslavia should be socially organized are almost identical to what the Federal Executive Council is offering in the sphere of economy. The moves that have been made by the party in power in Montenegro are not characteristic of a party which pretends to belong to the political forces on the left.

This is why we found unacceptable the offer to join an alliance of the left oriented forces, this is why we sought our place among those political forces and movements which can bring Montenegro and Yugoslavia a different socioeconomic future. This was stated by Zarko Rakcevic, president of the Party of Socialists of Montenegro, answering the question about the reasons behind the decision of the Party of Socialists to support the Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia over an alliance of the left-wing forces proposed by the Socialist Democratic Alliance (the Party of Socialists and the

Socialist Democratic Alliance have emerged as the result of the division of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Montenegro).

We do not like the activities of the party in power. Its work in the past 18 months has been on a collision course with our ideas. We do not like their attitudes toward the process of economic and political emancipation, their attitudes toward the need to prepare democratic infrastructure for the first postwar multiparty elections, Rakcevic said. What we have in Montenegro, and, unfortunately in Yugoslavia, is neo-collectivism and manipulation of the people. The manipulation for the benefit of the workers class was simply replaced with the manipulation for the benefit of the nation. We are going in different directions and can only talk about being direct rivals during the forthcoming election campaign. [passage omitted]

Relations Between Macedonians, Albanians Viewed

AU1410171590 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 6-7 Oct 90 p 4

[Dragan Nikolic article: "Changed Yardsticks: What Macedonians and Albanians Are Doing in Macedonia"]

[Text] Dr. Slavko Miloslavlevski, leader of the Social Democratic Party, publicly said the other day that election cooperation with the Albanian Party for Democratic Prosperity was desirable, something that no Macedonian politician had dared to say until then. Many said, however, that the party should be banned because it was a "single national," "separatist," "great Albanian" party, and the like. Miloslavlevski in fact said that it would be of extraordinary importance both for the democratic development of Macedonia and for the Albanian nationality if that party found "sufficient positive political energy for democratic cooperation with leftist democratic parties."

The executive committee of Skopje UJDI [Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative] announced a few days earlier that the ban of that party, or of any other party (for instance VMRO [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization]) "could directly lead to a Kosovo situation in western Macedonia, because incentive would thus be provided to extremist and militant members of banned organizations to begin underground activities which would be an introduction to civil war." According to UJDI, "the test of the present time can be passed only by a democratic Macedonia, in which political, national, and religious tolerance reign." The leader of the Albanian party is Nevzit Halili, who is widely thought to be a sober and democratically oriented Albanian. Halili says that his party is not a single nationality party (several thousand non-Albanians have joined it) and it is by no means what the authorities and some other organizations have accused it of being. He says that his party has had contacts with several Macedonian parties (the Social Democrats, the Party for Democratic Transformation, the Peasants Party, and MAAK [Movement for All-Macedonian Action]) and that during the elections it will certainly conclude a coalition with a Macedonian party.

Turning Western Macedonian Into a Kosovo

One gets the impression that the attitude toward the Albanians is essentially changing in Macedonia, and so is the attitude of the Albanians toward the Macedonians and Macedonia (FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT published in Skopje and now the only Albanian newspaper in Yugoslavia). Indeed, one can hear some old cry here and there for the repression of Albanians by the legal state, and some incidents occur, such as for instance, a fight between students of the two nationalities because of a playing field in Sarad near Skopje the other day, or pulling down, in a sea of buildings erected without a permit, only those belonging to Albanians (it happened in Skopje, for instance). But on the whole, it is no longer dangerous to say that the relations with the Albanians can be normalized only on democratic foundations. It seems that one could even say that a Macedonian party that would join a coalition with an Albanian party would not fail among Macedonian voters for that very reason.

The orthodox communists, who with their "totalitarian ideology and undemocratic practice" caused interethnic tensions and produced enemies (Albanians in the first place) were during the entire postwar period in a kind of coalition with the nationalities, including the Albanians, so that the nationalities were represented in party bodies and state organs in proportion to their numbers. However, the representatives of the nationalities were not elected but appointed, just as the representatives of the majority people were appointed. The ideologists of "real socialism" simply proclaimed any resistance to such "socialist democracy" to be nationalism, separatism, extremism, irredentism, and the like. The ruling crowd, incapable of seeing the prospects for development, distributed entitlements (at one stage even coupons for detergents) and kept the people quarreling, spreading the lie that the majority live poorly because the minority is too numerous and its rights are too great. Dramatic debates conducted about Cyrillic or Latin letters on some school rubber stamp or a schoolbook merely display the lack of prospects and the irrational attitudes of a spent model. Milan Pancevski, at that time a high-level party leader, ordered the definition of Macedonia to be changed: instead of a "legal state" it should be a "national state," which was not far from being an "ideological state." The roads to "turn western Macedonia into a Kosovo" were thus widely opened, particularly because the fear of the Macedonians of losing their state was quite natural when "the foundations of Yugoslavia were shaking" and "the specters of the past rose apocalyptically over our lives." After all, new "surveyors" emerged with the intention to "measure up Macedonia" "with the yardsticks of the last century." The fact that Macedonian democracy has possessed the strength to begin changing its attitude toward the internal "enemy number one" is only a sign that the Macedonian

"Bolshevism" is losing its positions in the Macedonian political scene and that the "Macedonian Spring" is getting stronger.

It seems that two options are now present—one in favor of the Balkans and the other in favor of Europe—and that a score of parties are aligning on one side or the other, one group tending toward a "reform" and the other toward a "national course." However, there are serious internal quarrels within the two groups, especially the "national" one.

In the "reform wing," the reform parties cannot agree on how to run at the forthcoming elections (will every party have its own candidates or will they have joint candidates, will the reform bloc be "open" or not, will the League of Communists of Macedonia be in it or will it stay alone, and the like). Meanwhile, "national parties," seriously shaken by quarrels within and among them, now try to consolidate (a secret VMRO conference was held in a motel on the Mladost Lake near Titov Veles a short while ago) because "a public grouping of the parties, in whose programs the interest of the Macedonian people is only secondary, or completely lacking, or is referred to mockingly, is in the offing." It is felt that the "reform bloc of the parties" (in which the two main reform parties, the League of Communists of Macedonia—Party for Democratic Transformation, and the Alliance of Reform Forces of Macedonia, will certainly lead, followed by the Social Democrats and the Democratic Alliance of Youth) will have an advantage in the forthcoming elections. It seems that the stars favor this bloc because the chief Yugoslav conflicts at present are far from Macedonia (and even the media war against Macedonia is running out of steam) and because the Macedonian economic situation is dramatic. The reformers do not underestimate the national problem nor the sovereignty of Macedonia—on the contrary, they proceed from them—but they do not want to dig themselves in on the Balkans, festooned with war flags and battle axes, but want to become integrated in a shaken Yugoslavia and civilized Europe.

Tupurkovski Rides Alone

Stojan Andov, leader of the Macedonian Alliance of Reform Forces, says that the decision at the forthcoming elections in Macedonia in November will in fact concern this option, whether it is sufficiently clear to the Macedonian voter and the protagonists in the political parties or not. However, before the Macedonians vote for a continuation of or a break with "the Balkans," the candidates for the future head of the Macedonian state are appearing on the political horizon. Vasil Tupurkovski, Kiro Gligorov, and Krste Crvenkovski are being prominently mentioned. Kiro Gligorov spoke in Stip within the League of Communists of Macedonia election campaign, and appears to have met with a rather lukewarm reception although he was pushed aside by Kolisevski and Tempo [Svetozar Vukmanovic] (because of the objections to the Headquarters Manifesto in the early days of the war) and although he was the creator of the first serious reform in our country (some say it was a copy of the Kosygin-Brezhnev reform) which was strangled by those who ordered it, the holders of the state-party monopoly. Gligorov discusses this at length in his marathon interview in NOVA MAKEDONIJA. Vasil Tupurkovski is still the most popular Macedonian politician, although Tito Belicanac, vice president of the Macedonian government, tried seriously to shake him because he works "alone," "outside the system" (and some people say that he cannot do otherwise, considering that the system no longer exists). Krste Crvenkovski, the strongest postwar Macedonian, was responsible for the "political fireworks" which made Macedonia relevant in Yugoslav politics, but unfortunately only for a short time because it again quickly subsided into real-socialist grayness. It is thought that recently Macedonia was elevated to this level by Petar Gosev, the most striking Macedonian politician in the topical "media war" against Macedonia. Because of his merits in this respect, which are admitted even by anticommunist leaders, and the popularity he has gained, he is constantly subjected to temptations to run alone in the forthcoming elections, although he is the head of the reform wing of the Macedonian communists and he is quite naturally in the ranks of the leftist reform parties.

Assembly Debates Budget Accord, Development Funds

LD1510213190 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1607 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Belgrade, 15 Oct (TANJUG)—No accord was reached in the Yugoslav federal parliament today on debt payment facilities for the least developed parts of the country—the Republics of Macedonia and Montenegro and the Province of Kosovo.

The facilities, proposed by the federal government, are opposed by the most highly developed Republics of Slovenia and Croatia.

The federal government will now most likely insist that the proposed facilities be approved by a special procedure, that is, by a decision of the Yugoslav state Presidency.

The same is very likely to happen with the proposed 22.2-billion-dinar (12 dinars per 1 dollar) revision of the federal budget, which has also failed to be approved by all the republics and provinces.

The overall Yugoslav federal budget for this year is to stand at 97.5 billion dinars, as proposed by the federal government.

Reformist Force Alliance Founded in Belgrade

LD0610171990 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2155 GMT 5 Oct 90

[Text] Belgrade, 5 Oct (TANJUG)—The founding assembly of the city organization of the Alliance of the

Reformist Forces of Yugoslavia [Savez Reformskih Snag.. Jusoglavije—SRSJ] was held in Belgrade this evening, at which a temporary committee and delegates to the founding assembly of the republican organization of the alliance was elected.

Journalist Toma Ognjanovic was elected chairman of the committee, and the committee and delegates to the republican assembly include a large number of well-known personalities—university professors, scientists, journalists, writers, and actors.

After the republican assembly, which will take place in about ten days' time, the SRSJ for Serbia will be registered with the competent organs in the republic and will join the election campaign.

Instead of in the BORBA building as intended, the assembly had to be held elsewhere. Workers of the BORBA printing house, despite the fact that the hall was paid for, threatened not to print BORBA if this meeting was held in their building.

Workers' Strike Halts Publication of HET NAP

LD1310220490 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1928 GMT 13 Oct 90

[Text] Novi Sad, 13 Oct (TANJUG)—The next issue of HET NAP (Seven Days), a Yugoslav weekly in the Hungarian language, will not appear on newsstands on October 19 owing to a strike by its publishers in Subotica (a town in the province of Vojvodina).

The strikers' committee said this evening the stoppage had been motivated by the appointment of Margit Savovic as editor-in-chief of the weekly, which has a 44-year tradition and a circulation of 42,000. The committee said she was unskilled for the job and had spent not a day of her life in the media.

Savovic was recently appointed to the post by the government of Vojvodina, which has been granted founders' rights over all Vojvodina information media by the provincial Assembly.

The transfer of founders' rights and thus also of the cadre policy to a narrow circle of politicians in the provincial government has provoked vehement protests by many journalists and public figrues in Vojvodina.